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PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The fact that the South-western corner of the Republic of Serbia within today’s Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia is inhabited predominantly by ethnic Albanians became a
pressing political problem immediately after the death of Tito in May 1980: Kosovo
Albanians demanded an upgrade of their autonomous province to the seventh Yugoslav
republic. Not only was this demand rejected, but in 1989 Serbian President Slobodan
Miloãevi‡ sacked what was left of Kosovo’s political autonomy. Since then, the Albanian
majority of the region has been under virtual siege by Serbian security forces.
Up to the Dayton Peace Accord of November 1995, the Kosovo Albanian response
to Belgrade’s apartheid-like regime was non-violent. However, a radicalisation process
among the younger generation of Kosovo Albanians produced a massive student
movement as well as a small, but efficient, militant underground. Since the fall of 1997,
inter-ethnic tensions in Kosovo have been increasing at a rapid pace, and by March
1998, the situation in Kosovo has become particularly volatile: from 28 February to 7
March, the Special Anti-Terror Units of the Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of
Serbia cracked down on the Kosovo Albanian guerrilla movement in the central Kosovo
region of Drenica. During this massacre, more than 80 Albanians, among them women,
children, and elderly persons, were killed. In addition, on 2 March Serbian riot police
brutally dispersed a crowd of several tens of thousands of Albanian demonstrators in
Prishtina. The Drenica massacre caused intergovernmental organisations and
international NGOs alike to step up their efforts in facilitating a non-violent solution to the
Kosovo conflict.
The first attempts for such an internationalisation of the Kosovo problem go back
into the spring of 1992 when the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina began. Yet when Belgrade
stopped this initial wave of third-party engagement concerning Kosovo in mid-1993, the
problem was dropped from the agenda of the international community. Accordingly, the
Dayton Peace Accord did not deal with Kosovo. The Kosovo Albanian tactics of non-
violent resistance to Serbian oppression were interpreted by Europeans and Americans
alike as a guarantee against escalation into armed conflict. From early 1996 on the
»Forgotten of Dayton,” i.e., the Kosovo Albanians leaders, laboured hard to put their
problem back onto the international agenda. As soon as some of them called for more
activist tactics (»intifada”) and others even turned to violence, the Kosovo issue figured
again prominently on the agenda of international organisations.
From the fall of 1997 on, virtually all international players voiced their »deep
concern” over what was going on in Kosovo and stressed the urgency of the matter. This
revitalised interest in Kosovo in the diplomatic sphere was paralleled by an intensification
of NGO activities. The result was a considerable number of policy recommendations and
a comparatively high degree of co-ordination among international players in tracks 1 and
2. Nevertheless, the outbreak of inter-ethnic warfare of March 1998 in Kosovo was not
prevented. Since then, on the threshold of low-level but permanent war in Kosovo spilling
over into adjacent countries and regions, prospects for the prevention of further violence
and even more so for a sustainable peace process in Kosovo became even bleaker.
The collective memory of international actors dealing with the Kosovo issue is
habitually weak. Therefore, this brochure—number one in the series ECMI Working
Papers of the newly founded Danish-German »European Centre for Minority Issues”—
attempts to document previous efforts by international organisations and NGOs to
mediate in the Kosovo conflict from 1992 up to the Drenica events. Particular attention is
paid to recommendations by diplomatic actors and other third parties seeking to improve
the present situation, to find interim solutions or to achieve a resolution of the conflict. Not
included are recommendations focusing exclusively on improvements of the human
rights situation in Kosovo.
The editorial deadline for this documentation was 9 March 1998--the day the
Contact Group on Bosnia-Herzegovina emerged as the main international forum to deal
with the Kosovo problem in its »new” and much more pressing form.
The term Kosovo refers to the administrative unit in the South-western corner of the
Republic of Serbia within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) – a territory of 10,887
square kilometres called Kosova or Kosova dhe Rrafshi i Dukagjinit in Albanian and
Kosovo or Kosovo-Metohija (abbreviated Kosmet) in Serbian.
The author is indebted to colleagues in three institutions and networks dealing with
the Kosovo conflict he has been or is part of: (1) The »International Commission on the
Balkans,” founded in 1995 by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the
Aspen Institute Berlin; (2) a group of contributors to a »Kosovo Policy Study” in the
framework of the Conflict Prevention Network of Directorate General 1A of the European
Commission at Brussels set up in 1997; and (3), a group of intellectuals from Prishtina
and Belgrade as well as external experts brought together for the first time in 1996 by the
Bertelsmann Science Foundation and the Research Group on European Affairs at the
Centre for Applied Politics of the Ludwig-Maximilian University of Munich.
Farimah Daftary, Kinga Gál, Priit Järve, and William McKinney of ECMI have been
supportive—and creative--in searching for documents and materials.
Stefan Troebst
Director of ECMI
Flensburg, April 1998
MAP 1: The Central Balkans
MAP 2: Kosovo
Reproduced with permission by the general editor from Kosovo – Kosova: Confrontation or
Coexistence, eds. Ger Duijzings, Duãan Janji‡ and Shkëlzen Maliqi (Nijmegen: Peace Research
Institute, University of Nijmegen, 1997), p. xvi.
I should like to make it quite clear that I believe that the ethnic Albanians in Kosovo
should realize that the province is – and will almost certainly continue to be – part
of Serbia. Any attempt to achieve full independence would not have the support of
the European Union and [...] would encounter fierce opposition from Serbia.
Peter Koijmans (Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands), »The sole solution: restoration
of autonomy and respect for human rights,” Opening speech at the 1994 Conference Kosovo/a:
Confrontation or Coexistence, Kosovo – Kosova: Confrontation or Coexistence, eds. Ger
Duijzings, Duãan Janji‡ and Shkëlzen Maliqi (Nijmegen: Peace Research Institute, University of
Nijmegen, 1997), p. 212.
We think that the international community should adopt a more prominent role in
solving the Kosova question. It should not only supervise and mediate, but also
provide the guarantees for a future agreement, thereby upholding its own self-
declared principles, of which the right to self-determination is only one. It should
show due respect and solidarity for, and do justice to, the peaceful policy of the
Albanian majority of Kosova. It should stop applying double standards: on the one
hand advocating high principles, while on the other hand tacitly rewarding dark, evil
and demonic policies. It should acknowledge that after more than ten years of
discrimination and terror against the Albanians, and after the violent dissolution of
Yugoslavia, Serbia has finally lost its mandate over Kosova.
Fehmi Agani (Vice-President of the »Democratic League of Kosovo”), »Is a peaceful solution of
the Kosova crisis possible?” ibid., p. 205.
Whatever happens, we will have to negotiate, but I’m afraid – knowing our
mentality – that this will occur only after major bloodshed, which would make all
talks useless: in the cemetery, to the best of my knowledge, there is no dialogue.
Milenko Karan (Serbian homme de lettres and psychologist from Prishtina), »Kosovo: from
tomorrow to yesterday,” ibid., p. 176.
INTRODUCTION
March 1998: Rubicon Crossed?
Not too much of inside knowledge of the Balkans was needed to realise that the winter of
1997/98 turned the formerly autonomous Yugoslav province of Kosovo inhabited
predominantly by Albanians1 into one of the most violent-prone crisis zones in Europe. In
September 1997, a massive protest movement of Albanian students gained momentum;
from November 1997 on, an underground »Liberation Army of Kosovo” (UÇK) with an
estimated strength of several hundred fighters increased the number of attacks on and
assassinations of Serbian officials and police officers; and the regime retaliated first by
police violence, show trials, long-term sentences, and nationalist tirades, then by bringing
more and more security forces into the central part of Kosovo.2 In January 1998, The
Economist depicted Kosovo as »Europe’s roughest neighbourhood”:
»You cross no border to get from Belgrade to Pristina, yet as you approach the city a flakjacketed
policeman will inspect your passport. If you arrive on a windy day, the uncollected rubbish will swirl
about you. There are no rubbish collectors in evidence, only police, who spend their days flagging down
cars at random, extracting ‘fines’ for offences they invent on the spot. In the villages around Pristina it is
worse: policemen routinely harass and occasionally torture inhabitants, who answer with smouldering
hatred. This, surely, is the grimmest spot in Europe, the crucible, some fear, of its next war.”3
The activities of the UÇK guerrillas4 who claimed to have »liberated” parts of Kosovo and
in an IRA style made public appearances at funerals5 and were openly applauded by
                                                 
1 There are no reliable statistical data on the current number, structure, and mobility of the population of Kosovo. The
last census taken in the FRY in 1991 was boycotted by Kosovo Albanians. According to incomplete official Serbian
statistics, out of 1,954,747 inhabitants of Kosovo 1,607,690 (82.2 per cent) were Albanians, 195,301 (10.0 per cent) Serbs,
57,408 (2,9 per cent) Muslims (goranci), 42,806 (2.2 per cent) Roma, 20,045 (1.0 per cent) Montenegrins, 10,838 (0.6 per
cent) Turks, and 8,161 (0.4 per cent) Croats. Cf. tables 14, »The number and ethnic structure of the population of Kosova
according to municipalities in 1991 (the number of Albanians is according to estimates),” and 15, »The ethnic structure of
the population of Kosova according to municipalities in 1991,” in Asllan Pushka, Kosova nd Its Ethnic Albanian Background:
An Historical-Geographical Atlas, trans. Muhamet Hamiti (Prishtina: Qendra për Informim e Kosovës, 1996), pp. 21-22.--
Since the 1991 census, up to 500,000 Kosovo Albanians have left Kosovo for Turkey, Macedonia, Austria, Switzerland, and
EU countries. By the end of 1995, 340,700 Kosovo Albanians had sought political asylum outside the FRY. Cf.
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, 1996 Ordinary Session, 5th S tting, Resolution 1077 (1996) on Albanian
asylum-seekers from Kosovo, Strasbourg, 24 January 1996, paragraph 3 (see full text below), and Der Fischer
Weltaltmanach 1998, ed. Mario von Baratta (Frankfurt/M.: Fischer Taschenbuchverlag, 1997), col. 395, where for the years
1990 to 1994 a figure of 400,000 Kosovo Albanians émigrés to Western Europe is given.
2 Yvonne Terlingen, »Kosovo: Show Trials in Pristina,” WrReport, no. 55, October 1997, p. 6; Shkëlzen Maliqi,
»Protest and Survive,” ibid., p. 7.
3 »Europe’s roughest neighbourhood,” in »A ghost of chance: A Survey of the Balkans,” p. 4, The Economist, 24
January 1998.
4 Stefan Lipsius, »Bewaffneter Widerstand formiert sich: Untergrundorganisationen stellen sich der serbischen
Staatsmacht im Kosovo entgegen,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 4 March 1998, pp. 10-11, and idem,
»Untergrundorganisationen im Kosovo. Ein Überblick,”  Südosteuropa 47 (1998), pp. 75-82.—Estimates on the number of
UÇK fighters vary from 350 (according to Western source) to 1.500 (according to Serbian sources). See Marie-Janine Calic,
»Kosovo vor der Katastrophe?,” Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik 1998, no. 4 (April), p. 405, and Zoran
Kusovac, »Another Balkans bloodbath?,” Jane’s Intelligence Review 1998, no. 2, pp. 13-16.
5 On  the »liberated territories” and on the public appearance of UÇK fighters at the funeral of the teacher Halit Gecaj
on 28 November 1997 cf. Guy Dinmore, »Kosovo’s Albanian rebels take up arms,” Fin ncial Times, 20-21 December 1998,
p. 2; Dejan Anastasijevi‡, »Sahrana svake nade: Reporter ‘Vremena’ u Srbici, na ‘slobodnoj teritoriji Kosova,’” Vreme, 4
December 1997, pp. 6-8; Dejan Anastasijevi‡, Tuhina Gjeraqina and Tihomir Loza, »Kosovo Hits Back,” WarReport, no. 57,
December 1997 – January 1998, pp. 4-5; Matthias Rüb, »Auf dem Amselfeld gehört die Nacht den vermummten Kämpfern
mit ihren Kalaschnikows: Ist ein neuer Kampf zwischen Serben und Kosovo-Albanern unvermeidlich?” Frankfurter
Allgemeine Zeitung, 23 January 1998, p. 4; Dragoljub Petrovi‡, »Srbija se brani u Srbici,” Naãa borba, 26 January 1998, p.
10; and Bahri Cani, »Skenderaj nije slobodna teritorija,” ibid., p. 11. See also Chris Hedges, »In Kosovo, War by Night:
Ethnic Albanian Insurgents Battle the Serbs,” International Herald Tribune, 20 October 1997, p. 5.
Kosovo Albanian youngsters and other radicals unsatisfied with the non-violent methods
of protest of students and political parties in Kosovo—»the movement that has made no
move.”6 »Prishtina’s cafes are now full of excitable young men eager to take up arms to
set Kosovo free,”7 so again The Economist on a province where at least half of the
Albanian population is under the age of 25. And the lost generation without a proper
education and without any career chances was growing at a fast pace—with 4.32 per
cent, birth rates in Kosovo in 1985 were are at European record height, and with 2.31 per
cent today they still are.8
On the other side of the barricade, the Chief of the General Staff of the FRY’s »Army
of Yugoslavia,” Colonel-General Mom˜ilo Periãi‡, detected »on the horizon an overture of
a general rebellion of Albanians against the organs of the Serbian state.” He and his two
colleagues in the Supreme Defense Council decided in December 1997 »to set an
absolute priority on Kosovo” and, accordingly to further strengthen the three army
corpuses in the South of Serbia at Prishtina, Leskovac, and Niã.9 In January 1998,
increased activities of Serbian security forces and army were noted in and around
Prishtina as well as in the stronghold of the UÇK, the Drenica region of Central Kosovo.10
This area of some 1,200 square kilometres situated 45 kilometres to the West of Prishtina
with the two municipalities of Skenderaj (Srbica) and Gllogovci (Glogovac) as its centre,
has a population of 110,000--almost exclusively Albanians (98.4 and 99.9 percent in
1991). Drenica is strategically important, since the main road connecting Prishtina with
Eastern Kosovo and Montenegro runs right through it. Also in January 1998, the
paramilitary Serbian Volunteer Guard--better known as the »Tigers” (rovi)—lead by
Þeljko Raþnatovi‡-»Arkan” were said to have returned to Kosovo.11
Compared to the rapid escalation and militarisation of the Kosovo conflict, positive
signs and signals were few and not very significant. On 1 January 1998, the Serb
Christian-Orthodox Patriarch Pavle sent a letter to the Student Union of the Albanian
underground university condemning a crackdown of Serbian security forces on student
demonstrators on 30 December 1997.12 Later in January, a »Pan-Serbian Church and
People Assembly” at Prishtina called on the political representatives of Kosovo Albanians
and Serbs to enter immediately into negotiations. »Only by dialogue can a solution be
found, since a war would be a catastrophe for Serbs and Albanians alike,” the final
                                                 
6 Quoted by Denisa Kostovi‡, »Turning Point in Kosovo,” WarReport, no. 57, December 1997 – January 1998, p. 4.
7 »Serbia: Turning-point?” The Economist, 13 December 1997, pp. 35-36. See also »Serbiens Polizei treibt Kosovo-
Studenten in Pristina auseinander: Einsatz von Schlagstöcken und Wasserwerfern,” Der Tagesspiegel, 31 December
1997/1 January 1998, p. 7.
8 Branko Horvat, Kosovsko pitanje (Zagreb: Globus, 1988), pp. 129-130. Interestingly enough, the birth rates of the
Serbs in Kosovo (2.24 per cent) were almost twice as high as the ones in inner Serbia (1.44 per cent).--For Albanian and
Serbian views on demographic development in Kosovo cf. Hivzi Islami, »Demographic Reality of Kosovo,” Conflict r
Dialogue. Serbian-Albanian Relations and Integration of the Balkans, ed. Duãan Janji‡ and Shkëlzen Maliqi (Subotica: Open
University, 1994), pp. 30-53, and Þivorad Igi‡, »Kosovo-Metohija - a Demographic Bomb in Southern Serbia,” Kosovo and
Metohija: An Integral Part of the Republic of Serbia and FR of Yugoslavia. Documents and Facts (Belgrade: Review of
International Affairs, 1995), pp. 99-103.
9 Vladimir Jovanovi‡, »Kosovo prioritet VJ,” Naãa borba, 13 January 1998, p. 2.
10 Vladimir Jovanovi‡, »’Adut’ za kasnije pregovore. Priprema li se ograni˜en udar na Drenicu?” Nedeljna naãa borba,
31 January/1 February 1998, p. 2.
11 Cf. »Arkan, perhaps sighted, surely wanted,” The Economist, 31 January 1998, p. 30.--The other prominent
Serbian paramilitary formation, the »White Eagles” (Beli orlovi) commanded by the chairman of the militantly nationalist
Serbian Radical Party and major of Zemun, Vojislav Ãeãelj, seems not to be active in Kosovo for several years now.
12 For the text of the letter see »Tu‡i i hapsiti studente je ogreãenje o ˜ast zemlje: Pismo patriarha Pavla studentskom
pokretu za ‘albanski univerzitet na Kosovu’ u Priãtini,” Naãa borba, 5 January 1998, p. 3, and for the answer by the
chairman of the Independent Union of Students Bujar Dugolli »Naã univerzitet je realnost: Pismo albanskih studenata
patrijarhu Pavlu,” Naãa borba, 6 January 1998, p. 1.
document of the meeting demanded.13 And in mid-February 1998 so-called 3+3 Group of
representatives of Serbian and Kosovo Albanian educational authorities met under the
auspices of the Catholic NGO Comunità di Sant’Egidio t  discuss curricula, textbooks and
other highly controversial topics related to the implementation of the education
agreement.14
On the weekend of 27 February to 1 March a battle-like clash between UÇK fighters
on the one side and heavily armed SAJ units on the other, equipped with 20 helicopter
gunships and 30 armoured personnel carriers, took place near the Drenica village of
Likoshan (Likoãan). At least four Serbian police officers and an unknown number of
Albanians guerrillas were killed. According to Albanian sources, the security forces
staged a revenge attack on the civilian Albanian population of the Drenica village of Qirez
(†irez), killing more than two dozens of women, children and elderly persons. Then, on 2
March, Serbian riot police equipped with armoured vehicles, water canons, tear gas and
batons cracked down on a large crowd of Albanian demonstrators in Prishtina and injured
at least 289 persons--among them Veton Surroi, editor of the Prishtina daily KOHA Ditore
and a key figure for several informal fora for Kosovo Albanian-Serbian dialogue. And from
4 to 7 March, the Serbian side directed a second blow against the Drenica villages of
Prekaz i Ulët (Donji Prekaz) and Llausha (Lauãa) where whole families and clans were
killed.15
From Kuchuk Kainarji to Dayton: Historical Legacies
Almost half of a total number of 7 million Albanians live as minorities outside Albania in
neighbouring Montenegro, Serbia (including Kosovo), Macedonia, Greece, and Italy, or
as labour migrants and political émigrés in Western and Northern Europe, particularly in
Germany, Switzerland, Sweden, and Norway.16 The situation is only partly the result of
                                                 
13 Matthias Rüb, »Aufruf zum Dialog in Kosovo: Panserbische Kirchen- und Volksversammlung gegen Gewalt,”
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 27 January 1998, p. 6.
14 Cf. »Albanski ðaci u drþavnim zgradama,” N ãa borba, 17 February 1998, p. 1; »Serbian-Albanian Talks Begin,”
RFE/RL Newsline, vol. 2, no. 36, pt. II, 23 February 1998; and Matthias Rüb, »Washington kündigt Lockerung der
Sanktionen gegen Belgrad an,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 25 February 1998, p. 2.—From 1996 on, members of the
3+3 Group on the Albanian side were Fehmi Agani, Vice-President of LDK, Abdyl Ramaj, Member of the LDK Presidency,
and Rexhep Osmani, Minister of Education in the »shadow government” and Member of the Board of LDK, as a
replacement for Xhavit Ahmeti, also Member of the LDK Presidency, who died in 1997 in a car accident. The Serbian side
was represented by Goran Per˜evi‡, Vice-Chairman of Miloãevi‡’s Socialist Party of Serbia, Ratomir Vico, Minister without
Portfolio in the Government of the Republic of Serbia, and Jovo Todorovi‡, Minister of Education of the Republic of Serbia,
who in 1998 was replaced by Dobroslav Bjeleti‡, director of the Serbian Textbook Publishers. Cf. Humanitarian Law Center,
»Education of Kosovo Albanians,” Spotlight Report no. 24, 16 October 1997, pp. 5-7; and »Measures Agreed on
Implementation of Educational Accord”, Kosova Daily Report #1380, 23 March 1998, item 1, at
http://www.hri.org/news/balkans/kosova.
15 »The Kosovo cauldron,” The Economist, 14 March 1998, pp. 33-34; Chris Hedges, »Bodies Attest to Fury Of Serb
Attack on Town,” International Herald Tribune, 10 March 1998, p. 6; Humanitarian Law Center, »Investigations in Drenica,”
8 March 1998, at ÓöÜëìá! Äåí Ý÷åé ïñéóôåß óåëéäïäåßêôçò. Anthony Robinson, »Alarm bell sounds over Kosovo,”
Financial Times, 4 March 1998, p. 2; Matthias Rüb, »Bewunderung für die Befreiungsarmee der Kosovo-Albaner:
Wachsender Haß gegen serbische Milizen,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 4 March 1998, p. 5; Guy Dinmore, »Serbian
forces accused of slaughter,” Financial Times, 3 March 1998, p. 2; »Policija rasterala demonstrante vodenim topovima i
suzavcem,” Naãa borba, 3 March 1998, p. 1; Guy Dinmore, »30 killed in Serb clashes with Albanian rebels,” Financial
Times, 2 March 1998, p. 1 and p. 20. See also Map of Drenica Massacre, KD-arta, 2 March 1998, at ÓöÜëìá! Äåí Ý÷åé
ïñéóôåß óåëéäïäåßêôçò., and for other internet sources on recent escalation in Kosovo the »INCORE guide to Internet
sources on conflict and ethnicity in Kosovo” compiled by the Initiative on Conflict Resolution & Ethnicity at
http://www.incore.ulst.ac.uk/cds/countries/kosovo.html.
16 Karl-Josef Schukalla, »Nationale Minderheiten in Albanien und Albaner im Ausland,” Alb ien(Südosteuropa-
Handbuch, VIII), ed. Klaus-Detlev Grothusen (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1993), pp. 505-528; figure »Ethnic
Albanians in Southeastern Europe,” Transitions, vol. 3, no. 4, 7 March 1997, p. 25.
post-World War II migration processes caused by urbanisation, industrialisation and
political repression. It is at the same time part of the omnipresent Ottoman heritage in the
Balkans. In the 19th century the Empire of the Sultans crumbled due to severe pressure
by its new Christian neighbour states as well as by some of the Great Powers. »Turkey in
Europe,” and particularly »the Three Provinces” of Selânik (Salonica), Monastýr (Bitola),
and Kosova (Kosovo, the Sancak of Yeni Pazar and the Northern parts of Macedonia),
became the target of territorial aspirations of Greece, Serbia, and Bulgaria. Thus, within
the overall »Eastern Question,” a »Macedonian Question,” an »Aromunian Question” and
others arose.17 Finally, in 1912, the newly founded Albania immediately raised the
»Albanian Question.” The core of this question was, and still is, the fact that the new
kingdom was far from including all areas inhabited by Albanians at that time.18 In
particular, the traditional center of the Albanian national movement, Kosovo with its
cultural centre Prizren, went to Serbia, not to Albania.19 The same was true for other
Albanian populated or claimed towns like Kalkandelen (today Tetovo), Gostivar, and
Prishtina, whereas Ulcinj (Ulqin) on the Adriatic became Montenegrin.20
In the decades to come, the Southern Balkans witnessed a profound change of
paradigm in internal and international relations: first, the notorious »Macedonian
Question” had been answered by a full-blown Macedonian nationalism culminating in the
erection of a Macedonian nation-state in 1991. Thus, in this core region not only the
power vacuum of Ottoman times, but also the ethnopolitical vacuum which had
magnetically attracted the micro-imperialisms of Serbs, Greeks, and Bulgarians had been
                                                 
17 Cf. M. S. Anderson, The Eastern Question, 1774-1923: A Study in International Relations (London, New York, NY:
Cambridge University Press, 1966); Fikret Adanýr, »The Macedonians in the Ottoman Empire, 1878-1912,” The Formation
of National Elites, eds. Andreas Kappeler, Fikret Adanýr and Alan O'Day (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1992), pp. 161-191; and
Max Demeter Peyfuss, Die Aromunische Frage. Ihre Entwicklung von den Ursprüngen bis zum Frieden von Bukarest (1913)
und die Haltung Österreich-Ungarns (Vienna, Köln, Graz: Böhlau, 1974).
18 No concise history of the »Albanian Question” has been published to this day. For the Albanian national movement
see Stavro Skendi, The Albanian National Awakening, 1878-1912 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1967);
Johannes Faensen, Die albanische Nationalbewegung (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1980); and Peter Bartl, Die albanischen
Muslime zur Zeit der nationalen Unabhängigkeitsbewegung (1878-1912) (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1968).
19 A concise history of the Kosovo problem is still lacking. For two partly successful attempts cf. Marco Dogo, Kosovo:
Albanesi e Serbi: le radici del conflitto (Lungro di Cosenza: C. Marco Editore, 1992); and Christine von Kohl and Wolfgang
Libal, Kosovo: Gordischer Knoten des Balkans (Wien, Zürich: Europaverlag, 1992). For 1998, the publication of two
monographs has been announced: (1) Noel Malcolm, K sovo: A Short History (London, New York, NY: Macmillan and New
York University Press); and (2) Miranda Vickers, Between Serb and Albanian: A History of Kosovo (London, New York, NY:
C. Hurst and Columbia University Press). Cf. a review of the two histories by Tim Judah, »Will There Be a War in Kosovo?,”
The New York Review of Books, vol. XLV, no. 8, 14 May 1998, pp. 35-38. For an excellent recent and uptodate bibliography
on Kosovo see [Peter Bartl,] »Kosovo” Bibliographisches Handbuch der ethnischen Gruppen Südosteuropas, eds. Gerhard
Seewann and Péter Dippold (München: R. Oldenbourg, 1997), vol. 2, pp. 1117-1158. For more background studies see
Duãan Janji‡, »National Identity, Movement and Nationalism of Serbs and Albanians,” Kosovo – Kosova: Confrontation or
Coexistence, eds. Ger Duijzings, Duãan Janji‡ and Shkëlzen Maliqi (Nijmegen: Peace Research Institute, University of
Nijmegen, 1997), pp. 117-176 (reprinted in Balkan Forum 3 [1995], no. 1, pp. 19-84); George Gavrilis, »The Making of a
Greater Albania?” State and Nation Building in East Central Europe: Contemporary Perspectives, d. John S. Micgiel (New
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filled.21 Secondly, the »Albanian Question” with its demographic, territorial, religious, and
political implications got out of the control of the neighbouring states. The Albanian
Diaspora of Montenegro, Kosovo, and Western Macedonia started a process of slow but
steady migration eastwards. At the same time, birth rates of Montenegrin, Macedonian,
and Serbian Albanians skyrocketed.
Only once, from 1941 to 1944, when Albania proper, Western Macedonia and the
larger part of Kosovo were under a single regime of occupation--first by Italy, then by
Germany--has the Greater Albania propagated by Albanian nationalism ever been united.
The Cold War then pushed the Albanian territorial question into the background once
again.
Yet, soon after Tito’s death on 5 May 1980, the complicated political and
constitutional construction the man from Kumrovec had found for the Kosovo Albanians
and the Serbs inside and outside Kosovo collapsed. In 1981, Kosovo Albanian
demonstrators openly demanded a »Kosova Republika,” that is republican status like
Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Macedonia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina inside the Socialist
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia—instead of their republic-like Socialist Autonomous
Province of Kosovo (Krahina Socialiste Autonome e Kosovës) according to the 1974
constitution.22 During the following years of rapidly increasing inter-ethnic tension in
Kosovo, the non-Serbian republics of Yugoslavia granted Serbia a free hand to resolve
the matter by way of police repression. That caused Kosovo Albanian radicals to turn to a
new interpretation of the slogan »Kosova Republika”—an independent Kosovo Albanian
state.
The accession of Slobodan Miloãevi‡ to power in September 1987 then brought a
new stage of escalation to the conflict. In the summer of 1988, he pushed through a bill
declaring Serbian the official language of Kosovo, thereby disallowing the use of Albanian
for official business. At the same time, the first mass rallies of Serbs demanding the
abrogation of the autonomy of Kosovo and Vojvodina took place. And in November 1988,
Miloãevi‡ engineered the resignation of the popular Azem Vllasi from the leadership of
the League of Communists of Kosovo and installed Rahman Morina as his puppet.
Protests and demonstrations on behalf of Kosovo Albanians culminated in February 1989
in a hunger strike of more than one thousand miners at the Trep˜a lead and zinc mining
and processing complex. Belgrade sent in the army and federal police and imposed
emergency measures.23 Already on 24 January 1989, a demonstration for »Kosova
Republika” had taken place in Prishtina. In March 1989, the Serbian Parliament adopted
amendments to the Serbian constitution in order to change the status of Kosovo. With
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what Belgrade has called »the 1989 Reform”24 a fake autonomy was decreed. Under
great intimidation by secret police and severe political pressure by Belgrade, the Kosovo
Assembly voted on 23 March with 168 to 10 in favour of these amendments (two
abstentions). This triggered off mass demonstrations by Albanian protesters which were
brutally answered by the security forces and by paramilitary units from Serbia resulting in
an unknown number of casualties. On 28 June 1989, the traditional Serbian St. Vitus Day
(Vidovdan) and the 600th anniversary of the Ottoman-Serbian Battle of Kosovo, Miloãevi‡
gave his famous »No one is allowed to beat you!” speech at a rally of almost one million
Serbs at Gazimestan near Prishtina. Mass demonstrations of Albanians and violent
clashes with the police went on for all of 1989 and the spring of 1990 culminating in late
January with a death toll of at least 27 Albanians.25
In the meantime, the Kosovo Albanian political elite was searching for new forms of
organisation and resistance. On 24 December 1989, the LDK was founded by the
Chairman of the Writers’ Union of Kosovo Ibrahim Rugova, who rallied the majority of the
180 members of the Kosovo Assembly behind him. On 2 July 1990, 114 ethnic Albanian
delegates of the Assembly met and declared Kosovo an »independent and equal entity
within the framework of the Yugoslav federation (confederation) and as an equal subject
with its counterparts in Yugoslavia”26—de facto a secession from Serbia. Already on 26
June 1990, however, the Assembly of the Republic of Serbia had decided to close down
temporarily the Kosovo Assembly and to proclaim the state of emergency over Kosovo.
On 5 July 1990, this decision was made a permanent one, and simultaneously a »special
administration” for the province was set up. Miloãevi‡ even managed to intimidate the
member of the Collective State Presidency of the SFRY to such a degree that they
»condemned” the declaration of independence by the disbanded Kosovo Assembly.27
The dismissal of some 15,000 Kosovo Albanians from their jobs resulted on 3
September 1990 in a general strike with a participation of up to 200,000 people. Serbian
authorities retaliated by preventing the return of the strikers to their work places. On 7
September, 111 Albanian, Turkish and Muslim delegates of the disbanded Kosovo
Assembly convened secretly in Kaçanik and promulgated on 13 September the
Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo. The Serbian parliament adopted, on 28
September 1990, a new constitution which definitely abolished the previous territorial
autonomy of Kosovo and Vojvodina by formally granting a fake-autonomy to the
»Autonomous Province Kosovo and Metohija” and the »Autonomous Province Vojvodina”
(paragraphs 6 and 108 to 112). These moves by Miloãevi‡ were accompanied by an
unparalleled cleansing of Albanians from virtually all major public and economic spheres
in Kosovo. At least 100,000 Albanians were fired from factories, mines, schools,
hospitals, the judiciary, cultural institutions, media, public services, municipal and regional
authorities etc., and replaced by Serbs, Montenegrins, or pro-Serbian Albanians. At the
same time, all Albanian political organisations as well as all cultural and sports
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associations were forbidden and most Albanian print and other media closed down.28
By the summer of 1991, the Kosovo Albanian leadership had firmly organised a
multi-level non-violent resistance movement aiming at the establishment of a »parallel”
Kosovo Albanian state on the territory of what now again was Serbia. From 26 to 30
September 1991, an underground referendum on this »sovereign and independent state
of Kosovo” was held. 87.01 per cent of the voters, i.e., 1,051,000 inhabitants of Kosovo,
were said to have participated, out of which 99.87 per cent were said to have voted
»Yes.” On 19 October 1991, the Republic of Kosovo was proclaimed as an independent
and sovereign state, and on 23 October, a provisional coalition government under the
leadership of LDK was formed with the gynaecologist Bujar Bukoshi as Prime Minister.
On 24 May 1992, elections for the Parliament of the »Republic Kosova” were held under
conspirative circumstances. With a turnout of 89.32 per cent, 96 seats went to LDK, 29 to
other Kosovo Albanian parties, and 5 to »people of Muslim ethnicity,” i.e., the Serbian-
speaking goranci in the municipality of Dragaã in the Gora region, the Southernmost tip of
Kosovo. 14 seats remained vacant; they were reserved for Montenegrins and Serbs from
Kosovo should they decide to take them. On the same day, elections for the President of
the »Republic of Kosova” took place. In addition to 766,069 voters in Kosovo, also
105,300 Kosovo Albanians abroad participated. With 99.56 per cent Rugova, the only
candidate, was elected. It was him who now organised the non-violent resista ce to the
Serbian policy of de-Albanisation and occupation since 1989.29
Neither in 1989 and 1990, nor during the critical year of 1991 or later did Rugova
tolerate or even undertake steps to a militarily backed secession or called on
neighbouring Albania to support (re-)unification by force. Thus, he gained an immense
amount of political goodwill in the West, where, however, LDK's ultimate goal--a
sovereign, independent »Kosova Republika” outside the FRY—was deliberately ignored.
Yet Rugova had no success in reversing Belgrade's apartheid policies in Kosovo itself.
Instead, the official Serbian regime of occupation and the institutions built up by the
Kosovo Albanians developed into two completely separate »states” on one and the same
territory. Since 1992, in Kosovo has existed an Albanian »shadow state” with its own
parliament, government, and president as well as its own financial, educational and
health care systems, all financed by a fiscal system based on a three-percent tax on the
monthly incomes of the Kosovo Albanian labour emigration in Western Europe. In
addition, Kosovo Albanian print media, news agencies, publishing houses etc. were re-
established, and a purely Albanian second-class economy of petty businesses
emerged.30 The authorities at Belgrade tolerated most of the parallel structures built up by
the Kosovo Albanians. Neither did the enforce the collection of taxes nor insist on the
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recruitment of Albanians for the army. This far-reaching separation of Serbian and
Albanian societies and »states” contributed to the low degree of political friction. Sensitive
issues, however, remained—the issuing of birth certificates, passports, or drivers’
licences and other legal matter like selling, buying and inheriting of landed property and
real estate.
Turning of the Tide: The Dayton Shock
For several years the rather low degree of friction and the appar nt stability of the
Serbian-Albanian dualism in Kosovo stunned outside observers and analysts.31 Yet, the
Peace Agreement achieved at the Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in Dayton, Ohio, on
21 November 1995 and signed in Paris on 14 December, has made the volatility of this
unique model of hostile coexistence more than obvious. The LDK was not present at the
negotiation table in Ohio and the Kosovo problem was mentioned in the final treaty only
once, in connection with preconditions for lifting the »outer wall of sanctions” against the
FRY.32 This »outer wall of sanctions” relates to full diplomatic recognition of the FRY; full
membership of the FRY in international organisations like UN and OSCE and in
international financial institutions like the World Bank and the IMF as well as to the
release of contested assets to the FRY. And despite Kosovo Albanian protests, the EU
unconditionally recognised the FRY while Germany decided to begin to »repatriate”
130,000 Kosovo Albanian émigrés to Serbia. Almost instantly the united front of political
forces of Kosovo split up. From early 1996 on, influential intellectuals like the leading
literary historian and outspoken nationalist Rexhep Qosja challenged Rugova’s tactics of
non-violent resistance by opting for an intifada-type of action,33 whereas Kosovo's
»Nelson Mandela” Adem Demaçi refuted even LDK's goal of »Kosova Republika” by
favouring a solution within a confederated or at least re-federalised FRY. His »Balkania”
(Ballkania), a »confederation or association of sovereign states consisting of Kosova,
Montenegro and Serbia” plus, maybe, the Hungarian-populated Vojvodina to the North of
Belgrade and the Muslim-populated Sandþak straddling Serbia and Montenegro, in
several regards resembled the post-1974 Yugoslav federation.34 In November 1997,
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Demaçi and Qosja together with the Trade Unions’ League of Kosovo and several
political parties closed ranks by founding a »Democratic Forum” as a counterweight to
»the monopoly and the omnipotence” of LDK.35 These Dayton-triggered changes in the
tectonics of »parallel” power in Kosovo have led the three main political currents, the
pacifists, the activists and the militants, to intensify their respective endeavours.36 Since
April 1996, the UÇK carried out assassinations of Serbian police and army officers;
Rugova tried to regain lost political ground by negotiating improvements in the
educational sector with the Serbian leadership; and the Demaçi-Qosja camp has
announced its intention to turn to  »active civil resistance” against Serbian repression.37
The inner-Albanian power struggle is further complicated by a parallel intra-Serbian
rivalry over Kosovo: Miloãevi‡'s »reconciliatory gesture” of signing (but not implementing)
an agreement on the Albanian-language education system in Kosovo with Rugova on 1
September 199638 provoked the reappearance of Greater Serbian nationalists in Kosovo.
The fact that the whole spectrum of Serbian political opposition to Miloãevi‡ was even
more nationalistic than »Slobo” himself, is the reason for the silence of the Kosovo Al-
banian elite during the mass demonstrations of the winter of 1996/97 in Belgrade and
other Serbian towns.39 On the one hand, prominent Kosovo Albanian leaders like Demaçi
criticised Miloãevi‡'s election fraud and sympathised with the demands of the Serbian
opposition.40 But on the other hand, they knew that the ideas of Vojislav Ãeãelj, Vuk
Draãkovi‡ and Zoran Ðinði‡ on Kosovo were much more radical than Miloãevi‡'s
comparatively flexible approach41—even Vesna Peãi‡ was no longer an exc ption among
the opposition.42 And a public opinion survey on the »Readiness of Serbia’s citizens to
solve ethnic conflicts” of November 1997 brought about equally discouraging results:
»An independent Kosovo, or the Republic of Kosovo within FRY, is admissible in the view of only a
negligible number of our respondents. Likewise, very few respondents would accept a division of
Kosovo. A vast percentage (41.8%) believes that the solution is to be looked for in the forcible or
‘peaceful’ expulsion of the Albanians. On the other hand, 27.2% of those manifesting ‘democratic
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tolerance’ would be willing, at best, to grant the Albanians their cultural autonomy. [...] In other words, in
the case of Kosovo is the Serbian public opinion neither willing to search for a compromise nor even for
a minimum democratic solution.”43
The process of differentiation among the Kosovo Albanian elite was not stopping at party
lines, to the contrary: both Rugova’s LDK and Demaçi’s PPK were affected by
fragmentation. Having announced in late 1997 that parliamentary and presidential
elections to the »shadow structures” would be held on 22 March 199844, Rugova had to
face open opposition at LDK’s third party convention in Prishtina on 25 February. While
the convention re-elected him as party leader and nominated him once more as its
candidate for the presidency, Rugova was severely criticised by leading party members
for his attempt to strengthen his position as party leader by a change of LDK’s statutes.
Under protest fifteen members of the party leadership, among them LDK vice-chairman
and founding member Hydayet Hyseini, left the convention and announced their decision
to leave the party.45 Ambivalent was the position of another former vice-chairman, the
respected Professor Agani. Although he did not openly criticise Rugova, LDK’s Main
Board on 15 March 1998 did not reelect him as vice-chairman and not even as a member
of the fifteen-member LDK Presidency. He kept, however, playing an important role as
LDK’s chief negotiator with Belgrade.46
Also in the PPK dissent was gaining ground. After having been nominated a
candidate for the presidency, party leader Demaçi refused to run for the post since he
»did not want to play around with the fate of his people” and »did not want to cheat the
Albanians with illusions.”47
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PRISHTINA AND BELGRADE:
SIX PROGRAMMES
Since 1991, Serbian and Kosovo Albanian politicians and intellectuals have come up with
a number of projects and proposals for the future status of Kosovo. While the ideas
propagated by radicals and extremists in Belgrade and Prishtina are not surprisingly
incompatible, there are some proposals on both sides that indeed have the potential to be
used as a starting point once a negotiation process develops.
»1974 (Plus)”
One of these is the Kosovo autonomy statute of the 1974-1989 period, when Kosovo and
Vojvodina were subjects of the Yugoslav federation as well as autonomous provinces
inside the Yugoslav Republic of Serbia with a status de facto equal to that of the six
»regular” republics of Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro, and
Macedonia. Today, however, all political groupings in Kosovo agree that a simple return
to the 1974 autonomy is unacceptable, since in their view the two-republic FRY of 1997 is
a construction fundamentally different from Tito's six-republic SFRY. Still, an offer for
1974-type autonomy by either Miloãevi‡ or the opposition could be the starting point for
substantial Serbian-Albanian dialogue. If, in particular, Belgrade would wrap such a
proposal into a post-Titoist gift paper to make it look different from the 1974
predecessor,48 the restoration of the constitutional status quo ante of 1989 would most
probably not be flatly turned down by Prishtina. Here, the Spanish model of a »State of
Autonomies”--an extended autonomy for Kosovo in concert with other autonomous units
like Vojvodina and/or Sandþak as proposed by a Greek research project on conflict
prevention in Kosovo49--could make sense. So far, neither the Serbian regime nor the
opposition have seriously tackled the issue: both fear that they will have Serbian
nationalist sentiment against them, while both obviously consider the Western goodwill to
be gained by such a move of lesser importance.
»Kosova Republika”
»No ‘special status’, no third republic, but only independence!” has been the official
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pacificazione etnica per l’area centrale danubiana?/Das Autonomiestatut für Trentino-Südtirol: ein Modell für die Befriedung
ethnischer Konflikte im mittleren Donauraum? (Milano, Berlin: Franco Angeli, Duncker & Humblot, 1996), pp. 63-71 and 226-
234. For a lucid critical treatment of the Trentino-South Tyrolean issues cf. Ruth Lapidoth, Autonomy - Flexible Solutions to
Ethnic Conflicts (Washington, D. C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1997), pp. 100-112.
49 Cf. for the results Thanos Veremis, »Avoiding Another Balkan War: Strategy on Conflict Prevention in Kosovo,”
Review of International Affairs 48 (1997), pp. 5-8.
programme of the LDK since the referendum of 199150 and is by now the sole
interpretation of »Kosova Republika.” However, »Albanians would accept a transitional
period of two years under an international protectorate during which a referendum on its
status will be organised,” Rugova underlined once again on 2 February 1998.51 While
Rugova’s non-violent tactics have been welcomed by the international community, his
maximalist programme was—and still is--decidedly detested.
»Balkania”
A compromise solution in-between independence and 1974 autonomy is Demaçi's March
1997 proposal of a confederation on the territory of today’s FRY.52 His »Balkania” would
profoundly reduce Belgrade’s position while leaving international borders intact. By
strengthening the position of Kosovo and Montenegro, probably also of Vojvodina and
Sandþak, Serbian predominance over the FRY would be balanced. Whether the Serbian
political elite is prepared for such a profound restructuring based not on nationalism but
on raison d'état is as unlikely as the willingness of most Kosovo Albanians to remain
under the same roof with the present oppressor.53
Partition
While for Kosovo Albanians the status of a republic inside a new »Balkania” is at the most
a second-best solution, the Serbian political class has started to discuss its own second
best option--a partition of Kosovo either along ethnic, religious, »historical” or geo-
economic lines or, even more likely, along a maximalist combination of all of them. By the
constant redrawing of municipality borders and by the creation of new municipalities in
Kosovo before 1974 and again from 1987 on, Belgrade has already carved out as many
as Serbian-dominated municipalities as possible. Today there are six municipalities with
an absolute non-Albanian majority—Zveçan/Zve‡an, Zubinpotok/Zubin Potok,
Leposaviqi/Leposavi‡, Novobërdë/Novo Brdo, Shtërpce/Ãtrpce, and Gora—instead of
one in 1981.54 When presented to the Serbian public by the president of the Serbian
Academy of Sciences and Fine Arts Aleksandar Despi‡ in July 1996, the partition
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in the book by Roux, Les Albanais en Yougoslavie, p. 400.
proposal came as a shock to Serbian nationalists of all shades.55 Th  idea to hand over
parts of the »Serbian Jerusalem” to »infidels” was perceived as treason and national
shame; the »advantage” of getting rid of a 30 per cent share of a minority population of
Muslim, Albanian-speaking non-Serbs which the architects of the partition project had in
mind did not convince the Serbian political class. For the Kosovo Albanians on the other
hand, partition was equally out of the question.
Regionalisation
In early 1997, Miloãevi‡’s coalition partner, the New Democracy Party (Nova
Demokracija), propagated a »Project for the Settlement of the Serbian-Albanian Issue in
Kosovo and Metohija (Kosovo)” aiming at a devolution of centralist rule. By a »’step-by-
step’ formula” a »basic political agreement between Serbs and ethnic Albanians from
Kosovo concerning basic principles and regulations regarding life in common within
Serbia and FR Yugoslavia” was to be achieved:
»As part of the regionalization of Serbia, each of the regions should be enabled to express its own
specific characteristics, with broad autonomy for Kosovo and Metohija (Kosovo) as a region within
Serbia and consequently within FR Yugoslavia as well.”56
Similar projects were presented to the Serbian public by the oppositional Social-
Democratic Party—»a Kosovo Region, within a decentralized and democratic Serbia,"57
and most recently in January 1998 by the Democratic Party of Serbia in its »Proposal for
a Democratic Solution to the Question of Kosovo and Metohija.”58
Another variety of the concept of regionalisation, yet with elements of the partition
plan, has been put forward by the nationalist Serbian Resistance Movement (Srpski
pokret otpora) of Montenegrins and Serbs from Kosovo led by Mom˜ilo Trajkovi‡: Kosovo
should be split into a Serbian and an Albanian part both of which should, however, remain
inside Serbia. In this view, »Kosovo and Metochia should be divided in two regions [...] on
the basis of geographic, economic, and historical criteria. Each region should consist of
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57 Duãan Janji‡, »Serbs and Albanians Between War and Dialogue,” Kosovo – Kosova. Confrontation or
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58 »Regionalizacija – izlaz iz kosovske krize. Demokratska Stranka Srbije predstavlila deklaraciju o Kosovu i Metohiji,”
Nedeljna naãa borba, 31 January/1 February 1998, p. 2.
500,000 – 1,000,000 population.”59 Obviously, the economically more important northern
half of Kosovo should become a Serbian stronghold, while the weaker South would be
dominated by Albanians.
Ethnic Cleansing
Although not proclaimed publicly even by militant Serbian nationalists, the project of
cleansing parts or even all of Kosovo of its Albanian population is on the hidden agenda
of the regime and the nationalist opposition alike. In the view of the Drenica massacre
which caused among else the long-term displacement of at least 17,000 people,60 th
project of expelling up to 2 million people from their homes and of driving them into
neighbouring Albania and Macedonia seems less much less utopic than it did before. The
explanation of the Drenica events by the Kosovo Albanian Presidency as aiming at
driving the Albanians out of Kosovo61, cannot be rejected offhand. The same goes for the
plan of a »resettlement of the population” of Kosovo ascribed to Miloãevi‡ even by
moderate Kosovo Albanian observers. The journalist Surroi suspects that »between
700,000 and 1 million people would have to be moved from the north-east toward the
south-west” of Kosovo in case the Serbian regime tried to stage a partition of the region.62
The risk for Belgrade seems to be manageable: As the reaction of the international
community to the Drenica massacre has demonstrated, swift and robust Western
intervention in Kosovo is unlikely. Also, a partial or complete cleansing of Kosovo would
probably not take more than several weeks. It would be followed or paralleled by a more
drawn-out and only partly voluntary process of »resettlement” by Montenegrins and Serbs
who since the 1970s had left the region for the urban centres of Serbia, and by Serbian
refugees from the Krajina, Eastern Slavonia and other parts of Croatia as well as from
Bosnia and Herzegovina. Equally, a return to the system of military colonist settlement
practised with considerable success in interwar Yugoslavia can be thought of. It can be
assumed that the Turkish minority in Kosovo, the Roma (including the so-called
»Egyptians”) and the Serbian-speaking Muslims in the Gora region would be cleansed
together with the Albanians.
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BELGRADE AND PRISHTINA:
FOUR SCENARIOUS
Since none of the programmes outlined above is acceptable to both sides, four other
scenarios can claim various degrees of likelihood.
Full-fledged Armed Conflict in Kosovo
From the spring of 1996 on, the danger of warfare between Albanian insurgents and
Serbian security forces has been increasing; in late 1997 it became imminent; and by
March 1998 it materialised if not for all of Kosovo, then at least on the regional level.
While the military results of fighting between security forces and guerrilla-type formations
are difficult to predict, its ethnodemographic outcome is easier to forecast. Undoubtedly,
the number of ethnic Albanians actually living in Kosovo will be severely reduced due to
refugee movements into other parts of the FRY, Macedonia, Albania, and, via
Macedonia, overseas—no longer to Pakistan and New Zealand, as an UNHCR
contingency plan from late 1992 had foreseen,63 but through »corridors” via Skopje-
Gevgelija, Tetovo-Debar and Kukës-Shkodër into the EU countries Greece and Italy. For
several years, Macedonia and since more recently also Albania are preparing for the
arrival of several hundreds of thousands of Kosovo Albanian refugees.64 In such a case,
not only women, children, and elderly persons will try to flee Kosovo, but also large
portions of its adult male population will be forced to seek shelter abroad. Independently
from what the final outcome of an Albanian-Serbian military confrontation in Kosovo will
be, the ethnodemographic balance sheet of Kosovo will be changed to the disadvantage
of the Albanian majority. Equally destructive will be the effects of military confrontation for
the Serbian side: to control the Kosov  Albanians during the phase of non-violent resi-
stance by permanently stationing a minimum of 20,000 security fores in and around
Kosovo was difficult and expensive,65 but it did not lead to high casualty figures among
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the occupation troops. Full-fledged guerrilla war, however, will demand a considerably
higher blood toll also on the side of the Serbs. Whether Serbian society, war-torn and
politically divided as it is, can shoulder another protracted military conflict is to be
doubted. Thus, the worst-case scenario of ethnic war in Kosovo would have detrimental
effects for everybody concerned--for the Kosovo Albanian majority, for the Serbian mino-
rity there, for heartland Serbia, for all of the FRY, and, not the least, for the Southern
Balkans as a whole.
Montenegrin Uncertainties
In addition to the tension between Kosovo Albanians and Serbs in the FRY, this
asymmetric federation is confronted with another and potentially equally disruptive
problem—the Serbian-Montenegrin rift. Since Miloãevi‡'s election fraud of end-1996, the
strained relations between the two unequal Yugoslav republics of Serbia and Montenegro
have become obvious. In particular, the Serbian president's coup of being »elected”
president of the FRY by the Federal Parliament on 15 July 1997 was vehemently
resented in Podgorica.66 Subsequently, on 19 October 1997, Miloãevi‡’s Montenegrin ally
Momir Bulatovi‡ lost the Montenegrin presidential election to Miloãevi‡’s strongest critic
Milo Ðukanovi‡. Following Montenegrin political tradition, Ðukanovi‡’s pragmatic
relationship to the Albanians of Montenegro was substantially different from Miloãevi‡’s
attitude. And with regard to the FRY’s return to the international community and economic
reconstruction, he was calling upon Belgrade to stop repression in Kosovo, to start a
dialogue with the Kosovo Albanian leadership, to prepare a comprehensive program for
the economic development of Kosovo, and to grant »a certain degree of autonomy.” In
his view, »without a dialogue in Kosovo, Yugoslavia cannot return to membership in the
international community.”67 In more concrete terms, the political elite of Montenegro
reached a consensus that unless Belgrade implements the education agreement with
Rugova and enters into a dialogue with the Kosovo Albanians, Montenegrin recruits to
the Army of Yugoslavia should no longer be sent to Kosovo.68 In the Serbian perspective,
all this was part of a dangerous scenario--the political emancipation of Montenegro and
the newly emerging Montenegrin nation from Serbia and the Serbs. And indeed, in
Podgorica, awareness of the fact is growing that the alignment with Serbia inside the FRY
is »a troubled marriage between an elephant and a mouse.”69 Thus, to shrink the size of
the elephant by increasing the number of mice is of vital interest to Montenegro, and here
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for good reason not Sandþak and Vojvodina,70 but first of all Kosovo comes into the
picture.
There is, however, another and even more dangerous scenario of Montenegrin-
Serbian differences: secession by Montenegro. If Podgorica splits away from the FRY,
then the raison d’être of the FRY would be gone. No Kosovo Albanian leadership would
miss such an opportunity for seceding from Belgrade.
Tense status quo Continued
In looking at the various scenarios of change also stagnation should not be ruled out—
»Kosovo could return to its former state of suppressed rage punctuated by weekly
assassinations.”71 While in Kosovo signs of changes for the better and, in particular, for
the worse alike can be identified, neither improvement nor escalation seem to be the only
possible developments. Non-development or stagnation seems to be another likely
course of events. In 1995, a Western observer described Kosovo as »stable and
explosive,”72 and what may appear to be a contradictory statement has indeed proved to
be an apt description of the situation during the last years there. While inter-ethnic
relations in Kosovo are certainly strained and Serbian authorities have undoubtedly
adopted a colonialist, even apartheid-like attitude towards the Albanian majority
population, the official Serbian state and the Albanian »parallel” state structures until
recently got along with each other with a comparatively low degree of friction. Moreover,
the recent wave of political violence against Serbian security forces by the UÇK has not
yet set the spiral of full-fledged escalation in motion. Thus, the peculiar and highly volatile
modus vivendi found in Kosovo under the difficult circumstances of the early 1990s could
be viable even for some time to come. At the same time, it is clear that due to the
demographic pressure this is definitely not a long-term solution.
Dialogue, Negotiations, Compromise
This last scenario is undoubtedly the most promising though not necessarily the most
likely one. Since the summer of 1992 there have been attempts by both sides to enter
into a dialogue. There have been several series of talks between politicians and meetings
of intellectuals from Prishtina and Belgrade. In the summer of 1996 a negotiation-type
process on educational issues was initiated by the Catholic NGO Comunità di
Sant’Egidio. Although it resulted in an agreement signed by Rugova and Miloãevi‡ on 1
September 1996, it had no practical consequences. Seen from both the Serbian and the
Kosovo Albanian perspective, the gap between the programmes outlined above is still far
too wide to be bridged by a compromise solution. At the same time, the deep
fragmentation of the political elites in Belgrade—regime, nationalist opposition,
democratic opposition—and Prishtina—doves, falcons, UÇK—is an impediment to any
dialogue, not to mention any lasting solution. To overcome this deadlock, the Kosovo
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Albanian leadership has called upon the international community to mediate. And despite
insistence on the principle of non-interference into what is called by Belgrade the internal
affairs of the FRY, third-party mediation in track 2, i.e., by NGOs, has been de facto
accepted by Miloãevi‡ and his Serbian opponents alike. There is, however, no formal
acceptance of any track 1 mediation, i.e., by international organisations or other
diplomatic actors. The same goes for monitoring activities.
TRYING TO INTERNATIONALISE THE
KOSOVO CRISIS
On 26 May 1992, in a situation of extreme inter-ethnic tension in Kosovo, the government
of the Republic of Serbia summoned representatives of the newly elected »parallel”
Kosovo Albanian parliament for talks to Belgrade. The Kosovo Albanian leaders,
however, ignored both this invitation and a subsequent one issued on 10 June. Speaking
for the parliament as a whole, the Social Democratic Party of Kosova (Parti
Socialdemokrate e Kosovës) explained the joint position, saying that the Albanians would
consider only a meeting on neutral soil led by international mediators.73 S nce then, the
Kosovo Albanian leadership with the LDK as its spearhead has developed an intensive
diplomatic, political and public relations activity to bring about the internationalisation of
the Kosovo problem. Official negotiations between the FRY and the Kosovo Albanian
»shadow state,” mediated by an international organisation—preferably by the UN or the
EU—and taking place in Western Europe or Northern America, became for Prishtina a
precondition for all formal meetings with the Serbian side and an important goal for
Kosovo Albanian diplomacy.
While in this regard Rugova and his foreign policy expert Agani have not been
successful so far, they have had more success in raising the awareness of Europeans
and Americans of the Kosovo problem and even managed to keep up this interest during
all of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina from 1992 to 1995. By stressing the non-violent
tactics of their anti-Serbian resistance, they gained a considerable amount of goodwill in
Washington, Brussels and elsewhere.74 Yet it was the possibility of a flare-up of violence
in Kosovo which in the winter of 1995/96 significantly increased the awareness of
international actors.75 And from the fall of 1997 it has become ultimately clear that the
tense situation in Kosovo demands the whole range of preventive diplomacy, early action,
conflict mediation, good offices, and crisis management that the international community
is able to offer.
Yet, for the time being, any internationalisation—be it an International Conference on
Kosovo, official mediation by an international actor in bilateral negotiations, or just active
facilitation of dialogue--is vetoed by the FRY. In Belgrade’s view, the Kosovo issue is a
purely internal affair of the Republic of Serbia which does not allow interference by
international organisations or other governments. So far, the international community has
not been able to overcome this intransigent stand of Miloãevi‡. While the US has adopted
a policy of the stick—the »outer wall of sanctions”--, the Europeans are betting on the
carrot of financial aid to Belgrade in return for »decent” behaviour. Interestingly enough,
neither part of the international community has instrumentalised the fact that there are
32,000 heavily armed NATO-led SFOR combat troops stationed just some 150
kilometres away from Kosovo, another 530 UNPREDEP Blue Helmets in the immediate
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vicinity, on the Macedonian side of the border with Kosovo, plus blue helmets as well as
US, Italian and Turkish military advisers in the northern parts of Albania.
Despite the differences in tactics, there is much US-EU common ground concerning
the ultimate resolution of the Kosovo conflict: no unilateral change of international
borders, no violence, but also no continuation of the volatile status quo with its human
rights violations; instead, a solution within the FRY in the form of internal self-
determination for the Kosovo Albanians, the exact degree of which the parties to the
conflict should define by way of dialogue and negotiations. Since late 1997, the Contact
Group on Bosnia-Hercegovina, the United States, Germany and France, the OSCE as
well as the EU have taken—or announced--new initiatives, and the European Parliament
and the Parliamentary Assemblies of the Council of Europe and the OSCE are
demanding more active involvement. In doing so, virtually the whole international
community agreed that the difficult topic of education should be the first item on the
agenda of Kosovo Albanian-Serbian talks. Yet by March 1998, none of the international
actors mentioned above had formulated a concise policy aiming at bringing about such a
direct dialogue. »International mediation efforts,” thus the result of a recent analysis, »are
incoherent, fragmentary and lacking a concept. They are primarily declaratory and take
place only after an escalation.”76
In trying to evaluate recent initiatives and their outcomes, a look back at what has—
and has not--been achieved since 1992 seems appropriate. The manifold frustrating
experiences of international actors from the outbreak of the war in Bosnia and
Hercegovina on in trying to mediate between Belgrade and Prishtina provide a realistic
background for an evaluation of the chances of current mediation efforts. Moreover, such
an analysis can help to identify the more complicated issues in the Kosovo knot of
problems and the less complicated—and thus more promising for third-party involvement-
-ones. The key problem of primary, secondary and higher education as well as the
notorious status questions seem to belong to the first category, issues like health care
and even media access to the latter.
United Nations
From mid-1992 on, the United Nations have been closely monitoring the human rights
situation in Kosovo. On the basis of the reports by Tadeusz Mazowiecki, former Prime
Minister of Poland and first Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in the
Territory of the Former Yugoslavia of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights,
and his successor Elisabeth Rehn, former Minister of Defence of Finland, the United
Nations General Assembly has kept reiterating five basic demands concerning the
situation of human rights in Kosovo:
»The General Assembly [...]
Noting with regret that a memorandum of understanding on the education system in Kosovo signed in
1996 has not yet been implemented, and calling for full and immediate implementation of that
memorandum,
Noting with concern the use of force by Serbian police against peaceful Kosovo Albanian student
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protesters on 1 October 1997, and the failure of the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
(Serbia and Montenegro) to make reasonable accommodation to address the students’ legitimate
grievances,
1. Expresses its deep concern about all violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms in
Kosovo, in particular the repression of the ethnic Albanian population and discrimination against it, as
well as acts of violence in Kosovo;
2. Calls upon the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro):
(a) To take all necessary measures to bring to an immediate end all human rights violations
against ethnic Albanians in Kosovo, including, in particular, the discriminatory measures and
practices, arbitrary searches and detention, the violation of the right to a fair trial and the practice of
torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, and to revoke all discriminatory legislation,
in particular that which has entered into force since 1989;
(b) To release all political prisoners, and cease the persecution of political leaders and
members of local human rights organizations;
(c) To allow the return in safety and dignity of Albanian refugees from Kosovo to their homes;
(d) To allow the establishment of genuine democratic institutions in Kosovo, including the
parliament and the judiciary, and respect the will of its inhabitants as the best means of preventing
the escalation of the conflict there;
(e) To allow the reopening of educational, cultural and scientific institutions of the ethnic
Albanians;
3. Urges the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) to pursue
constructive dialogue with the representatives of ethnic Albanians of Kosovo.
 
4. Welcomes the visits to Kosovo of the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights in
the Territory of former Yugoslavia and her relevant report, and calls upon her to continue to monitor
closely the human rights situation in Kosovo and to continue to pay due attention to that matter in
her reporting;
 
5. Urges the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) to allow the
immediate unconditional return of the long-term mission of the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe to Kosovo [...].”77
In 1996, Elisabeth Rehn added that she »believes that international monitors in Kosovo
[...] could have a beneficial impact,”78 and in December 1997 she considered »a much
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stronger international presence necessary,” since »the situation in Kosovo is alarming.”79
This assessment was shared by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Mary
Robinson, who in January 1998 expressed her »deep concern on the recent increase of
violence” in Kosovo80--a view she repeated in early March in the light the Drenica events.
»This is very, very worrying and could have a wider impact in the whole region,” she
observed, and added: »We keep talking, both at the U. N. and at the international level,
about lessons learned—but we don’t learn the lessons!”81
Less intense has been the interest of the UN Security Council in the Kosovo issue.
In the framework of the division of labour between the UN and the CSCE concerning the
post-Yugoslav imbroglio, Kosovo ended up within the sphere of responsibility of the latter
organisation. However, when CSCE was forced out of the FRY in the summer of 1993,
the UN Security Council on 9 August at its 3262nd meeting chaired by US Ambassadress
at the UN Madeleine K. Albright dealt with the problem of Kosovo. Albeit the
representative for China underlined the importance of »the principle of non-interference in
the internal affairs of sovereign States” and labelled accordingly »the issue of Kosovo [...]
an internal affair of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia”82 the Council with 14 votes in
favour—including the Russian Federation--, none against and only China abstaining
adopted a Resolution calling for a return of the CSCE to Prishtina:
»The Security Council [...],
Bearing in mind that the CSCE missions of long duration are an example of preventive diplomacy
undertaken within the framework of the CSCE, and have greatly contributed to promoting stability and
counteracting the risk of violence in Kosovo, Sandjak and Vojvodina, the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro),
Reaffirming its relevant resolutions aimed at putting an end to conflict in the former Yugoslavia,
Determined to avoid any extension of the conflict in the former Yugoslavia and, in this context, attaching
great importance to the work of the CSCE missions and to the continued ability of the international
community to monitor the situation in Kosovo, Sandjak and Vojvodina, the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro),
Stressing its commitment to the territorial integrity and political independence of all States in the region,
1. Endorses the efforts of the CSCE [...];
2. Calls upon the authorities in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) to
reconsider their refusal to allow the continuation of the activities of the CSCE missions in Kosovo,
Sandjak and Vojvodina, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), to cooperate with
the CSCE by taking the practical steps needed for the resumption of the activities of these missions and
to agree to an increase in the number of monitors as decided by the CSCE;
3. Further calls upon the authorities in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) to
assure the monitors’ safety and security, and to allow them free and unimpeded access necessary to
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accomplish their mission in full;
4. Decides to remain seized of the matter.”83
In the years to come, the UN Special Envoy to Yugoslavia and UN Co-Chairman of the
ICFY Steering Committee—until May 1993 Cyrus R. Vance, then Thorvald Stoltenberg—
regularly informed the Security Council on developments in Kosovo.84
According to Serbian and Albanian sources, in September 1993, UNESCO initiated
in Geneva the mediation of an educational agreement for the Kosovo Albanians—an
attempt that within days came to nothing since the FRY insisted on Belgrade as location
for such talks.85
More successful was a joint initiative of UNESCO and WHO of 1996 aiming at a
vaccination program against polio to be carried out via cooperation with both the
governmental and the »parallel” health care systems in Kosovo.86
Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe
Among the first international bodies to deal with the Kosovo issues was the Conference
on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE—since 1 January 1995: OSCE). At the
CSCE Meeting of Experts on National Minorities which took place in Geneva from 1 to 19
July 1991, i.e., parallel to the military events in Slovenia, Serbia was heavily criticised for
its Kosovo policy.87 In early May 1992, a rapporteur mission under the Swiss legal expert
Thomas Fleiner-Gerster had visited Serbia and recommended the sending of monitors to
Kosovo, Sandþak and Vojvodina. The discussion of the mission’s »reports of the grave
situation of ethnic Albanians in Kosovo and the denial of fundamental freedoms to them”
as well as of »the military situation in Kosovo” in the CSCE’s Committee of Senior
Officials on 18-20 May 1992 caused heated exchanges with representatives from
Belgrade.88 The Fleiner-Gerster Mission was followed by a fact-finding mission under
Canadian Ambassador David Peel in late May. On 10 June 1992, the Committee of
Senior Officials installed a task force on the former Yugoslavia which was ordered to
»prepare recommendations [...] on the role that further CSCE missions, of either short or
long duration, might play in promoting peace, averting violence and restoring respect for
human rights and fundamental freedoms in Kosovo, Vojvodina and Sanjak.”89
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At its Helsinki Summit in July 1992, the CSCE not only adopted a Declaration on the
Yugoslav Crisis calling for »immediate preventive action” in Kosovo and urging »the
authorities in Belgrade to refrain from further repression and to engage in serious
dialogue with representatives from Kosovo, in the presence of a third party,”90 but also
provided the diplomatic tools to do so. At the same time, on 8 July CSCE temporarily
suspended the membership of the fallen apart SFRY which since May 1992 was claimed
by the newly proclaimed FRY.
Another CSCE exploratory mission under Swedish Ambassador Jan af Sillén was
sent to Kosovo, Sandþak and Vojvodina in early August, and on 14 August 1992,
following the strong advice of the USA, the Committee of Senior Officials decided »to
establish, in co-operation with the relevant authorities, a continuous presence in Kosovo,
Sanjak and Vojvodina, in the form of missions of long duration”:
»The missions will:
- promote dialogues between the authorities concerned and representatives of the populations and
communities in the three regions;
- collect information on all aspects relevant to violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms
and promote solutions to such problems;
- establish contact points for solving problems that might be identified;
- assist in providing information on relevant legislation on human rights, protection of minorities, free
media and democratic elections.”91
From 2 to 8 September 1992, the Head of Mission, Norwegian diplomat Tore Bøgh and
his personal advisor Kåre Eltervag, also Norway, carried out a reconnaissance trip and
on 9 September negotiated with authorities at Belgrade to set up a mission coordination
centre there. On 11 and 12 September the two diplomats proceeded to Kosovo.92 On 17
September 1992, the Committee of Senior Officials requested Bøgh to »begin
immediately with the establishment of a continuous presence in the three regions.”93
Accordingly, outposts in Prishtina under Canadian diplomat Philipp Hahn (from early
February 1993 on with a permanent presence in the Kosovo towns of Peja/Pe‡ and
Prizren), in Novi Pazar (with a branch in Prijepolje), and in Subotica were set up and
manned by 12 mission members.94 Close coordination with ICFY’s Kosovo activities was
ensured. At the same time as the CSCE Mission of Long Duration to Kosovo, Sanjak and
Vojvodina, a CSCE Spillover Monitor Mission to the former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia was sent under US diplomat Robert Frowick to Skopje.95
The decision to let the missions into the FRY was made by US-American
businessman of Serbian origin Milan Pani‡, who as the candidate of the newly elected
FRY President Dobrica †osi‡ on 14 July 1992 took over the office of Federal Prime
Minister. In August, Pani‡ had met with Rugova in London. He promised the restoration
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of self-rule for the Kosovo Albanians, the readmittance of Albanians to Prishtina
University, the reinstallment of Albanians professors, freedom for the Albanian press and
free elections.96
During the so-called »Pani‡ Interlude,” conditions for CSCE mediation in Kosovo
looked rather promising. On 26 September 1992 mission members Robert Norman and
Peter Mulrean, both from the US, reported to Bøgh on a trip to Prishtina:
»On September 24-25, members of the CSCE Mission of long duration met in Prishtina, Kosovo, with
leaders of the Albanian opposition and the Serbian Republic Government in Kosovo.
Both sides expressed a willingness to engage in dialogue. It was clear, however, that for now
they are entrenched in diametrically opposed positions on the fundamental political questions of the
status of Kosovo in Serbia.
There is some hope as to developing dialogue on the current stand-off in the education system.
Teaching of an Albanian curriculum with Albanian as the language of instruction has been outlawed by
Belgrade and has been replaced by a Serbian curriculum. This is unacceptable to the Albanian students
who are boycotting the school system at all levels.
The federal government last week proposed a 14-point plan to the Albanians to resolve the
educational crisis. Albanian leaders told us the political framework of the proposal was unacceptable—it
includes a statement that Kosovo is an integral part of Serbia and refers to Albanians as a minority
population—but indicated some of the points left room for discussion. We urged them to respond to
these points. They promised to prepare either a response to the federal proposal or a counter-proposal,
which we offered to communicate to the federal government.
The Serbian Republic officials promised full cooperation with the CSCE mission, offering an open
invitation to visit prisons, hospitals, police facilities, factories, etc.
The visit of the Mission to Kosovo was reported in the local and national media, as well as in the
Albanian opposition newspaper.”97
On 28 October 1992, Ambassador Bøgh signed a Memorandum of Understanding with
the Federal Government in Belgrade regulating mission activities and prerogatives.
Although the »Pani‡ Interlude” had ended in December 1992, in a Protocol of 29 April
1993 the FRY still under the †osi‡ Presidency agreed to extend the missions’ initial six-
month mandate until 28 June 1993. Already in early 1993, the Kosovo branch of the
missions had been enlarged by eight more members.
In July 1992, Vienna and Belgrade had agreed that the question of the suspended
participation of the FRY in the CSCE would be reconsidered in case the missions did not
report major human rights violation during the first twelve months of its operation. In the
light of Belgrade’s support for the Bosnian Serbs’ ethnic cleansing campaign, the CSCE
considered re-admittance of the FRY to be a wrong political signal—despite the fact that
the missions of long duration indeed did not report gross violations by Serbian authorities
in Kosovo, Vojvodina, and Sandþak. Having succeeded in forcing the Federal Assembly
on 1 June 1993 to remove the independently minded FRY President †osi‡ and to replace
him by the yes-man Zoran Lili‡, Miloãevi‡ had free hands to use the CSCE’s intransigent
stance as a pretext to get rid of the missions of long duration. On 2 July he interdicted the
prolonging the visas of mission members, and by 28 July the missions had to leave the
country.98
In his last report of 29 June, the Head of Mission gave a gloomy picture of the
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achievements and failures of the Kosovo branch of the missions:
»It is abundantly clear that Belgrade has not been able to cope with the crisis in Kosovo, a long-
standing problem which it has exacerbated with its own actions. In the circumstances some
government circles, after initial hesitations, have expressed increasing satisfaction with the presence
and activities of the CSCE Missions of Long Duration there. Its mandate to promote dialogue with
recalcitrant Albanians provides another avenue to influence more moderate Albanians and to pursue
opportunities for an eventual accommodation under a regime of increased autonomy. [...] Albanian
leaders have not been greatly concerned about CSCE efforts to promote dialogue with Serbia. In
drawn-out educational talks and more recently in the negotiations to retain an independent press, they
have been less flexible than their Serbian counterparts. The latter have offered significant concessions
but asked in return for some form of acknowledgement of Serbian law and order. The former rejected
all conditions that in the narrow and at times inconsistent perception of their people could be interpreted
as acceptance of Serbian sovereignty over Kosovo. They perceive their benefit from the CSCE
presence in terms of exposing and ameliorating human rights violations committed by the Serbian
administration. Albanians see some benefit in the Missions’ work but not nearly enough in terms of their
needs. Sustained police criminality as well as numerous other instances of Serbian discrimination and
disrespect of law and order at Albanian expense, have become nothing but proofs that Serbia has lost
all claim to their province.
It is clear of course, that Serbian authorities face a dilemma. If they eliminate police repression
the separatist opposition will quickly get out of hand by mounting unpalatable initiatives such as
convoking the parallel assembly that is waiting in the wings. If they continue human rights violations
their claim along with their capacity to govern the province will continue to erode. Albanian leaders
doubt the long term prospects of Serbian rule and welcome any CSCE contribution helping them to
expose internationally the incapacity of Serbia to fulfil minimum obligations towards its Albanian citizens
in Kosovo. Thus some Serbians and many Albanians, each for very different reasons, perceive
important benefits from CSCE missions and welcome their presence in Kosovo.”99
The leaving of the Kosovo branch of the missions had an immediate and negative impact
on the human rights situation in the region: Former local staff of the mission and other
Kosovo Albanians who had been in contact with the mission were interrogated, detained,
and beaten.100
Without being formally withdrawn, the missions’ activities since the summer of 1993
are at least formally carried out on a provisional basis by the ambassadors of CSCE
participating States in Belgrade, in particular by those of the CSCE Troika. Information
thus submitted to an d hoc Working Group on Kosovo is reported weekly to the CSCE
»Vienna Group” (now OSCE Permanent Council). Since then, the CSCE/OSCE
Chairman-in-Office is formally Head of the CSCE Missions of Long Duration to Kosovo,
Sanjak and Vojvodina.101 During the years 1993 to 1996, at CSCE/OSCE Summits and
other high-ranking meetings »the unconditional return of the CSCE Mission of Long
Duration to Kosovo, Sandjak and Vojvodina” was routinely demanded.102 I  a dition, the
CSCE/OSCE Parliamentary Assembly kept monitoring the situation in Kosovo by
dispatching almost annually delegations there.103 And at the OSCE Lisbon Summit of
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December 1996 heads of states and governments of the participating States declared:
»19. We welcome the OSCE’s continuing focus on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. We express our
expectation that the OSCE Mission of Long Duration to Kosovo, Sandjak and Vojvodina will be able to
resume its work as soon as possible. In fulfilling its mandate, such a Mission should actively contribute,
among other thing, to following developments and fostering dialogue with a view to overcoming the
existing difficulties. Other forms of OSCE involvement would also be desirable. They should include
efforts to accelerate democratization, promote independent media and ensure free and fair elections.
Recalling our previous declarations, we call for the development of a substantial dialogue between the
Federal Authorities and the Albanian representatives of Kosovo in order to solve all pending problems
there.”104
Yet on 6 February 1997, the Danish OSCE Chairmanship nominated former Dutch
Foreign Minister Mr Max van der Stoel as Personal Representative of the Chairman-in-
Office for Kosovo »to closely examine the situation in Kosovo and to explore the
possibilities for ways and means of reducing existing tensions as well as preventing
potential tensions from building up.” In addition, he was asked »to explore the possibilities
for a constructive dialogue on these issues between the authorities of the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia and representatives of Albanians in Kosovo.”105 He was, however,
handicapped by the fact that Belgrade did not allow him to visit Kosovo. Also in Prishtina
there had been reservations against him: his additional function of OSCE High
Commissioner on National Minorities provoked criticism among the Kosovo Albanians
who explicitly consider themselves not a national minority but the majority.106
In October 1997 Van der Stoel had a first meeting with Kosovo Albanian experts and
politicians from Prishtina and—separately--with Serbian experts from Belgrade in
Dürnstein, Austria:
»The consultations were designed as a purely informal and confidential forum. They covered a wide
range of issues including the increase of tensions in Kosovo and the possibilities of reaching agreement
on confidence-building measures that could serve as stepping stones towards a definitive solution of
the Kosovo problem. Various formulas for the future status of Kosovo were extensively discussed.”107
Based on the results of these meetings the Personal Representative made several
observations:
»Regarding the question of a possible status of Kosovo, I note that the Kosovo Albanian claim for
independence finds no international support and that it is strongly rejected by all political forces in
Serbia and the FRY. At the same time, I draw the attention to the fact that no peaceful solution for the
Kosovo problem can be achieved on the basis of the status quo (a limited autonomy). In this
connection, I note ideas put carefully forward by some Kosovo Albanian politicians and intellectuals on
Kosovo as a federal unit in a re-structured federation. One can see advantages of such a solution, but
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also enormous difficulties within the framework of efforts to convince both sides to accept it.”108
The Sixth OSCE Ministerial Council Meeting in Copenhagen on 18 and 19 December
1997 expressed its »profound concern over the rising tensions in Kosovo” and urged the
parties to engage in a »constructive dialogue” in order to find political solutions. The
Ministers called on Miloãevi‡ to cooperate with Van der Stoel and deplored Belgrade’s
failure to grant him a visa thus far.109
The way Serbian police dispersed a student demonstration at Prishtina on 30
December 1997 caused Van der Stoel for the first time to issue a public statement on the
Kosovo problem. It consisted of the following three sentences:
»The brutal way in which the police dispersed a peaceful student demonstration in Kosovo yesterday
gives rise to deep concern. The police actions have led to a further escalation of tensions, which could
have been avoided.
These events demonstrate once more the urgent need to insure the implementation of the
education agreement on which the two sides agreed on 1 September 1996.”110
Having expressed its »serious concern [...] over the rising tension in Kosovo” at a
meeting in Warsaw on 21 January 1998111, the OSCE Ministerial Troika led by the new
Polish Chairmanship sent its Belgrade-based ambassadors on 2 and 3 February for a
fact-finding mission to Prishtina. The Polish, Danish, and Norwegian diplomats led by
OSCE veteran Ambassador Stanis³aw D…browa were, however, not received by
Serbian officials there. The wish to solve the difficult legal problem of FRY’s participation
in the OSCE and thus to become a regular member of at least one pan-European
organisation, seems soon after to have led Belgrade to grant a visa to Van der Stoel for
what was called »a private visit” to Kosovo. On 19 February 1998, the OSCE official
arrived at Prishtina for talks with Rugova, other LDK officials, and representatives of
human rights organisations. Due to the character of his visit, Van der Stoel did not try to
meet the Serbian authorities. But the PPK headed by Demaçi also refused to meet the
Personal Representative of the OSCE Chairman-in-Office, the reason being once more
Van der Stoel’s other function as OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities.112
On 2 March, a press release »OSCE Chairman-in-Office Deeply Concerned over
Armed Clashes in Kosovo” was published:
»The Chairman-in-Office of the OSCE, Polish Foreign Minister Bronislaw Geremek, is deeply shocked
and disturbed by the most recent unrest in Kosovo, and strongly condemns the violence that has led to
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so many casualties. Such violence, whether it be the result of repression or terrorism is equally
unacceptable and goes against basic, commonly accepted standards of prevention and solution of
conflicts. Continued lack of dialogue and understanding can only lead to a further deterioration of the
situation.
Therefore, the OSCE Chairman-in-Office urges all sides to refrain from any further acts of
violence and to start a meaningful dialogue. The OSCE is ready to assist in this process. It will also
continue its active involvement related to the full and unrestricted observance of all OSCE principles
and commitments.
Consequently, the Chairman-in-Office has instructed his Personal Representative for Kosovo, Mr.
Max van der Stoel, to further increase his efforts. He has also drawn the attention of the Permanent
Council to the gravity of the present situation.
The Chairman-in-Office remains convinced that the solution of the Kosovo problem constitutes a
crucial element in normalising the relations of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia with the international
community. In this connection, the willingness on the part of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’s
authorities to accept the re-establishment of the OSCE Mission of long duration to Kosovo would be a
positive step.”113
Although Geremek in his statement explicitly had named Van der Stoel in the capacity of
his Personal Representative for Kosovo, soon after he nominated the former Spanish
Prime Minister as Felipe González as the »Personal Representative of the Chairman-in-
Office for the FRY” and underlined that this »would include a mandate for addressing the
problems in Kosovo.”114 On 9 March, the Contact Group welcomed Geremek’s
nomination of González, and on 11 March the OSCE Permanent Council in a special
session supported the decision.115 Geremek’s move was co-ordinated with the EU which
on 13 March supplied González with an additional EU mandate to mediate in the Kosovo
conflict.116
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe
With the FRY as the only successor state of Tito’s Yugoslavia not being a member of the
Council of Europe, this international organisation for several years did not deal with the
Kosovo issue. However, the Council’s Parliamentary Assembly in its 5th S ting on 24
January 1996 discussed in depth a report of its Committee on Migration, Refugees and
Demography focusing on political refugees from Kosovo in the Council’s member states.
As a result, the Assembly adopted »Resolution 1077 (1996) on Albanian asylum-seekers
from Kosovo:”
»1. The Assembly is seriously concerned by persistent reports from many reliable sources of continuing
systematic human rights violations against the Albanian population in Kosovo, including torture, police
brutality, violent house searches, arbitrary arrests, political trials and irregularities in legal proceedings.
2. The Assembly deplores the ethnic persecution and discrimination which appears to be directed
mainly at those Kosovo Albanians engaged in passive resistance to the Serb authorities, which
suppressed Kosovo’s autonomous status within the former Socialist Federated Republic of Yugoslavia
in 1989, and at those active in the ‘parallel’ Kosovo Albanian Assembly, Government, education, health
and welfare systems. Such discrimination has also resulted in the dismissal of over a hundred thousand
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Kosovo Albanians from their jobs and the ejection of hundreds from their homes.
3. Invoking such persecutions, some 340,700 Kosovo Albanians have sought asylum in several Council
of Europe member states in recent years, for example 230,000 [recte: 130,00—S. T.] in Germany and
60,000 in Sweden. Between 3 and 15 per cent of these, depending on the country, have been given
refugee status under the 1951 Geneva Convention and its 1967 Protocol. The remainder, considered to
have migrated mainly for economic reasons, are subject to voluntary or forced repatriation.
4. When international sanctions interrupted air travel to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and
Montenegro), some Council of Europe countries organised the forced mass repatriation of rejected
asylum-seekers from Kosovo via Bulgaria, Hungary and ‘the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.’
However, the restoration of air travel has not permitted direct mass deportations since the federal
Yugoslav authorities refuse readmission of rejected asylum-seekers unless certain conditions are met.
These conditions, relating mainly to the validity of identity documents, financial assistance and the lifting
of sanctions, are the subject of bilateral negotiations with the countries concerned, which have out of
necessity postponed planned mass repatriation pending their outcome.
3. Consequently, the Assembly [...]:
i. calls on the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and
the Government of the Republic of Serbia:
a. to strictly respect and safeguard human rights in Kosovo;
b. to allow the International Committee of the Red Cross immediate access to all
detainees;
c. to guarantee the return to their homes of rejected Kosovo Albanian asylum-seekers
in safety and dignity;
d. to renounce their plans for the systematic mass resettlement of Serbs in Kosovo and
to respect the principle of proportionality in deciding where to locate Serb refugees so as to avoid
aggravating tensions between the Serbs and the Albanian majority in Kosovo;
e. to accept the good offices of the Council of Europe and the European Union in the
organisation of a population census in Kosovo;
f. to resume negotiations with the representatives of the Kosovo Albanians with a view
to finding a suitable framework for co-existence based on full recognition of, and respect for, the
political, national, cultural, social and economic rights of the Kosovo Albanians in accordance with
Council of Europe principles and instruments;
ii. urgently demands that the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)
allow the establishment of genuine democratic institutions in Kosovo, and respect the will of its
inhabitants as the best means of preventing the escalation of the conflict in the region;
iii. calls on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro):
a. to adopt an amnesty for deserters and draft evaders;
b. to fulfil its obligations to readmit rejected asylum-seekers from Kosovo in
accordance with international law;
iii. calls on the representatives of the Kosovo Albanians to explore every opportunity to find a
suitable framework for co-existence between the Serbian and Kosovo Albanian populations
based on full recognition of, and respect for, their political, national, cultural, social and
economic rights in accordance with Council of Europe principles and instruments;
iv. invites the governments of the member states of the Council of Europe:
a. to renounce their intention to forcibly return rejected Albanian asylum-seekers from
Kosovo, and to grant them temporary protection until such time as the human rights situation in
Kosovo allows them to return in safety and dignity;
b. to organise any voluntary returns in groups under the aegis of the International
Organisation for Migration (IOM) directly to Priãtina airport, after informing local human rights
organisations;
c. to discuss the problems of the Kosovo Albanian asylum-seekers and refugees
directly with the representatives of these groups;
d. to exert pressure on the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia
and Montenegro) and the Government of the Republic of Serbia to respect and safeguard the
human, political and national rights of the Kosovo Albanians;
e. to promote the resumption of dialogue between the representatives of the Kosovo
Albanians and the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and
the Republic of Serbia under the aegis of the high representative responsible for the civilian aspects
of the implementation of peace, referred to in the Dayton Agreement, with a view to agreeing on
confidence-building measures and to reaching a mutually acceptable political settlement;
vi. invites the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) to allow the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) to resume participation in its work with a view to
fostering dialogue between the Serb authorities and the Kosovo Albanians and to sending a long-term
international observer mission to Kosovo in co-operation with the Council of Europe;
vii. calls on the Governments of Bulgaria, Hungary, »the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” and
Romania to refuse to allow their countries to serve as transit points for the forced return of rejected
Albanian asylum-seekers from Kosovo.”117
In addition, on the same day the Parliamentary Assembly adopted »Recommendation
1288 (1996) on Albanian asylum-seekers from Kosovo” to the Committee of Ministers of
the Council of Europe:
»1. Referring to its Resolution 1077 (1996) on Albanian asylum-seekers from Kosovo, the Assembly
recommends that the Committee of Ministers:
i. offer the high representative responsible for the civilian aspects of peace implementation
referred to in the Dayton Agreement the good office of the Council of Europe with a view to:
j. proposing a full range of measures designed to build confidence between the ethnic
Albanian and Serb populations in Kosovo, as well as between the representatives of the Kosovo
Albanians and the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and
the Republic of Serbia, with the view to reaching a just political solution for Kosovo and with a
particular focus on human rights, civil, political and cultural rights, education, sport, health and the
media;
k. the organisation of a population census in Kosovo in co-operation with the European
Union;
ii. ensure, in any negotiations between the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and
Montenegro) and the Social Development Fund of the Council of Europe, that no use is made of Fund
resources to alter the ethnic balance in the territory of Kosovo;
iii. invite the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of Europe to study the feasibility of establishing
a local democracy embassy in Kosovo.”118
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However, the Committee of Ministers took up none of these recommendations.119 The
appeals of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe fell on equally stony
ground in those two member states concerned the most: Germany and Switzerland. Both
stuck to their practice of »repatriating” asylum-seekers from Kosovo to the FRY.120
Yet, the interest of the Parliamentary Assembly in the Kosovo issues soon
exceeded the asylum question. On 13 January 1998, the Assembly’s Political Affairs
Committee approved a draft resolution on »recent developments in the Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia—in particular the deterioration of the situation in Kosovo,” which on 28
January 1998 was adopted by the Parliamentary Assembly.121 The core parts of this
resolution prepared by the Chairman of the Political Affairs Committee, Hungarian
parliamentarian András Bársony, read:
»6. The Assembly, while supporting the principle of the FRY’s territorial integrity, condemns the
continued repression of the ethnic Albanian population in Kosovo which has led to the appearance of
armed resistance in Kosovo bringing the FRY to the brink of civil war. It calls for the instant and full
restoration of human rights and fundamental freedoms of the ethnic Albanian population. The FRY
Government should also enable to international community to establish a permanent presence in
Kosovo and implement the agreement on education concluded between Mr Milosevic, then president of
Serbia, and Mr Rugova, leader of the Albanian community in Kosovo.
7. The Assembly expects the political representatives of the Albanian community in Kosovo
immediately and unconditionally to condemn and refrain from the use of violence as a means to resolve
the conflict with the FRY authorities.
8. It calls on Albania to use its influence on the Albanian community in Kosovo to support a peaceful
resolution of the conflict, to continue its dialogue with the FRY, and to prevent smuggling of weapons
looted during the events in Albania in early 1997.
9. The Assembly is ready to assist in contact between representatives of the FRY authorities and the
Albanian community in Kosovo. The Council of Europe has considerable expertise in the relevant areas,
such as human rights, minority rights and education, which it could put at the disposal of the parties.”122
The declaration was strongly criticised by four deputies of the parliament of the FRY
present as guests at Strasbourg. They condemned the Parliamentary Assembly’s
»meddling in the internal affairs of Serbia” as well as »separatism” and »organised
terrorism” of Kosovo Albanians.123
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The Drenica massacre then motivated the President of the Parliamentary Assembly
Leni Fischer on 12 and 13 March 1998 to lead a delegation to Belgrade and Prishtina.124
International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia
At the London Conference of 26-27 August 1992, the EC Conference on Yugoslavia was
transformed into the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia set up by the
United Nations and the European Community in Geneva. An UN and a EC Co-Chairman
presided over a Steering Committee and several working groups. After an initial focus on
Kosovo, this topic was turned into a side-show dealt with along with other problems like
those of Serbian-populated Krajina in Croatia, Albanian-populated Polog in Macedonia
(Tetovo-Gostivar region), the Sandþak, and Vojvodina.
In the fall of 1992, ICFY’s Working Group on Ethnic and National Communities and
Minorities headed by German Ambassador Geert Ahrens set up a Special Group on
Kosovo, and by means of silent diplomacy tried to mediate between Belgrade and
Prishtina. The fact that on 14 July 1992 Pani‡ had become Prime Minister of the FRY
provided a window of opportunity for such talks. At a meeting in August in London, Pani‡
had offered to Rugova to re-establish the s atus quo ante 1989 for Kosova, and on 9
October Rexhep Osmani, the Minister of Education of the »shadow government,” was
released from prison.125 According to a proposal by the Kosovo Albanian side, the focus
of these talks was on educational issues.126 On 14 October 1992 the Serbian-speaking
Ahrens succeeded in having representatives of the Kosovo Albanians and of the Federal
Government agree on a common statement:
»1. Representatives of the Government of the FRY and Serbia led by the Federal Minister of Education,
Mr. Ivi‡, and representatives of the Albanians met in Pristina on 13 and 15 October with the
participation of the Geneva Conference Special Group on Kosovo, under the Chairmanship of
Ambassador Ahrens. A representative of the CSCE mission was also present.
2. After detailed discussion of the problem of education in the Albanian language, the participants
agreed that the present situation must be changed. They further agreed on the urgent desirability of the
return to normal working conditions for school and other educational institutions.
3. It was agreed that, to achieve this, it would be necessary to adopt a pragmatic approach requiring
urgent resolution, without prejudice to the positions of the parties on broader political issues.
4. The Albanian representatives agreed to provide a list of schools and other educational institutions to
be covered by the measures mentioned in (2); as well [as] a list of teaching plans and programmes.
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5. The Group agreed to meet again in Belgrade on 22 October. At that meeting discussions will be held
on all the issues mentioned with the aim of reaching the necessary decisions for immediate actions.”127
On 22 October 1992, the sides even agreed that the term »education” should cover the
four levels of pre-school, elementary school, secondary school and higher education.
Still, »no agreement could be reached so far on conditions under which school buildings
should be opened, teachers should be reinstated and entrance examinations should be
handled.”128 Nevertheless, the reopening of elementary and secondary schools was
scheduled for 2 and 3 November.129
In late 1992, Belgrade’s position on matters related to Albanian-language education
hardened,130 since Pani‡ had been the subject of severe criticism by Miloãevi‡ and
ultimately had to leave office. When Serbian police arrested the rector of the Albanian
underground university, Ejup Statovci, the dialogue collapsed.131 From mid-1993 on,
Miloãevi‡ boycotted any mediation in this regard by the ICFY for the next two years.132 In
June 1995, however, Ahrens was instrumental in bringing about an informal roundtable
on inter-ethnic relations in the FRY at Belgrade, which was attended by deputy chairman
of Miloãevi‡’s Socialist Party, Per˜evi‡, as well as by LDK Vice-Chairman Agani in
Belgrade. Despite considerable willingness to compromise on the side of Agani and a
certain degree of flexibility demonstrated by Per˜evi‡, no result was achieved.133
Peace Implementation Council and
Office of the High Representative for Bosnia-Herzegovina
The London Peace Conference of 8 to 9 December 1995 decided that »a Peace
Implementation Council (PIC) composed of all those states, international organisations
and agencies attending the Conference, will subsume the ICFY.”134 Simultaneously, an
Office of the High Representative (OHR) was set up to oversee the civilian
implementation of the Bosnian Peace Agreement of 21 November 1995 according to
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Annex 10.
Two of the ICFY Working Groups whose activities were considered as important
also in the future, have been transferred to the newly created PIC:
»The border missions and working groups (notably on state succession and humanitarian issues, as
well as on ethnic and national communities and minorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in
neighbouring countries) will continue their work with their present terms of reference for as long as
necessary.”135
For practical reasons, the two Working Groups have been attached to the OHR, based in
Brussels.136 In April 1996, German Ambassador Martin Lutz succeeded Ambassador
Ahrens as Head of the Working Group on Ethnic and National Communities and
Minorities.
Despite the continuation of the mandate, the transfer of the Working Group from
ICFY to OHR had major consequences, mainly due to the fact that PIC and OHR were
Dayton follow-up institutions and clearly focused on Bosnia and Herzegovina: The
Macedonian Government refused to co-operate because it did not want to be associated
with the »Dayton countries,” and in Croatia the gradual establishment of a presence of
UNTAES and the OSCE made the Working Group’s involvement redundant.
In the FRY, the authorities recognised the mandate of the Working Group. However,
they found out early that OHR had not much political leverage in matters outside Bosnia
and Herzegovina: the High Representative Carl Bildt needed Miloãevi‡’s cooperation in
Bosnian affairs and was therefore not able to pressurise him on ethnic problems in Serbia
considered by Belgrade as being an internal affair the FRY. This was also the reason why
Belgrade initially prevented Ambassador Lutz from visiting Kosovo by not issuing a visa.
So Kosovo has suffered from remaining in the shadow of the Bosnian crisis, from
which it started to emerge only after Dayton. This was particularly apparent when at PIC’s
third implementation conference »Bosnia and Herzegovina 1998: Self-sustaining
Structure” at Bonn on 9 and 10 December 1997, for the first time—and with the consent
of Russia137--the Kosovo issue was mentioned:
»The Council, welcoming the continuing efforts of the Chairman of the Working Group for Ethnic and
National Communities and Minorities, takes note with increasing concern of escalating ethnic tension
elsewhere in the region, including Kosovo and other areas. This has the potential further to destabilise
the region. The Council calls upon those concerned to refrain from activities that might exacerbate
existing difficulties and to strive for mutually acceptable solutions through responsible dialogue.”138
In protest against this statement, the Serbian representatives from Belgrade, Pale, and
Banja Luka walked out of the conference.139
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Contact Group on Bosnia-Herzegovina
Like PIC and OHR, the four-power Contact Group established on 26 April 1994
concentrated almost exclusively on Bosnia-Herzegovina. Only after its enlargement by
Italy and Germany, in May 1996, did it touch upon the Kosovo issue: in response to the
escalation caused by Serbian police actions against the newly emerging UÇK, the
Contact Group demanded extended autonomy for the region inside the FRY. On 24
September 1997 then, during the student demonstrations at Prishtina, the Group for the
first time issued a detailed statement on Kosovo:
»We, the Foreign Ministers of the Contact Group countries (France, Germany, Italy, Russian
Federation, United Kingdom, and the United States) meeting at the United Nations in New York on
September 24 together with representatives of the Luxembourg EU Presidency, EU Commission and
the Office of the High Representative, discussed the situation in Kosovo, the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia.
We voiced our deep concern over tensions in Kosovo. We call on the authorities in Belgrade and
the leadership of the Kosovar Albanian community to join in a peaceful dialogue. We urge the two sides
to create the conditions necessary for refugees from Kosovo to return home. As a first step, we call on
all concerned to implement the Education Agreement without delay and to follow this up with additional
confidence-building measures.
We warn against any resort to violence to press political demands and urge all sides to exercise
maximum restraint.
Regarding the dispute over Kosovo’s status, the position of the Contact Group countries is clear;
we do not support independence and we do not support maintenance of the status quo. We support an
enhanced status for Kosovo within the FRY. Such a status should fully protect the rights of the Albanian
population in accordance with OSCE standards and the U. N. Charter. As a first step to reduce tension,
it is essential that dialogue begins.”140
On the occasion of a meeting with Rugova in Hamburg at the same time, German
Minister of Foreign Affairs Klaus Kinkel announced an upcoming visit on behalf of the
Contact Group to Kosovo. Robert S. Gelbard, Special Representative of the US
President and the US Department of State for the Implementation of the Dayton Peace
Accords, and Wolfgang Ischinger, Political Director of the German Foreign Office, were
said to travel to Prishtina on 21 October 1997. Their visit was, however, postponed.141
In early 1998, the interest in the Kosovo issue flared up again when Contact Group
Political Directors, meeting in Washington on 8 January, indicated that they would
»continue to focus on Kosovo as a matter of high priority":
»The following principles underline the Contact Group’s continued interest in the situation in Kosovo:
• it is for the authorities in Belgrade and the leadership of Kosovar Albanian community to
assume their responsibility to promote stability and a solution to the problems between them in
order to ensure a peaceful and prosperous future for their people. The Contact Group will
support a mutually agreed solution that respects democratic standards;
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• as a first step to reduce tensions, it is essential that a dialogue begins;
• the Contact Group supports neither independence nor the maintenance of the status quo. It
supports an enhanced status for Kosovo within the FRY. Such a status should fully protect the
rights of the Albanian, Serb, and other residents of Kosovo in accordance with OSCE standards,
Helsinki principles and the UN Charter.
• the Contact Group condemns both violent repression of non-violent expressions of political
views and terrorist actions to achieve political goals, and strongly urges all sides to seek
peaceful solutions to their difficulties;
• we call on the FRY to address this question urgently. Making concrete progress to resolve the
serious political and human rights issues in Kosovo is critical for Belgrade to improve its
international position and relations with the international community.
To facilitate dialogue, the Contact Group has decided to consider further the Kosovo issue and, in
particular, how to support existing efforts to implement the Education Agreement, which would be an
important first step towards the promotion of stability. It will draw on the views of all those that have
been working to resolve the problems of Kosovo.”142
At the same meeting, the Contact Group set up its own Working Group on Kosovo, which
met for the first time on 5 February 1998 in London.
According to a Contact Group announcement of 9 January 1998, the postponed visit
of Gelbard and Ischinger to Prishtina was rescheduled for 16 January. After a four-hour
meeting with Miloãevi‡ in Belgrade, however, the joint US-German trip to Kosovo was
cancelled »because of weather conditions at the airport.”143 The two diplomats sent their
apologies to Rugova and
»reiterated that as a first step to reduce tensions, it is essential that the genuine dialogue begins. They
emphasized that the Contact Group supports neither the independence for Kosovo nor the status quo. It
supports an enhanced status for Kosovo within the FRY. Such a status should fully protect the rights of
Albanian, Serb and other residents of Kosovo in accordance with OSCE standards, Helsinki principles
and the U. N. Charter.”144
In an interview with the independent Belgrade daily Naãa borba on 24 January, Ischinger
announced that his and Gelbard’s visit to Prishtina is »delayed but not cancelled.”145
At its Moscow meeting of February 25, 1998, the Contact Group confirmed its
position on Kosovo expressed on 24 September 1997 and 8 January 1998. It noted that
since that time, there had been little progress. The Group reiterated that it supported
neither independence nor the maintenance of the status quo. Once more it instead opted
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for an enhanced status of Kosovo within the FRY including what was called »meaningful
self-administration.”146
The litmus test for the Contact Group’s Kosovo engagement was the Drenica
massacre of early March 1998. At the London meeting of 9 March of the Contact Group
Foreign Ministers Evgenii Primakov, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian
Federation, did not participate but sent one of his deputies, Nikolai N. Afanas’evskii.147 As
a result of US-Russian head-on confrontation, a lengthy document was issued:
»Statement on Kosovo
1. We the Foreign Ministers of Contact Group countries, together with representatives of the European
Commission and the Office of the High Representative, met in London on 9 March to discuss the
increasingly tense situation in Kosovo, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), and the unacceptable
use of force over recent days. The Balkans region has seen too much bloodshed in recent years for
the international community to stand aside.
 
2. We recalled that when we met in New York on 24 September 1997, we voiced deep concern over
developments in Kosovo and called on the authorities in Belgrade and the leadership of the Kosovar
Albanian community to join in a peaceful dialogue. We are dismayed that in the period since
September, rather than taking steps to reduce tensions or to enter without preconditions into
dialogue toward a political solution, the Belgrade authorities have applied repressive measures in
Kosovo. We note with particular concern the recent violence in Kosovo resulting in at least 80
fatalities and condemn the use of excessive force by Serbian police against civilians, and against
peaceful demonstrators in Pristina on 2 March.
 
3. Our condemnation of the actions of the Serbian police should not in any way be mistaken for an
endorsement of terrorism. Our position on this is clear. We wholly condemn terrorist actions by the
Kosovo Liberation Army or any other group or individual. Those in the Kosovar Albanian community
who speak for the different political constituencies should make it clear that they, too, abhor
terrorism. We insist likewise that those outside the FRY who are supplying finance, arms or training
for terrorist activity in Kosovo should immediately cease to do so.
4. We condemn the large-scale police actions of the last 10 days that further inflamed an already
volatile situation. The violent repression of non-violent expression of political views is completely
indefensible. We call upon the authorities in Belgrade to invite independent forensic experts to
investigate the very serious allegations of extrajudicial killings. If these accusations are borne out,
we expect the FRY authorities to prosecute and punish those responsible .
 
5. Our commitment to human rights values means that we cannot ignore such disproportionate
methods of control. Government authorities have a special responsibility to protect the human and
civil rights of all citizens and to ensure that public security forces act judiciously and with restraint.
 
6. In the light of the deplorable violence in Kosovo, we feel compelled to take steps to demonstrate to
the authorities in Belgrade that they cannot defy international standards without facing severe
consequences. The Contact Group has decided to take a broad range of action to addres the
current situation on an urgent basis. The Contact Group welcomes the continuation of consultations
in the United Nations Security Council, in view of the implications of the situation in Kosovo for
regional security. Against that background, the Contact Group:
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· requests a mission to Kosovo by the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
 
· urges the office of the Prosecutor of the ICTY to begin gathering information related to the
violence in Kosovo that may fall within its jurisdiction. The FRY authorities have an obligation to
cooperate with the ICTY. Contact Group countries will make available to the ICTY substantiated
relevant information in their possession.
 
· supports the proposal for a new mission by Felipe Gonzalez as the Personal
Representative of the OSCE Chairman-in-Office for the FRY that would include a new and
specific mandate for addressing the problems in Kosovo
 
· supports the return of the OSCE long-term missions to Kosovo, the Sandzak and Vojvodina
 
· recommends that the Special Session of the OSCE Permanent Council meeting on 11
March arrange for Embassies in Belgrade of OSCE participating states to intensify their visits to
Kosovo so as to provide for a continuous presence
 
· will continue vigorously to support Sant’Egidio’s efforts to secure implementation of the
Education Agreement, and identify resources to assist a fair and acceptable arrangement
 
· proposes the establishment of an international consortium including non-Governmental
Organisations that would promote civil-society building in Kosovo and the distribution of
humanitarian assistance
 
· recognising that neighbouring countries of the FRY have legitimate security concerns
stemming from violence and unrest in Kosovo, will arrange an urgent meeting of the Contact
Group with representatives of governments in the region to discuss the grave consequences of
an inter-ethnic conflict and its possible spillover to other parts of the region. We expect them to
do all in their power to prevent support for terrorism. The meeting will in particular address:
- the possible despatch of a short-term OSCE monitoring group to enhance the ability of the
Albanian mission’s Shkodra field office to monitor the FRY (Kosovo) border
- the possible strengthening of the present OSCE mission in Skopje
· recommends that consideration be given to adapting the current UNPREDEP mandate, and
would support the maintenance of an international military presence on the ground in the former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia when the current mandate of UNPREDEP expires
 
· will monitor the situation in Kosovo by frequent joint visits to Pristina by Contact Group and
other representatives
1. At the same time, it is not enough for the killing to stop; too much damage has already been done to
human life and to the FRY’s credibility. Because of the gravity of the situation, we endorse the
following measures to be pursued immediately:
a) UN Security Council consideration of a comprehensive arms embargo against the FRY, including
Kosovo;
 
b) Refusal to supply equipment to the FRY which might be used for internal repression, or for
terrorism;
 
c) Denial of visas for senior FRY and Serbian representatives responsible for repressive action by
FRY security forces in Kosovo;
 
d) A moratorium on government financed export credit support for trade and investment, including
government financing for privatisations, in Serbia.
The Contact Group notes that the Russian Federation cannot support measures c) and d) above for
immediate imposition. But if there is no progress towards the steps called for by the Contact Group, the
Russian Federation will then be willing to discuss all the above measures.
We call upon President Milosevic to take rapid and effective steps to stop the violence and engage in a
commitment to find a political solution to the issue of Kosovo through dialogue. Specifically, he should
within 10 days:
- Withdraw the special police units and cease action by the security forces affecting the civilian
population.
 
- Allow access to Kosovo for the ICRC and other humanitarian organisations as well as by
representatives of the Contact Group and other Embassies.
 
- Commit himself publicly to begin a process of dialogue, along the lines in paragraph 10, with the
leadership of the Kosovar Albanian community.
 
- Cooperate in a constructive manner with the Contact Group in the implementation of the actions
specified in paragraph 6 above which require action by the FRY government.
If President Milosevic takes these steps, we will immediately reconsider the measures we have now
adopted. If he fails to take these steps, and repression continues in Kosovo, the Contact Group will
move to further international measures, and specifically to pursue a freeze on the funds held abroad by
the FRY and Serbian governments.
The Contact Group has decided to meet again on 25 March to assess the response of the government
of the FRY.
1. Belgrade’s own actions have seriously set back the process of normalisation of the FRY’s relations
with the international community. Unless the FRY takes steps to resolve the serious political and
human rights issues in Kosovo, there is no prospect of any improvement in its international
standing. On the other hand, concrete progress to resolve the serious political and human rights
issues in Kosovo will improve the international position of the FRY and prospects for normalisation
of its international relationships and full rehabilitation in international institutions.
 
2. No one should misunderstand our position on the core issue involved. We support neither
independence nor the maintenance of the status quo. As we have set out clearly, the principles for a
solution of the Kosovo problem should be based on the territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia, and be in accordance with OSCE standards, Helsinki principles, and the UN Charter.
Such a solution also must take into account the rights of the Kosovo Albanians and all those who
live in Kosovo. We support an enhanced status for Kosovo within the FRY with a substantially
greater degree of autonomy would bring and recognise that this must include meaningful self-
administration.
 
3. The way to defeat terrorism in Kosovo is for Belgrade to offer the Kosovar Albanian community a
genuine political process. The authorities in Belgrade and the leadership of the Kosovar Albanian
community must assume their responsibility to enter without preconditions into a meaningful
dialogue on political status issues. The Contact Group stands ready to facilitate such a dialogue.”148
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As this document indicated, the Contact Group was completely preoccupied by sorting
out its internal difference in opinion. There was only little energy to manoeuvre left to
tackle the issue preventing conflict in Kosovo.
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
In matters pertaining to Kosovo, the NATO seemed to follow the lead of the Contact
Group without making public statements of its own on the issue. By late 1997, however,
that partly changed. On 16 December 1997, the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic
Council at Brussels declared:
»We confirm that NATO’s interest in stability extends beyond Bosnia and Herzegovina to the
surrounding region. We share the concerns expressed at the PIC concerning the escalating ethnic
tension in Kosovo and other areas. We call upon those concerned to refrain from activities that might
exacerbate existing difficulties and to strive for mutually acceptable solutions through responsible
dialogue.”149
On 7 January 1998, at a meeting in Brussels, NATO ambassadors expressed »great
concern” about the situation in Kosovo,150 and on 27 January 1998, an unnamed senior
NATO official at the Supreme Headquarters of Allied Powers in Europe in Mons, Belgium,
said that growing violence in Kosovo was fuelled by what he called »the wholesale
transfer of weapons to Kosovo” from Albania—a development which in his view could
lead to regional destabilisation. On the same day Reuters reported that NATO currently
was considering a role for itself in preventing spillover of conflict in Kosovo to
Macedonia.151
On 5 March, the North Atlantic Council issued a statement on the situation in
Kosovo:
»The North Atlantic Council is profoundly concerned by the violent incidents which took place in Kosovo
the last few days, and in particular the Serbian police’s brutal suppression of a peaceful demonstration
in Pristina on 2 March 1998. It condemns unreservedly the violent repression of non-violent expression
of political views as well as terrorist acts to achieve political goals.
The North Atlantic Council calls on all sides to take immediate steps to reduce the tensions. The
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) in particular has the obligation to undertake early initiatives to
avoid a deterioration of the situation. A rapid and full implementation of the Education Agreement would
represent an important step forward.
The North Atlantic Council calls on the authorities in Belgrade and leaders of the Kosovar
Albanian community to enter without preconditions into a serious dialogue in order to develop a
mutually acceptable political solution for Kosovo within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) on the
basis of the principles outlined by the international community, and most recently the Contact Group on
8th January and 25th February 1998. The North Atlantic Council welcomes international efforts to
facilitate this process, including by the OSCE.
NATO and the international community have a legitimate interest in developments in Kosovo,
inter alia because of their impact on the stability of the whole region which is of concern to the
Alliance.”152
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Western European Union
Like NATO, the WEU developed its interest in Kosovo only at the end of 1997. On 5
November, the WEU Assembly adopted a »Recommendation on Europe’s Role in the
Prevention and Management of Crises in the Balkans” submitted on behalf of its Defence
Committee:
»The Assembly [...] recommends that the Council [...] ask the Planning Cell to follow closely
developments not only in Albania [...] but also in Kosovo and FYROM where worsening inter-ethnic
relations are far from reassuring, and to draw up contingency plans in coordination with NATO,
including the use of combined joint task forces in order to be prepared for the deployment of a
European force for crisis prevention and management on the spot.”153
And on 10 March 1998 WEU Secretary General José Cutileiro declared:
»WEU is extremely concerned by the situation in Kosovo, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), in
light of the deplorable violence in recent days.
Today the Council heard reports on recent EU and NATO activities as well as on the Contact
Group meeting held in London on 9 March. WEU supports all efforts to bring an end to acts of
repression in Kosovo, condemns terrorism and calls for a peaceful dialogue between the authorities in
Belgrade and the leadership of the Kosovar Albanian community.
WEU will continue to monitor the situation closely.”154
European Union
From the aggression of the Yugoslav People’s Army against Slovenia and Croatia in the
summer of 1991 on, the Council of Foreign Ministers and the Commission of the
European Community—since 1994 European Union—directed their attention also to
Kosovo. However, due to pressure from Belgrade the EC Conference on Yugoslavia in
The Hague starting on 7 September 1991 did not deal directly with this matter. Later in
1991 then, the EC adopted the view of the Conference’s Arbitration Commission
regarding the status of Kosovo. This body under Robert Badinter did not consider the
formerly autonomous provinces Kosovo and Vojvodina within the Socialist Republic of
Serbia to be federating sovereigns of the Socialist Federal Republic Yugoslavia with the
right to form their own state. While the Commission did not question the right of Kosovo
to autonomy as a non-sovereign territorial unit with national characteristics, it equally did
not recommend diplomatic recognition like it did in the case of Slovenia or Macedonia.
The Kosovo Albanian leadership’s argumentation that representation on the collective
Federal Presidency made Kosovo a sovereign federating unit was ignored by the
Badinter Commission and by the EC.155 Of course, there was also a political element in
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it—the factual similarity of the positions of the Serbs in the Krajina within Croatia and of
the Albanians in Kosovo within Serbia. While EC member states like Germany were
afraid of an encouragement of Krajina separatism by a recognition of an independent
Kosovo, they considered the Krajina issue promising in forcing Belgrade to restore
autonomy to Kosovo.156
From 1992 on, the EC used to »recall that frontiers can only be changed by peaceful
means and remind the inhabitants of Kosovo that their legitimate quest for autonomy
should be dealt within the framework of the EC Peace Conference.”157 And in its Lisbon
Declaration, the European Council stated:
»With regard to Kosovo, the European Council expects the Serbian leadership to refrain from further
repression and to engage in serious dialogue with representatives of this territory. The European
Council reminds the inhabitants of Kosovo that their legitimate quest for autonomy should be dealt with
in the framework of the Conference on Yugoslavia. It stresses the need to immediately dispatch
observers to Kosovo as well as to neighbouring countries in order to prevent the use of violence and
with a view to contributing to the restoration of confidence.”158
More explicit was the Council’s Edinburg Declaration of December 1992, which
demanded »[t]he autonomy of Kosovo within Serbia must be restored.”159
On 30 October 1995, shortly before the post-Dayton deterioration of inter-ethnic
relations in Kosovo, the Council had called »with regard to the FRY [for] the granting of a
large degree of autonomy within it to Kosovo,”160 f llowed by a declaration of 9 April 1996
expressing »concern about the human and minority rights situation in the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia.”161 However, EU did not take a political initiative but followed the
lead of the Ahrens Working Group attached now to Carl Bildt. This became clear a year
later in a »Policy Paper on Former Yugoslavia”:
»As regards Kosovo, the EU fully supports the approach pursued by the Regional Issues Working
Group, which aims to establish a framework for dialogue between Pristina and Belgrade and the
development of confidence building measures in Kosovo. The question of Kosovo has to be solved on
the basis of both the granting of a large degree of autonomy and respect for the internationally
recognized borders of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. In that respect, the European Union attaches
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importance to the establishment of a EU presence in Kosovo.”162
By that time, the EU had diplomatically recognised the FRY due to the FRY’s diplomatic
recognition of Macedonia in the spring of 1996. In contrast to the US doctrine of keeping
up an »outer wall of sanctions” around Belgrade, some European countries like, for
instance, Germany prioritised their national interest of sending back refugees to the FRY.
Here, the Kosovo issue played a particular role since among the 400,000 FRY citizens
seeking asylum in Germany there were 130,000 Kosovo Albanians.163
From the spring of 1997 on, the perception that the Kosovo problem should be dealt
with within the borders of the FRY became official EU doctrine. During a visit by Milan
Milutinovi‡, Foreign Minister of the FRY, to Brussels in December 1996, Commissioner
Hans van den Broek underlined
»that the normalisation of relations between the Union and Belgrade cannot be dissociated from the
Kosovo issue, and, in particular, from the possibility of opening a EU Information Office in the province.
The Commissioner stressed that this initiative should not be interpreted as a wish on the part of
the EU that Kosovo should become completely independent. He said that the Union believes that the
province should regain a certain amount of autonomy, comparable to the situation prior to 1989.”164
For the first time the formula that Kosovo should be granted »a large degree of autonomy
within the FRY”165 appeared in Council conclusions of early 1997.
In the context of the 1995 principles of conditionality governing the EU’s relations to
those countries of Southeastern Europe that were neither EU member states nor
associated to the EU—Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, FRY, Macedonia, and Albania--
the Kosovo problem figured prominently. A strategy paper by the EU Commission on the
»application of conditionality to the development of relations between the EU and the
countries concerned by the regional approach” discussed by the Foreign Ministers at a
General Affairs Council on 24 February 1997 was approved166 an  adopted on 29 April
1997 by the EU Council of Ministers. Closer political and economic relations between the
EU and the countries in question, particularly in the field of trade, financial assistance and
economic cooperation, should provide an incentive towards general democratisation,
respect for and protection of minorities, and market economy reforms:
»In an effort to consolidate peace and stability in the region and to contribute to its economic renewal,
the EU intends to develop bilateral relations with the countries of the region within a framework which
promotes democracy, the rule of law, higher standards of human and minority rights, transformation
towards market economies and greater cooperation between those countries.”167
With regard to the applicability of the EU’s PHARE programme, it was stated that »[i]n the
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case of FRY, general assistance through this programme also requires a credible offer for
a real dialogue on the status of Kosovo.”168 As one of two conditions for the beginning of
negotiations with Belgrade on the implementation of the PHARE programme and
autonomous trade preferences, »[e]xistence of a real dialogue with the Kosovo Albanians
on the status of the Kosovo within the borders of the FRY” was listed.169 And before the
conclusion of a cooperation agreement with the EU, Belgrade would have to prove its
»readiness to cooperate and entertain open, good neighbourly relations with the countries
in the region” as well as to meet a specific condition--”[e]ffective granting of a large
degree of autonomy to the Kosovo.”170 In a footnote, this latter condition was explained:
»The definition of what comprises ‘a large degree of autonomy for the Kosovo within the borders of the
FRY’ should be decided by mutual agreement between the government and political forces in Kosovo.
The parties should aim for a fair legal framework going beyond the respect of minority rights.”171
Another sign of increased EU interest in the Kosovo issue was the setting up of a Conflict
Prevention Network (CPN) under the auspices of the European Commission’s Directorate
General 1A. CPN is a network of academic institutions, NGOs and independent experts
forming a part of the EU’s Analyses and Evaluation Centre.172 Pilot studies on conflict in
Zaire and on Kosovo were commissioned to the German think-tank Stif u g Wissenschaft
und Politik (SWP) at Ebenhausen. On 30 June 1997, SWP presented a »Kosovo Policy
Study” advocating a »three-step approach to gradually increase the involvement,
presence, and visibility of the EU” in the Kosovo issue. A summary read:
»With no solution to its constitutional status the Kosovo problems remains the most intensive conflict in
the South Balkans and could become violent any time soon, starting with clashes between Albanians
and Serbs and spreading into neighboring countries, maybe even dragging in EU and NATO member
states.
Thus, major security, economic, and humanitarian interests of the Union are affected, leaving little
room for successfully continuing the Bosnia peace process and any other stabilization and development
program of the region at large. In light of this background the international community could profit from
a window of opportunity which will be opening after the Yugoslav and Serbian elections allowing the EU
to play a forceful role in conflict prevention.
In this paper, CPN suggests a three-step approach, consisting of short-term, medium-term and
long-term measures, although the different stages will not be fully distinct. The approach is embedded
in the EU strategy on conditionality for the relations with the countries of the region. Each of the
suggested steps aims at reaching concrete achievements by using a mixture of sanctions and
incentives addressed to either the Serbian or the Albanian side. At different stages of the suggested
process the plan also considers the involvement of and cooperation with other international actors,
including the US and the OSCE as well as the Council of Europe. The basic idea of the three-step
approach is to gradually increase the involvement, presence and visibility of the EU.
»Step 1: Short-term measures
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Short term measures should start immediately. Given the fact that international efforts to resolve the
problem have run into a dead end, the priority aim at step one is simple and modest: creating an
element of trust in the good-will and qualification of the European interlocutors, opening the avenue of
dialogue, and finally, establishing a formalized and accepted international presence in Kosovo. The EU
policy, in this early phase, should be guided by a behind-the-scenes approach which is sensible to the
grievances of both sides, but extremely discrete.
Specific measures are referred to: Group of experts, special co-ordinator for Kosovo, extended
diplomatic activity, US-involvement, suspension of refugee repatriation, intelligence on internal security,
cooperation with NGOs on confidence-building, and EU office in Prishtina.
As an incentive the EU could offer to upgrade diplomatic relations with the FRY and/or to renew
autonomous trade preferences.
Step 2: Medium-term measures
The second step of the approach will have to start immediately after the establishment of the EU
presence in Kosovo which will be sometime next year after the Serbian elections and the formation of
the new government. In this phase, the EU could start to play a more visible, prominent, and active role,
aiming at deepening the process of confidence building, with the conclusion of a Memorandum of
Understanding as a final goal.
Specific measures are referred to: Human rights monitoring, special envoy, democratization,
improving living conditions, stronger US role, labour division with other international actors, regional
approach, and memorandum of understanding.
Progress in phase two could be rewarded by assistance in support of democracy through
PHARE.
Step 3: Long-term measures [...]
The primary long-term aim is talks between representatives of the two sides on the future legal status of
Kosovo under the auspices of an international mediator. Trust-building will continue to be the leitmotif of
the EU’s efforts that, at this stage at the latest, need to show concrete results in the more sensitive
areas of conflict. CPN suggests that holding an international conference is not the appropriate way of
bringing the parties to the negotiating table, but rather behind-the-scenes activities and shuttle-
diplomacy will pave the way for initial talks. One might expect that, due to the sensitivity of the issue, an
interim solution is to be suggested, which would leave the question of a final status open.
Specific measures are referred to: Internal security, international mediation, talks on the legal
status of Kosovo, implementation commission, and intensified development cooperation.
Starting contractual relations and intensified development cooperation would be the major
incentives in this phase. This would not only encourage the parties to comply with the agreement, but
also strengthen the links between democracy and development, helping the Kosovars to address some
of their most urgent economic problems.
CPN suggests that the EU should profit from the window of opportunity and launch its initiative
immediately. This would not only promote the development and refinement of a coherent EU-strategy
for the relations with the countries in the region, but would also be a first step towards establishing a
precedent-setting model for preventing, mitigating and resolving ethnic difference on the basis of justice
and respect for human rights. In view of the fact that the ambivalent performance of the EU in the early
phase of the Yugoslav crisis presented a serious danger to its prestige and credibility, given the rapid
erosion of confidence in the EU in large parts of the European (and international) public, a vigorous role
for the EU in preventing conflict escalation in the South Balkans will undoubtedly contribute to
improving consistence, quality, impact and visibility of the Union’s capability in conflict prevention and
crisis management.”173
The study neither triggered off immediate action by the EU, nor had did it have a visible
impact on Brussels. For e.g., the EU Council of Foreign Ministers Meeting on 15
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September 1997 simply repeated previous statements by deciding that the examination
of relations between the EU and the FRY would focus in particular on the
»situation in Kosovo and definition of specific procedures governing a European Union presence in
Pristina;
existence of real dialogue with the Albanians of Kosovo on the status of Kosovo within the borders of
the FRY;
application of the agreement on education concluded by Mr Milosevic and Mr Rugova, and the
possibility of EU financial support;
the question of the return of the long-term OSCE mission to FRY minority regions.”174
Yet the Central Planning Department for External Relations of the Commission’s
Directorate General 1A in a draft paper on a »EU Policy Concept for Kosovo” of 17
September 1997 incorporated CPN-SWP assessments and recommendations including
the »three-step approach.” The paper contained a »5 Point Action Plan” consisting of the
following elements:
»1. – Refining and Reinforcing the policy of a EU presence in Prishtina [...]
2. – Expanding and refining targeted community aid to Kosovo; The need for immediate results and
longer-term consequence [...]
3. – Co-ordinating the approach of the EU with other actors in the region (USA; OHR; OSCE: The issue
of a Special EU Co-ordinator [...]
4. – Memorandum of Understanding as outcome of confidence building measures paralleling the status
talks [...]
5. – Creating the base for longer-term measures and a constitutional agreement [...].”175
Aware of the fact that a »moderating role” of the EU »is anathema for Belgrade,” the
paper suggested close coordination between Brussels, Washington, OSCE and OHR,
brought about, if need be, by a »EU Special Envoy.” The paper also underlined the
necessity of equally close internal coordination of all EU activities by a »Special EU Co-
ordinator.”176 As a medium-term aim, a »Memorandum of Understanding between Serbian
and Albanian representatives [...] [to] prepare both parties for substantial talks” was
envisaged,177 while »the primary longer-term aim for a EU policy concept could be
envisaged as talks between representatives of the two sides n the future legal status of
Kosovo under the auspices of an international mediator.”178 Only »at a later stage, the
holding of an international conference is an appropriate way of bringing the parties to the
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negotiating table.”179 For good reason, the draft paper did not identify which of the many
proposals for a solution of the Kosovo problem Brussels was favouring:
»It would be highly inappropriate for third parties to prescribe what the outcome of negotiations should
be. Nevertheless, in the process towards international mediation in the negotiations the EU will have to
develop a common vision and work on concrete proposals. The Carrington Plan could form a basis,
which has been accepted by all EU-Member states. At an early stage – and in close co-ordination with
OHR – a small group of international legal experts should prepare options f r c stitutional texts and
look into similar effects made in other parts of the world.”180
In addition, on the official level, Brussels offered its financial support to Belgrade to bring
about a solution to the educational issue in Kosovo, and an eight-point EU »Draft
Declaration Concerning the FRY” of 29 October 1997 called for »good neighbourliness,
and a constructive approach to solving the ethnic and minority problems of the region,
including Kosovo.”181 In addition, on 7 November 1997 an official request for opening a
EU office in Prishtina was sent to Belgrade. Due to the FRY’s non-compliance with EU
demands in general and the non-implementation of the educational agreement of 1
September 1996 mediated by the Catholic NGO mentioned above in particular, on 30
December 1997 the Secretariat of the Ministerial Council announced that trade
preferences granted to Belgrade by Brussels in April 1997 would be temporarily
suspended from 1 January 1998 on.182
The need for a coordination of diplomatic activities in the Kosovo issue was
reiterated at a EU-US Summit in Washington, D. C., on 5 December 1997. A Senior
Level Group dealing with the New Transatlantic Agenda of 1995 called for »new,
coordinated efforts in Kosovo to maintain peace and to promote respect for human rights
there” and stated:
»We were united in condemning violence against peaceful protesters in the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia (FRY) and in seeking respect for human and political rights in Kosovo through the opening
of a comprehensive dialogue between FRY authorities and the Kosovar Albanian leadership.”183
The new British EU Presidency also focused on the Education Agreement of 1
September 1996. On 27 January 1998, British Foreign Secretary Robin Cook called upon
the Serbian authorities to restore Albanian-language education in Kosovo:
                                                 
179 Ibid. (Emphasis in the original).
180 Ibid., p. 6 (Emphasis in the original).—At the EC Conference on Yugoslavia in The Hague in October 1991, EC
negotiator Lord Peter Carrington had proposed a plan for the reconstruction of Yugoslavia as »a lose association of
sovereign and independent republics” with the possibility of special status for regions compactly inhabited by minorities.
While in a first version of this plan of 18 October Kosovo was not mentioned at all, a second version of 25 October did
contain the provision to re-establish the autonomy of Kosovo and Vojvodina within Serbia. As a concession to Belgrade,
Carrington deleted this passage from a new draft of 1 November. Nevertheless, on 4 November Serbia rejected the
Carrington Plan. Cf. »Peace Conference on Yugoslavia: Arrangements for General Settlement [the so-called Carrington
Draft Convention], The Hague, 18 October 1991,” Yugoslavia Through Documents, doc. no. 124, pp. 357-363. See also
ibid., pp. 363-365, Miloãevi‡’s answer, and »Peace Conference on Yugoslavia: Treaty Provisions for the Convention, The
Hague, 1 November 1991,” ibid., doc. no. 127, pp. 370-378. For critical evaluations of the Carrington Plan cf. Viktor Meier,
Wie Jugoslawien verspielt wurde (München: C. H. Beck, 1995), pp. 402-413; Libal, Limits of Persuasion, p. 68-69; and Gow:
Triumph of the Lack of Will (1997), pp. 57-59.
181 Draft Declaration Concerning the FRY, 29 October 1997 (16HOO).
182 »Serbische Polizei löst Demonstration auf,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung no. 303, 31 December 1997, p. 1. Cf.
also »At Last, a Right Decision – EU Suspends Trade Incentives for Belgrade,” Kosova Daily Report #1310, 30 December
1997, item 1, at http://www.hri.org/news/agencies/kosovo.
183 »New Transatlantic Agenda Senior Level Group Report to the EU-U. S. Summit December 5, 1997,” at
http://europa.eu.int/search97cgi.
»It’s not just in the interest of Kosovo that the schools be reopened. It’s in the interest of Belgrade. As
long as the schools remain closed Belgrade is creating a breeding ground for terrorism and violence.”184
And in accordance with the Contact Group statement of 8 January, Cook added that »the
EU supports a high degree of autonomy but we cannot support any acts of violence or
terrorism.”185
On 18 February 1998, the Head of the Unit for Albania and Yugoslavia in the
Directorate General 1A of the European Commission, Hansjörg Kretschmer, visited
Prishtina where he discussed with the Serbian Governor’s Secretary for Information,
Boãko Drobnjak, the possibilities for the opening of a EU office as well as issues of
independent media, civic society and democracy support in Kosovo under Serbian rule.186
On 23 February 1998, the EU Council of Foreign discussed relations with Bosnia-
Herzegovina and the FRY and concluded:
»Western Balkans – Kosovo
Conclusions
The Council reiterated its deep concern at the continuing deterioration of the situation in Kosovo, and
called on all parties concerned to exercise restraint and refrain from all acts of violence to achieve
political goals or to suppress the legitimate democratic expression of views.
The Council called on the authorities in Belgrade and the leadership of the Kosovo Albanian community
urgently to begin a full and constructive dialogue. It agreed that implementation of the Education
Agreements would be an important step, which the EU would be prepared to support substantially and
noted that there was scope for action and other confidence-building measures.
The EU will support any settlement reached by mutual agreement, and recalls its position in favour of
the effective granting of a large degree of autonomy to Kosovo within the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia.”187
The excessive use of force by the Serbian security forces in the Drenica region and in
Prishtina from 27 February to 2 March 1998 caused EU External Relations Commissioner
Van den Broek on 3 March to call upon Miloãevi‡ to initiate a dialogue with the Kosovo
Albanians and to restore their autonomy. Due to possible spillover effects, the Kosovo
conflict in his view was no longer an internal affair of the FRY. The international
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community would not allow that the Southern Balkans »go up in flames.”188 Also, on 3
March the political directors of the foreign ministries of the EU countries met in Brussels
to discuss the possibility of bringing the Kosovo problem before the UN Security Council.
It was also decided that British Foreign Minister Cook should travel to Belgrade as soon
as possible.189 On the same day, the British EU Presidency published the following
declaration »concerning the upsurge of violence in Kosovo”:
»The EU is deeply concerned by the violent incidents in Kosovo over the past few days. The EU
unreservedly condemns the violent repression of non-violent expressions of political views, including
peaceful demonstrations as well as the use of violence and terrorism to achieve political goals. It
regrets that police action led directly to civilian casualties. The EU urges all sides to exercise restraint
and refrain from further violence, and calls on the Serbian law enforcement agencies to respect fully
human rights and the rule of law in the pursuit of their duties. The EU reiterates its call as a matter of
urgency for the authorities in Belgrade and leaders of the Kosovar Albanian community to resolve the
situation peacefully through a full and constructive dialogue.”190
At the same time a meeting between Cook and Miloãevi‡ took place in Belgrade on 5
March, Serbian security forces raided the Drenica village of Prekaz.191 Accordingly, the
British Foreign Secretary did not succeed in convince Miloãevi‡ to restore autonomy for
the Kosovo Albanians.192 On 13 March then, the EU Council of Ministers followed the lead
of OSCE and supplied the OSCE mediator for Kosovo, Felipe González, with an
additional EU hat.
By early March 1998, the »carrot approach” had come to dominate EU’s policy in
the Kosovo issue, while the much more elaborated »three-step approach» outlined in the
CPN-SWP paper has not yet been adopted. The British EU Presidency indirectly made it
clear that no major Kosovo initiative could be expected during the first half of 1998.
Whether that will change in the second half of the year under the auspices of Austria
remains to be seen. And the upcoming elections for the German Federal Parliament of
October 1998 make predictions for the German EU Presidency from January 1999 on
impossible.
European Parliament
Since 1990, Kosovo has appeared regularly on the agenda of the European Parliament.
On 11 October 1990, the parliamentarians were »deeply concerned over the situation of
human rights in Kosovo,”193 and on 11 June 1992, they took »the view that the continuing
oppression of the Albanian population of Kosovo is unacceptable and constitutes an
obstacle to normal relations between Serbia and the [European] Community.”194
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The waves of the »Dayton shock” to the Kosovo Albanians, i.e., the loss of influence
of Rugova’s LDK and the increasing prominence of advocates of intifada-like tactics from
early 1996, did not go unnoticed by the European Parliament. On 29 February 1996 the
following resolution was adopted:
»Recommendation on the need for an early settlement of the dispute on the future of Kosovo
The European Parliament [...]
A. alarmed that the persecution of the majority ethnic Albanian population of Kosovo by the
Government of the new Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) might
unfortunately lead to an armed struggle in Kosovo in which people in neighbouring countries could
become involved,
B. believing that a peaceful settlement of the dispute in Kosovo is still possible if Mr Milosevic is willing
to enter into negotiations without preconditions with Mr Rugova and other elected representatives of
the people of Kosovo,
C. recognizing that Mr Milosevic is at present unwilling to make any concessions to the people of
Kosovo or to start negotiations with their elected representatives,
D. having regard to the situation in Vojvodina, where recently the minorities have been subjected to
increasing pressure under a policy of altering the ethnic structure through Serbian settlement,
E. aware of the desire of the governments of Serbia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia for full
diplomatic recognition and for the ending of all sanctions imposed on them by the United Nations,
F. having regard to the decision of the Government of the USA to open an office in Kosovo,
1. Requests the Council to resolve, as a joint action under Article J.3 of the Treaty on European Union,
that full diplomatic recognition of, and the lifting of any remaining sanctions on, the new Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia will only be granted if a full and satisfactory settlement is reached between
Mr Milosevic and the elected representatives of the people of Kosovo;
2. Requests the Council to instruct the Commission to open an office in Kosovo;
3. Instructs its President to forward this recommendations to the Council and, for information, to the
Commission.”195
On 18 April 1996, the European Parliament »called on the Council and on the
Commission to take the initiative of holding an international conference dealing
specifically with Kosovo, requesting the Commission to open an office there.”196 A year
later, on 13 March 1997, the next resolution followed:
»Condemning the continuous repression in Kosovo, Parliament urged the Serbian authorities to release
all political prisoners, to guarantee the freedom of the media and to start negotiations with
representatives of the people in Kosovo on the future of the region. It also called on the Council to make
every effort to launch a strong and practical initiative to achieve the opening of negotiations between the
parties and to make steady negotiations on Kosovo a condition for any further development of the EU’s
relations with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.”197
The brutal reactions of the Serbian police to the non-violent student demonstrations at
Prishtina prompted the Parliament to issue another resolution on 23 October 1997:
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»The European Parliament [...]
1. Condemns the violent actions of the Serbian police force against peaceful demonstrations in the
Kosovo region and calls on the Serbian authorities to desist from further violence;
 
2. Urges the Serbian authorities to implement without further delay the education agreement signed in
1996 and calls on the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the representatives of
the people in Kosovo to start negotiations as soon as possible leading to an overall political solution
for the situation in the Kosovo region;
 
3. Calls on the Commission and the Council to take the necessary steps to contribute actively to the
conclusion of such an agreement and urges them to make it clear once more to the government of
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia that future relations with the EU are dependent on respect for
human rights and positive developments in the situation in Kosovo;
 
4. Calls on the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to respond positively and promptly to
the European Union’s decision to open an office in Pristina;
 
5. Urges the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to grant the High Commissioner of the
OSCE, Max van der Stoel, a visa to allow him to travel to Kosovo;
 
6. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Government
and the Parliament of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Ibrahim Rugova.”198
On 21 January 1998, the Parliament’s Committee on Foreign Affairs, Security and
Defence Policy together with representatives from CPN-SWP held an ad hoc briefing on
Kosovo which resulted in a series of policy recommendations to the EU, among them the
nomination of a EU Special Representative for Kosovo. The Committee’s chairman Tom
Spencer forwarded to the Parliament’s President José Maria Gil-Robles a draft letter to
the President in Office of the Council of the European Union, the British Foreign Minister
Robin Cook, containing these recommendations:
»Ethnic tensions in Kosovo have continued to rise during the last months to the point where the danger
of warfare between Albanian insurgents and Serbian security forces has become increasingly likely.
Failure to find a resolution of the Kosovo crisis dangerously risks a violent conflict that might spill-over
into neighbouring countries, including Macedonia, Albania, Greece, and Turkey. Large-scale bloodshed
in the region would negatively affect major security, economic, and humanitarian interests of the
European Union. In view of the escalatory dynamics in the region, immediate preventive action is
necessary.
The urgency of a EU diplomatic action on Kosovo can be underlined by two developments which
will most probably heighten tensions in Kosovo in the coming months: First, the upcoming elections in
Kosovo in March 1998 and, second, the continuing power struggle between Serbia and Montenegro
over the reconstruction of the Yugoslav federation.
It is our view that any EU initiative must be cautiously prepared and would need a close
cooperation with other international actors, including the Contact Group.
The EU should make use of the richness of its instruments while the conflict is still manageable.
The proposal of opening a EU office in Pristina, also endorsed by the European Parliament, can only be
one element within a more timely, structured and comprehensive EU policy towards the Kosovo conflict.
We invite the Presidency to nominate a EU Special Representative as an appropriate means for
initiating the first steps toward a more direct and active involvement and leadership of the EU in
preventing a further escalation of the conflict in Kosovo.
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The mandate of such a EU Special Representative should reflect the seriousness and the scope
of the EU’s commitment and should include the establishment of a specific task-force in his support.”199
Kinkel-Védrine Initiative
A result of the concerns of the Contact Group and of the EU over Kosovo was an
initiative of November 1997 by the foreign ministers of Germany and France, Klaus Kinkel
and Hubert Védrine.200 In a letter to Miloãevi‡ of 19 November 1997, they called on
Belgrade to participate in a »peaceful dialogue” with Prishtina, to accept third-party
mediation, and to grant »a special status” to Kosovo. The German text read:
»Sehr geehrter Herr Präsident!
Gemeinsam mit den anderen Außenministern der Kontaktgruppe haben wir am 24. September 1997
die Situation im Kosovo diskutiert und unsere tiefe Besorgnis über die Lage dort zum Ausdruck
gebracht. Wir haben Ihre Regierung und die Führung der Kosovo-Albaner zur Aufnahme eines
friedlichen Dialoges aufgerufen. Die Lage im Kosovo hat sich seitdem verschärft. Demonstrationen im
Kosovo und Terroranschläge veranlassen die Kontaktgruppe, wie bereits die Europäische Union, sich
intensiver mit dem Kosovo-Problem zu beschäftigen. Die Kontaktgruppe möchte damit helfen, daß die
Regierung der Bundesrepublik Jugoslawien und die Vertreter der albanischen Bevölkerungsgruppe im
Kosovo zu einer Lösung des Problems finden. Deutschland und Frankreich werden sich in der
Kontaktgruppe von einer Reihe von Prinzipien leiten lassen, die wir Ihnen im folgenden erläutern
möchten.
-- Deutschland und Frankreich gehen davon aus, daß nur eine Verhandlungslösung zwischen
Vertretern der Bundesrepublik Jugoslawien, der Republik Serbien und der albanischen
Bevölkerungsgruppe im Kosovo die Grundlagen für einen stabilen und dauerhaften Frieden in der
Region schaffen kann. Eine für die Verhandlungspartner akzeptable dritte Seite sollte an den
Verhandlungen teilnehmen.
-- Die internationale Staatengemeinschaft sollte jedes Lösungsmodell, auf das sich die
Verhandlungspartner einigen können, unter der Voraussetzung, daß es sich nicht um eine Lösung zu
Lasten Dritter handelt, nach Kräften unterstützen. Ein entsprechendes Angebot zur Unterstützung einer
Lösung der Probleme im Erziehungsbereich hat die Europäische Union bereits gemacht. Dies muß
auch für weitere vertrauensbildende Maßnahmen gelten.
-- Die internationale Staatengemeinschaft hat vielfach erklärt, daß weder eine Unabhängigkeit des
Kosovo noch der status quo Grundlagen für eine langfristige friedliche Regelung sein können. Eine
dauerhafte Lösung auf europäischem Niveau muß einen Sonderstatus für Kosovo vorsehen.
-- Jede Lösung muß demokratischen Prinzipien entsprechen.
Deutschland und Frankreich werden sich dafür einsetzen, daß die Europäische Union und die
internationale Gemeinschaft positiv auf Fortschritte hin zu einer friedlichen Lösung des Kosovo-
Problems reagieren.
-- Sie werden sich dafür einsetzen, daß eine Einigung über vertrauensbildende Maßnahmen zwischen
den Verhandlungsparteien breite Unterstützung findet. Dies gilt über die angekündigte EU-Hilfe für den
Erziehungsbereich hinaus. Auch weitere zwischen beiden Seiten vereinbarte Projekte zur Förderung
des friedlichen Zusammenlebens der ethnischen Gemeinschaften im Kosovo sollten von der
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Europäischen Union und anderen internationalen Organisationen unterstützt werden. Diese
Unterstützung muß allen ethnischen Gruppen im Kosovo zugute kommen.
-- Eine Vertretung der Europäischen Union in Prishtina könnte Definition und Ausführung derartiger
Projekte erleichtern und zur Vertrauensbildung beitragen. Ihre Eröffnung würde zudem den Weg für die
Aufnahme normaler diplomatischer Beziehungen zwischen der Europäischen Union und der
Bundesrepublik Jugoslawien bereiten.
-- Deutschland und Frankreich werden nach einer Rückkehr der Langzeitmission der OSZE in den
Kosovo, den Sandzak und die Vojvodina einen Wunsch der Bundesrepublik Jugoslawien nach
Mitgliedschaft in der OSZE in einer für alle Seiten akzeptablem Form zu unterstützen versuchen.
-- Die Wiedergewährung von Handelspräferenzen durch die Europäische Union zugunsten der BRJ
würde durch die Aufnahme des von uns vorgeschlagenen ernsthaften Dialogs über das Kosovo-
Problem erleichtert werden.
-- Fortschritte bei der Umsetzung der Empfehlungen von Felip Gonzales würde die Bereitschaft der
Bundesrepublik Jugoslawien unterstreichen, dem Lager der demokratischen Staaten beizutreten und
würden die volle internationale Integration der BRJ und ihre Zusammenarbeit mit der Europäischen
Union erleichtern.
Sehr geehrter Herr Präsident,
diese Überlegungen zielen darauf ab, einen Weg aufzuzeigen, wie die Probleme im Kosovo gelöst
werden können und die internationale Isolation der Bundesrepublik Jugoslawien abgebaut werden
kann. Beides ist im Interesse der Stabilität auf dem Balkan und in ganz Europa.
Wir stehen Ihnen gerne zur Verfügung, während unseres geplanten, aber zur Zeit
aufgeschobenen Besuchs in der Bundesrepublik Jugoslawien mit Ihnen den Meinungsaustausch über
diese Überlegungen zur Lösung des Kosovo-Problems fortzusetzen.”201
                                                 
201 »Die Situation im Kosovo, Brief von Bundesaußenminister Klaus Kinkel und Außenminister Hubert Védrine an
den Präsidenten der Bundesrepublik Jugoslawien Slobodan Milosevic, Frankfurt an der Oder, 19. November 1997.”—There
is no official English translation of this letter. The French text reads: »Cher Monsieur le Président, De concert avec les autres
ministres des Affaires étrangères du Groupe de contact, nous avons discuté le 24 septembre 1997 de la situation au
Kosovo et exprimé notre profonde préoccupation concernant la situation sur place. Nous avons appelé votre gouvernement
et les responsables des Albanais du Kosovo à entamer un dialogue pacifique. La situation au Kosovo s’est depuis lors
aggravée. Des manifestations au Kosovo et des attentats terroristes incitent le Groupe de contact à se saisir plus
activement, comme l’Union européenne le fait déjà, du problème du Kosovo. Le Groupe de contact désirerait ainsi
contribuer à ce que le gouvernement de la République fédérale de Yougoslavie et les représentants de la communauté
albanaise au Kosovo parviennent à résoudre le problème. La France et l’Allemagne seront guidées au sein du Groupe de
contact par une série de principes que nous souhaiterions expliciter ci-après.
-- La France et l’Allemagne partent du principe que seule une solution négociée entre les représentants de la
République fédérale de Yougoslavie, la République de Serbie et la communauté albanaise au Kosovo peut jeter les bases
d’une paix stable et durable dans la région. Un tiers acceptable par les partenaires de la négociation devrait prendre part aux
négociations.
-- La communauté internationale devrait soutenir toute solution qui pourrait recevoir l’accord des parties à la
condition que cette solution ne se fasse pas au détriment d’un tiers. L’Union européenne a déjà fait une offre de ce type
pour aider à la résolution des problèmes qui se posent dans le domaine de l’éducation. Ceci doit aussi valoir pour de
nouvelles mesures de confiance.
-- La communauté internationale a déclaré plusieurs fois que ni une indépendance du Kosovo ni le statut quo ne
peuvent servir de bases à une règlement pacifique à long terme. Une solution durable au niveau européen doit prévoir un
statut spécial pour le Kosovo.
--Toute solution doit s’appuyer sur des principes démocratiques.
La France et l’Allemagne s’engageront pour que l’Union européenne et la communauté internationale réagissent
positivement aux progrès effectués en faveur d’un règlement pacifique du problème du Kosovo.
--Elles s’engageront pour qu’un accord sur des mesures de confiance entre les parties aux négociations rencontre
un large soutien. Cela vaut au-delà de l’aide de l’Union européenne annoncée dans le domaine de l’éducation. De
nouveaux projets acceptés par les deux parties pour encourager la cohabitation pacifique des communautés au Kosovo
devraient là aussi être soutenus par l’Union européenne et d’autres organisations internationales. Ce soutient doit profiter à
tous les groupes ethniques au Kosovo.
-- Une représentation de l’Union européenne à Pristina pourrait faciliter la définition et l’exécution de ce genre de
projets et contribuer au renforcement de la confiance. L’ouverture de cette représentation ouvrirait la voie à l’établissement
The answer from Belgrade was negative: on 26 November 1997, the Yugoslav Minister of
Foreign Affairs Milutinovi‡ declared, »Kosovo is an internal affair and nobody else’s
business.” Besides that, so Milutinovi‡, does the Constitution of Serbia already provide
for autonomy of Kosovo and Metohija.202
Equally negative was the Serbian reaction when Kinkel used a visit to Tirana on 6
February 1998 to state with reference to Kosovo that he will »not tolerate that 90 percent
of the population is maltreated and oppressed by the 10 percent.” Although he added that
»extended autonomy”, not independence, would be the solution to the Kosovo problem,203
the FRY’s state news agency »Tanjug” depicted him as »a false peacemaker, whose
clear aim is a new wave of instability under the cover of concern over the human rights of
the Albanians.”204 And on 13 February 1998 the Political Director of the Foreign Ministry of
the FRY, Dragomir Vu˜i˜evi‡, declared the joint French-German visit announced in the
Kinkel-Védrine letter to be unwelcome.205 The more surprising was the result of a meeting
between Védrine and the FRY’s new foreign minister Þivadin Jovanovi‡ in Paris on 18
February: now a joint visit by Védrine and Kinkel to Belgrade and probably even Prishtina
was accepted and 19 March—three days before the scheduled elections for the
underground Parliament of Kosovo—was fixed as a date.206
The Drenica events of early March 1998 obviously came as a shock to the German
Foreign Ministry. On 2 March, a disoriented and visible helpless Klaus Kinkel declared on
the recent escalation of conflict in Kosovo:
                                                                                                                                                      
de relations diplomatiques normales entre l’Union européenne et la République fédérale de Yougoslavie.
-- La France et l’Allemagne essaieront, après le retour de la mission à long terme de l’OSCE au Kosovo, au Sandjak
et en Voivodine, de répondre à un souhait de la République fédérale de Yougoslavie d’être membre de l’OSCE sous une
forme acceptable par toutes les parties.
-- La reconduction par l’Union européenne des mesures commerciales au profit de la RFY serait facilitée par
l’ouverture du dialogue sérieux que nous avons proposé sur le problème du Kosovo.
-- Des progrès dans la mise en oeuvre des recommandations de Felipe Gonzalez souligneraient de la disponibilité de
la RFY à adhérer au camp des Etats démocratiques et faciliteraient de la pleine intégration internationale de la RFY ainsi que
sa coopération avec l’Union européenne.
Cher Monsieur le Président,
Ces réflexions ont pour but de frayer un chemin visant à résoudre les problèmes au Kosovo et à mettre un terme à
l’isolement international de la République fédérale de Yougoslavie. Ces deux aspects sont dans l’intérêt de la stabilité à
l’échelle des Balkans et de toute l’Europe.
Pour poursuivre avec vous l’échange de vues sur ces réflexions visant à résoudre le problème du Kosovo, nous
serons à votre disposition à l’occasion de notre visite programmée, et pour l’instant reportée, en République fédérale de
Yougoslavie./.” Cf. »Situation au Kosovo, Lettre du Ministre des Affaires Etrangères M. Hubert Védrine, et du Ministre
Allemand des Affaires Etrangères, M. Klaus Kinkel, au Président de la République Fédérale de Yougoslavie, M. Slobodan
Milosevic (Francfort sur l’Oder, 19 novembre 1997),” DPIC – Bulletin quotidien, 20 November 1997, pp. 24-25.—On 21
November 1997, during a meeting at Paris, Védrine personally handed over a copy of the letter to Rugova. Also present was
the German ambassador to France, Immo Stabreit. On 22 November, Rugova had a meeting with the President Jacques
Chirac’s advisers David Levit and François Delater, with Prime Minister Lionel Jospin’s diplomatic adviser Jacques Morris
Ripper, as well as with deputies from both the Socialist and the Green groups of the National Assembly. Cf. »President
Rugova Meets with French Foreign Minister Hubert Védrine,” Kosova Daily Report #1283, 21 November 1997, item 1, at
http://www.hri.org/news/agencies/kosovo.
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»Die jüngsten gewalttätigen Auseinandersetzungen zwischen serbischen Sicherheitskräften und
bewaffneten Kosovo-Albanern sind außerordentlich besorgniserregend. Offenbar kam es zu
zahlreichen Toten und Verletzten. Dies zeigt: Die Lage spitzt sich immer mehr zu. Die
Völkergemeinschaft kann sich nun wirklich keine neue Zuspitzung der Situation im Kosovo leisten. Das
wäre ganz schlimm.
Wir verurteilen Terrorismus und Gewalt, egal von welcher Seite sie ausgehen. Dem Terrorismus
muß der Boden entzogen werden, der beste Weg hierzu sind Fortschritte bei der Lösung des Kosovo-
Problems. Gleichzeitig müssen die Kosovo-Albaner das Recht haben, sich politisch frei zu äußern.”207
On 3 March, after a meeting with US Secretary of State Albright, Kinkel described in more
detail the »carrots” the EU was willing to offer to Belgrade:
»Both our countries agree that we must make it plain to the Serbs and Milosevic that if they play along,
we have things to offer: You need the international assistance of the financial institutions, the IMF. You
need the IMF, you need the World Bank, and first and foremost, you need Europe. We want to help you,
which presupposes that you play along in Kosovo. [...] We want the Serbs to have a place in Europe,
we want to cooperate with them in the European Union. We want bilateral co-operation with them, it is
of crucial importance to us, too, but there are some things which we are not going to be able to relax or
to take a more laid-back attitude upon, unless things improve in Kosovo.”208
United States of America
The Kinkel-Védrine Initiative was welcomed and probably politically supported by the US
State Department209 whose interest in the Kosovo issues has been particularly strong
since 1992. On 27 December of that year, intelligence reports on a planned crackdown by
Belgrade on Kosovo had prompted the outgoing administration of President George Bush
in a confidential »Christmas Warning” to Miloãevi‡ to threaten unilateral air-strikes
against strategic targets in Serbia—a threat repeated by the new President Bill Clinton on
10 February 1993.210 The statement implied that »it was the policy of U. S. governments
to intervene militarily and unilaterally in protection of Kosovo if the country was attacked
by Serbia.”211 This position was once more repeated by US Ambassadress at the UN
Albright in the Security Council on 9 August 1993:
»President Bush’s message was specific and clear: We are prepared to respond against Serbia in the
event of a conflict in Kosovo caused by Serbian action. Secretary of State Christopher has firmly
reiterated this message.”212
Since then, US officials have stated several times that improvement of the situation in
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Kosovo is one of the conditions for lifting the »outer wall of sanctions” imposed on the
FRY. The US has conditioned the removal of the »outer wall” upon the normalisation of
relations among the successor states to the former Yugoslavia and the solution of
succession issues, including the division of assets; restoration of human and political
rights in Kosovo; fulfilment of obligations under the Dayton Agreement; cooperation with
the International Criminal Court for the former Yugoslavia at The Hague; and the process
of democratisation of Serbia.213
On 11 July 1995, following a public relations trip by Rugova to the US and after
heated discussions, the US House of Representatives passed a bill barring any lifting of
the sanctions against Belgrade until the »excessive Serbian control” over Kosovo is
ended.214
The opening of an office of the United States Information Service (USIS) in Prishtina
on 5 June 1996 had a considerable symbolic impact: for the first time after the summer of
1993 when the CSCE Missions of Long Duration had to leave Kosovo, there was at least
a semi-diplomatic representation in the capital of the province, and also for the first time
Kosovo »President” Rugova and the Serbian Deputy Governor for Kosovo, Miloã
Neãovi‡, met in public, and even shook hands. In April 1997, Assistant Secretary of State
John Kornblum visited Prishtina where he met Rugova and Neãovi‡,215 and in November
1997 US diplomacy used the stage of the OSCE Implementation Meeting in Warsaw to
accuse Belgrade of »police violence” and »gross violations of human rights” in Kosovo.216
From the fall of 1997 on, Special Representative Gelbard met Miloãevi‡ almost on a
monthly basis and paid numerous visits to Prishtina. Another frequent traveller to Kosovo
was the Head of the US Mission to the FRY, Richard Miles, who regularly met with
Rugova and Neãovi‡’s successor Veljko Odalovi‡.
Although Rugova claimed to have developed a special relationship with the State
Department, during his last visit to Washington in August 1997 he was told outright by
Secretary of State Albright that LDK’s goal of »Kosova Republika” was not in accordance
with US Balkan policy. In particular, UÇK activities—labelled by Albright »terrorism”—
were disapproved:
»Ethnic Albanians in Kosovo are still denied their most basic human and political rights and suffer
repeated abuses at the hands of Serbian authorities, particularly the police and the courts. Real
progress on improving the situation in Kosovo remains a central element of the Outer Wall of sanctions
against Serbia. There will be no relief from sanctions until Belgrade has taken concrete steps to
address the legitimate grievances of the Kosovo Albanian community.
At the same time, the United States does not support independence for Kosovo. The unilateral
redrawing of borders would not contribute to the stability of the region. A solution to the problems of
Kosovo can and must be found within the framework of Serbia and the ‘FRY.’ [...]
The United States is deeply concerned about terrorist actions in Kosovo and the political killings
that have taken place there this year. The LDK should publicly condemn any such incidents. The trials in
Kosovo of suspected terrorist, however, have fallen far short of Western judicial standards. Belgrade
should not use concern about terrorism as an excuse to increase the pressure on the Kosovar Albanian
community still further.”217
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During several meetings of US officials with Rugova at Prishtina during February 1998,
no change of this US attitude was noticeable. And on 22 February, in a press briefing
following a meeting with Rugova, Special Representative Gelbard repeated the formulas
of »unconditional dialogue,” »future of Kosovo within the ‘Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’”
and »enhanced status.”218 Furthermore, he underlined that »Kosovo is right there in the
center of those issues which can allow for the end of that outer wall of sanctions.”219
However, after a lengthy talk with Miloãevi‡ on the following day, Gelbard rewarded
Belgrade’s policy towards the Republika Srpska with concessions of considerable
symbolic value. While the »outer wall of sanctions” would not be lifted, Gelbard
announced four unilateral measures by his government: (1) eligibility of the FRY for the
Southeast European Cooperative Initiative (SECI); (2) JAT charter flights to US airports;
(3) opening of a FRY consulate in the US; and (4) lifting of the ceiling of personnel at the
Permanent Representation of the FRY at the UN in New York. Concerning Kosovo,
Gelbard stuck to the by now ritual condemnation of Serbian police violence and Kosovo
Albanian terrorism alike.220
On 25 February the Special Representative gave a speech at the conference »A
Dialogue on Bosnia in the Balkans: Exploring Regional Approaches to Peace” organised
by the United States Institute for Peace in Washington. Here he criticised Miloãevi‡ for
the excessive use of force by Serbian police and for stonewalling the implementation of
the Education Agreement while he again »publicly condemned terrorist actions in Kosovo
to achieve political goals.”221 He became much more specific during the questions-and-
answers sessions following his speech:
»In some ways it’s a bit ironic that now that Bosnia is going so well, everybody’s able to focus on
Kosovo.
I think a number of things have to be done. The United States, first of all, and I want to say this
very clearly, believes quite strongly that the future of Kosovo lies within the borders of the ‘Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia,’ and a solution must be found in that context. Clearly there need to be a
process leading to much greater self-administration, no sham autonomy but real self-administration,
and a process where the majority population has a much greater voice in their own lives. This includes,
of course, human rights but it also includes all other aspects of daily life.
The government of the ‘FRY’ has, I’m afraid, been the best friend that extremist organizations
have so far. They are, by their actions, by their words, diminishing the prestige and the capabilities of
the moderate leadership to be able to take action, to take hold of the situation and to act responsibly. An
I have urged the ‘FRY’ government, including President Milosevic, to work to try to find ways to
strengthen the moderate leadership, to work with them, clearly, to have a dialogue that is unconditioned
and one that produces an outcome which will assure that there is a significant lessening of tensions.
The first step, as I said, simply because it’s right here in front of us, is the education agreement.
Monsignor Paglia of the Sant’Egidio Order has done a remarkably impressive job trying to move this
forward. But here we are almost two years after the agreement and it’s not done yet.
I have spending a great deal of time, as have my colleagues, talking to and working with the
student leaders in Kosovo. I think they have performed remarkably through their non-violent, positive
demonstrations beginning on October 1st. We’ve told them, very frankly, peaceful demonstrations have
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a long tradition in the United States, long ,very honorable tradition, and we were prepared to support
them as long as those demonstrations continued to be positively oriented and peaceful. It was truly
unfortunate that when the first one started on October 1st, a large number of them were beaten badly by
the police. They’ve scheduled another demonstration for March 13th that will have two themes: one, the
traditional one of getting the university reopened, but two, condemnation of violence on both sides. And
that—I heard this in talking to them on Sunday afternoon—just reinforced to me that these are our hope,
these are the hope for the future.
I am concerned that the leadership, the political leadership in Kosovo is not acting positively. It’s
not acting. They’re sitting back passively thinking that some kind of—(word inaudible)—United States
deus ex machina will descend and rescue them, sort of like Superman flying in and picking them up. It’s
not going to happen. Their fate has to be worked out with the leadership of the ‘FRY,’ and they have to
work together to do this. [...]
We think that there is a role for the OSCE, and my government is now working to try to see what
can be done to try to affect some kind of single, focused OSCE dialogue. It would be a serious mistake
for President Milosevic to get into a chicken-and-egg problem here and say he’ll only do that once
there’s OSCE membership. He’s got to start now.”222
Two days later Miloãevi‡ started the Drenica massacre. The first US reaction to this
event came on 1 March by the director of the United States Information Center in
Prishtina, Richard Huckaby:
»The United States is deeply concerned by the reports of recent violence and the resulting loss of life
and injuries that have occurred in the Drenica region of Kosovo. As Special Representative Gelbard
said during his visits to Belgrade and Pristina last week, the situation in Kosovo is ‘dangerous,’ and we
urge all parties to exercise restraint. Continuing violence will complicate efforts to initiate the dialogue
necessary to reduce tensions and allow the province to escape the repression which characterizes the
continuing unacceptable status quo. We urge Serbian authorities, in accordance with the
responsibilities of states to their citizens, to spare no effort in making sure that necessary medical care
is available to all of its citizens.”223
Belgrade’s crackdown on Albanian demonstrators in Prishtina on 2 March made State
Department spokesman James P. Rubin to issue the following statement:
»The United States is appalled by the recent violent incidents in Kosovo, which only underline
Belgrade’s ready recourse to force to address the serious political dispute between Belgrade and
Pristina. [...] The United States condemns the violence and the excessive use of force by Serbian
police. [...]
We continue to call on all sides to enter into an unconditional dialogue, and for authorities in
Belgrade to implement immediately the Kosovo education agreement on an effective basis as an
important step to reduce tensions. We have also called on Kosovar Albanian leaders to condemn
terrorist action by the so-called Kosovo Liberation Army (UCK), noting that violence does not contribute
to the search for a just and durable solution to the problems of Kosovo. As the events of this weekend
demonstrate, the vast majority of violence in Kosovo is due to actions of government authorities. The
United States expects the Serbian police in Kosovo to act with maximum restraint and the Yugoslav
army to take no action that might lead to further violence. Further state-sponsored violence would only
deepen Belgrade’s isolation and dim prospects for the integration of the ‘FRY’ into the international
community.
In his meeting with President Milosevic last Monday, Special Representative Robert Gelbard
previewed limited steps the U. S. was prepared to take to recognize Belgrade’s constructive actions in
support of Dayton implementation. Ambassador Gelbard also made very clear to Milosevic that these
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limited, reversible steps were conditioned on continued cooperation and—in particular—on the situation
in Kosovo. In light of Serb actions in Kosovo over the last three days, we are actively considering the
question of whether it may be necessary to revoke some or all of these steps, in additions to
considering further actions that might increase Belgrade’s isolation.”224
On 3 March then, Gelbard stated, »President Milosevic is well aware that the United
States will not tolerate violence, and violence will be met by the most dire consequences
imaginable. That will be the end of his government without any question.”225 And on the
next day, he declared, »we simply won’t brook any renewal of violence and yes, I do put
the overwhelming onus on the government.” He added, »we continue to be prepared to
deal with this problem with Milosevic, with his military, and with his police using every
appropriate tool we have at our command” and underlined »U. S. policy has not
changed.”226 Yet when asked on the same day whether »America is planning to intervene
militarily in Kosovo", the White House Press Secretary Mike McCurry answered:
»[T]here is no immediate discussion of any use of military force there. There are any range of options
that are available for the world community and specifically for the United States to pursue with respect
to the violence that has occurred in Kosovo. It has been of great concern to the United States
government that we have condemned, very clearly that we have discussed in diplomatic exchanges
with the government of Serbia, and we would certainly hope that a peaceful outcome to the dispute, the
participation of the Kosovo Albanians, as well as the Serbian elements in Kosovo, that their discussions
could lead to peaceful and amicable resolutions of the conflicts that they have.”227
Finally, at the Contact Group meeting in London of 9 March 1998, Secretary of State
Albright told her colleagues:
»We first acknowledge that this crisis is not an internal affair of the FRY. The violence is an affront to
universal standards of human rights we are pledged to uphold. It represents precisely the sort of
conduct that sparked the war in the former Yugoslavia. It is divide and rule all over again, with thugs in
uniform targeting not just individuals, but whole families, clans and communities in order to sow
widespread fear.
It is President Milosevic who is responsible for internationalizing this crisis—not we. The time to
stop it is now, before it spreads. Otherwise, we will have to accept responsibility for the consequences
to the region, to Europe, and to the values we share.
Second, we must avoid being paralyzed by the kind of artificial even-handedness that equates
aggressors with their victims. We need to say clearly what is to clearly true: that responsibility for the
violence lies squarely with Belgrade.
The authorities in Serbia will try to blur the picture by claiming their actions are a legitimate
response to a terrorist threat. We do not deny that they face such a threat. We have no sympathy for a
so-called liberation movement that judges, tries and executes the ethnic Serbs and Albanians it does
not like.
But we expect governments to live up to higher standards than terrorist groups. An no
provocation can possibly excuse the Serbian authorities’ conduct in Kosovo. In recent days, we have
received credible reports that security forces have mortared villages, burned houses, conducted
extrajudicial executions, and killed pregnant women and elderly people who could not possibly have
been a threat to them. Belgrade has incriminated itself further by keeping independent observers out of
the region; it has even denied access to the International Red Cross.
President Milosevic would like us to accept his government as legitimate. But legitimate
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governments solve internal political problems with dialogue and the rule of law, not with artillery.
The only effective way to deal with this kind of violence is through action, not rhetoric—that is the
most important lesson of 1991. Moral condemnation and symbolic gestures of concern alone will get us
nowhere. More warnings will be meaningless: President Milosevic has already done what we have
warned him to do. Diplomatic visits to the region will also fail unless we demonstrate to President
Milosevic that he is losing more than he is gaining by continuing his present course of action.
We need to remember that before the recent crackdown, the United States and others began to
ease international pressure against Serbia. By his conduct, President Milosevic has spurned our
incentives. And he has shown us that the outer wall of sanctions is not sufficient. We need additional
leverage.”228
By giving the »VIP treatment” to Rugova the US expressed their approval of LDK’s non-
violent orientation and thus considerably enhanced the prestige of this particular leader.
By rewarding Belgrade instantly for even small concessions regarding the Republika
Srpska, yet more so by labelling UÇK armed resistance against Serbian oppression
»terrorism” the same US provided Miloãevi‡ with a strong excuse, even an incentive for
his raid against Drenica. Inconsistencies like this have led political observers in the US to
state that in comparison to Washington’s policy towards Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Macedonia, and Albania, US policy towards Kosovo is less coherent and probably not
sufficient.229
Regional Initiatives
Regional cooperation in the Balkans, once initiated by non-aligned Yugoslavia, did not
survive the end of the Cold War. There is, however, a non-formalised Balkan cooperation
on the level of heads of states and governments and foreign ministers. Following a
Turkish initiative, on 25 November 1992 a Conference of Foreign Ministers of the Balkan
and Regional Countries—including Austria, but excluding FRY—was held in Istanbul. It
urged »the United Nations Security Council to examine the possibility of deploying forces
in Kosovo, Vojvodina and Sandzak [...] to contain the extremely explosive situation
reigning in these areas.” Specifically, the Conference
»10. Strongly urges all parties concerned to exercise the greatest moderation and restraint over Kosovo,
and particularly federal authorities (Serbia-Montenegro) to use their influence to insure continued
involvement of Serbian authorities in the Geneva Conference-brokered talks on the situation in Kosovo;
the Serbian authorities, as well as the Kosovan leadership to cooperate with the Conference; and all the
sides to contain extremist elements under their control.”230
It took five years until the next pan-Balkan meeting, a summit of heads of states and
governments of eight Balkan countries, convened in Crete on 3-4 November 1997. Here,
Albanian Prime Minister Fatos Nano and FRY President Miloãevi‡ met separately to
discuss the Kosovo issue—without reaching any result. The reaction in Kosovo, however,
was extremely negative. Since 1990, Albania’s Kosovo policy was characterised more by
cautiousness than by Greater Albanian ideas. In October 1991, it is true, the Albanian
Parliament had asked the government to recognise the self-proclaimed Republic of
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Kosovo, but in vain.231 While under President Sali Berisha Albania presented the Kosovo
issue to international organisations, the new leadership under the »Southerner” Nano
abstained from doing so.232 In February 1998, Nano explicitly stated that Tirana is
watching »Belgrade’s retrograde policies in Kosovo with great concern” while at the same
time it treated the Kosovo problem as an internal affair of the FRY.233
More formalised regional organisations like the US-inspired SECI or the Turkish-
inspired Black Sea Economic Co-operation (BSEC) have not touched upon the Kosovo
issue—not the least due to their basically economic character.
Also the Balkan policy of Greece--the only EU member state in the region—made
several attempts to offer good offices and to mediate in the Kosovo conflict, the last one
on 16 January 1998 when Greek Deputy Foreign Minister Iorgos Papandreou extended a
mediation offer to Miloãevi‡, Rugova and Nano. While there was no reaction from
Belgrade, Albania accepted the offer and LDK Vice-Chairman Agani flatly refused it.234 In
the Kosovo Albanian perspective, Greece is perceived as having a special relationship
with Belgrade based on Christian-Orthodox values, on anti-Muslim sentiment with an anti-
Albanian component, and on the strive for a common Serbian-Greek border.
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THIRD-PARTY INVOLVEMENT IN TRACK 2:
NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS
Currently, no foreign media and only a few humanitarian international organisations like
the International Committee of the Red Cross, the International Federation of the Red
Cross and the Red Crescent, UNHCR, UNICEF and the World Health Organisation are
permitted permanent representation in Kosovo. Furthermore, the international NGOs
permanently represented in Kosovo are almost exclusively humanitarian and medical
ones—the Soros Foundation being the exception to the rule.235 Where even monitoring is
difficult, early warning, early action and preventive measures are hardly applicable.
Yet, quite a number of national and international NGOs as well as institutions
specialising in inter-ethnic conflict management and think-tanks undertake mediation
efforts on different political and societal levels and/or come up with policy
recommendations on various aspects of the problem. Clearly, the Dayton Agreement has
triggered off a significantly increased interest in this problem.
Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organizations
Among the international NGOs representing the interest of non-dominant ethnic groups it
was in particular the 1990-founded UNPO which dealt with the Kosovo issue. Since
UNPO’s 2nd General Assembly of August 1991, also »Kosova” is a member, represented
by Rugova’s LDK.236 Well before Dayton, on 24 January 1993, UNPO’S 3rd General
Assembly had adopted the following declaration:
»RESOLUTION ON THE SITUATION IN THE REPUBLIC OF KOSOVA AND SANJAK
Considering that the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina cannot be contained despite all efforts by the
international community;
Considering further that the war threatens the state of Kosova as well as Sanjak and the former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia;
Aware that this was has the potential to lead to another Balkan war which has serious implications for
the peace and stability of Europe;
1. Calls upon UNPO Secretariat to assist the leaders of Kosova and Sanjak to promote the following
ends:
a. To stop the brutal and disastrous war in Bosnia and Herzegovina;
b. To promote peaceful negotiations
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c. To persuade the international community to prevent the escalations of war in the Republic of
Kosova, Sanjak and former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, by deploying peace keeping
troops. To control the borders by military observers in order to stop the weapons coming from
Serbia to Kosova and Sanjak; to demilitarize the whole region of former Yugoslavia under
international auspices; to destroy all heavy weapons and all military facilities of former
Yugoslavia; to punish all war criminals.”237
The following month, UNPO prepared a report on the human rights situation in Kosovo
which in its updated version of December 1993 contained the following
»CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE UNPO REPORT ON THE NATIONAL AND
HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION OF THE ALBANIANS IN KOSOVA [...]
To prevent the possible outbreak of an armed conflict, and improve the human rights situation of the
Albanians in Kosova, the UNPO makes the following recommendations:
- Demilitarization of the region. The heavy Serbian military movements along the border of Albania
and Macedonia, and the distribution of weapons to Serbian and Montenegrin civilians are alarming
factors. To reduce the threat of war the authorities should draw back their army and take steps to
prevent the distribution of armaments to civilians;
- The sending of UN Peacekeeping forces. Although Serbia has not had any success yet with their
provocations against the Albanians in Kosova, it could easily turn into a violent conflict. Such a
conflict must be prevented by all means, since a war in this region is very likely to spread to
neighbouring states such as Albania, Macedonia and Greece;
- The freedom of movement for the Albanians in Kosova and their neighbouring states. The Albanian
population in Kosova is being isolated because of the ‘Berlin Walls’ at the border line
Kosova/Albania and Kosova/Macedonia. To reduce the tense situation in this region, all Albanians
should be restored freedom to travel to and from Kosova;
- The return of human rights observers. In July 1993 Serbia expelled CSCE observers from Kosova.
To promote respect for human rights and prevent further escalation of human rights violations it is
imperative that human rights observers return to this region.
- Kosova should be exempted from the UN sanctions against Serbia. To support the peaceful
Albanian movement, the international community should exempt Kosova from the UN sanctions.
- Taking part in peace conferences. Any future peace conference on the situation in former
Yugoslavia, organized by the United Nations, the European Community or the CSCE, should invite
the representatives of the state of Kosova and recognize them as a separate and independent party
in the conflict.
- Recognition by the international community of a sovereign and independent state of Kosova. The
Albanian people in Kosova have a lawful claim of self-determination and the referendum held under
the Kosova population on 26-30 September 1991 shows that an overwhelming majority wants to
become an independent state. Furthermore, the government of Kosova is willing to accept all
commitments and obligations defined by the European Community as preconditions for the formal
recognition of Yugoslav Republics wishing to be recognized, and prepared to fully consider all
future requests and obligations issued by the European Community that are deemed appropriate for
the recognition of a sovereign state of Kosova.”238
Another Kosovo resolution was adopted by UNPO’s 4th General Assembly at the Hague
in January 1995:
»RESOLUTION REGARDING KOSOVA
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The General Assembly,
RECOGNISING, the right of Kosova to self-determination and independence, its right to choose and
elect its own government and the illegality of the Serbian military occupation of Kosova;
APPALLED, that the Serbian regime has been quietly carrying out ethnic cleansing of Albanians in
Kosova;
DEEPLY CONCERNED, with the escalation of human and political rights violations of ethnic Albanians,
including:
1. Police brutality against ethnic Albanians including killings, arbitrary searches, seizures and arrests,
forced evictions, torture and ill-treatment, which has resulted in the deaths of Albanians while in
custody;
2. The closure of schools and of the University which teach the Albanian language;
3. The banning of television, radio and newspaper in Albanian language, and the intimidation and
imprisonment of Albanian journalists;
4. The dismissal of Albanian doctors from health institutions;
5. The dismissal of over 80% of ethnic Albanians (150.000) from their jobs;
6. The expulsion of Albanian judges from the courts;
7. The elimination of the Albanian language, particularly in public administration and services;
CONCERNED that Serbia is preventing the Parliament of Kosova from convening, and that Serbia has
expelled the long-term mission of the OSCE from Kosova;
DEEPLY CONCERNED that the conditions in Kosova are deteriorating and that any moment, they may
escalate to war which would certainly spread internationally, beyond the borders of Kosova;
NOTING that UNPO has stood behind peoples which have worked for the protection of the rights to
self-determination within their ancestral territories, and which supports non-violent resolution of
international disputes;
THEREFORE,
URGENTLY CALLS on Serbia to withdraw its military and police forces from Kosova.
APPEALS to the international community to prevent the escalation of war in Kosova by providing
international protection by deploying international peacekeeping troops, demilitarise all the territory of
Kosova, ensuring that Albanians participate equally in the discussions regarding the resolution of this
conflict, and to strengthen sanctions against Serbia until the Kosova problem is solved.
APPEALS to the international community to recognise the self-determination of the Kosova people,
thereby recognising the independent state of Kosova.”239
Minnesota Advocates for Human Rights
Also from the pre-Dayton epoch stems »The Minnesota Plan: Recommendations for
Preventing Gross Human Rights Violations in Kosovo” of April 1993. The Minnesota
Advocates for Human Rights, »an independent organisation of lawyers and other
advocates committed to the impartial promotion and protection of international human
rights,” called for an United Nations trusteeship system in Kosovo in case Belgrade did
not re-establish the 1974 autonomy. Their Minnesota Plan contained the following
concrete policy recommendations:
»Human Rights Monitoring
1. The United Nations Security Council should take all possible steps to establish a U.N. observer
mission in Kosovo and ensure that the mission includes an adequate number of human rights fact-
finders with the qualifications and resources necessary to document and report on human rights abuses
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and to act as a deterrent to further violations. The Security Council should coordinate these efforts with
the monitors from the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) who are stationed in
Kosovo. In addition, the Special Rapporteur on former Yugoslavia should focus greater attention on
Kosovo. The international community should support local credible human rights monitors. [...]
Direct Negotiations
2. A conference involving representatives of the Serbian government and representatives of the
Albanian population of Kosovo should be convened as soon as possible under the auspices of the
United Nations, the CSCE, or the European Community to discuss peaceful resolution of the ethnic
violence and massive human rights violations taking place in Kosovo. [...]
Autonomy
3. The United Nations Security Council should declare its intent to refuse to recognize the Serbian
government as the successor to Yugoslavia in the United Nations and should urge Member States to
withhold recognition of Serbia until the province of Kosovo is granted autonomy. At a minimum,
autonomy would require that the Serbian government: (1) stop human rights violations in Kosovo,
including arbitrary detention, torture, inhuman treatment and arbitrary killings; (2) remove all Serbian
and Yugoslav military forces, including paramilitary forces, from Kosovo; (3) restore Albanian Kosovars
to their former professional and public positions; (4) stop resettling Serbs into Kosovo; (5) reopen all
educational opportunities for Albanian Kosovars; and (6) rescind all facially discriminatory laws.
As a condition of autonomy, the Kosovo provincial government must agree to: (1) abide by
international norms regarding minority rights, including provisions of proportional representation for
ethnic Serbs in the Kosovo provincial government; (2) allow United Nations monitoring of Kosovo to
ensure compliance with international standards regarding minority rights; and (3) hold free and fair
elections within one year of the withdrawal of Serbian and Yugoslav forces from Kosovo.
The United Nations should provide peacekeepers to police Kosovo until elections are held. There
should be no arming of Kosovars during this interim period. [...]
Trusteeship
4. If the Serbian government does not agree to grant autonomy of Kosovo by September 1993 as
described above, or in the event of an escalating pattern of gross violations of human rights and
fundamental freedoms, the United Nations Security Council should call for the Serbian government
voluntarily to place Kosovo under the Trusteeship system governed by Articles 75-91 of the United
Nations Charter. Designation of Kosovo as a trust territory would not predetermine a particular legal
status for the region in the future. [...]
Additional Measures
5. The Security Council should further resolve that if the Serbian government refuses to place Kosovo
under Trusteeship after failing to grant autonomy or escalating the pattern of gross human rights
violations, the situation in Kosovo will be deemed a ‘threat to international peace and security.’ In this
event, the Security Council should declare Kosovo a safe haven and provide protection for residents of
the province by all necessary measures. [...]
Minority Rights
6. The provisional government of Kosovo must guarantee minority rights for non-Albanians in the
province as set forth by the United Nations, CSCE and the Council of Europe. Each minority must be
allowed effective participation in government and equal access to public services as guaranteed in
Article 21 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The government of Kosovo must also permit
United Nations monitoring to ensure compliance with international standards regarding minority rights.
Communications
7. The United Nations should provide support for independent and objective media within Serbia. The
international community should use radio, television and written communications to provide accurate
information to the Serbian population. [...]
8. Every effort must be made to increase world attention to the situation in Kosovo and to maximize the
opportunity for Kosovars to communicate with the outside world. The international community should
support and consult locally based fact-finders and fact-finding organizations. [...]
War Crimes
9. The United Nations should aggressively pursue the investigation and prosecution of war crimes,
crimes against humanity, crimes against the peace and gross human rights violations in all regions of
former Yugoslavia and the compensation for victims of those crimes. Such prosecution can serve as a
deterrent to the commission of similar atrocities in Kosovo.”240
Comunità di Sant’Egidio
So far, the most concrete political result of NGO activities has been a Memorandum of
Understanding providing for »the return of the Albanian students and teachers back to
schools” brokered by the chairman of the Catholic Laymen Organisation Comunità di
Sant’Egidio of Rome, Monsignore Vincenzo Paglia. The Memorandum was drafted in
Serbian and signed on 1 September 1996 simultaneously in Belgrade by the »President
of the Republic of Serbia Slobodan Miloãevi‡” and in Prishtina by »Dr. Ibrahim
Rugova.”241 An English translation distributed in Belgrade on 1 September 1996 read:
»Since some years now, the educational system of Kosovo - from elementary schooling to university -
does not work in a normal way.
By mutual consent the undersigned, Mr. Slobodan Miloãevi‡, President of the Republic of Serbia,
and Dr. Ibrahim Rugova have agreed to proceed to the normalization of the educational system of
Kosovo for the Albanian children and youth.
On this line the agreement reached foresees the return of the Albanian students and teachers
back to schools.
Because of its social and humanitarian value the present agreement is above any political debate.
The concern which both undersigned feel very strongly for the future of the Albanian children and youth
of Kosovo has lead them to reach such an agreement.
Both undersigned thank their joint friends of the Community of S. Eudigio [recte: Eugidio] for the
generous commitment, help and support they have given to the dialogue.
Both undersigned are furthermore certain about the commitment of all those who are in charge in
the implementation of the agreement for the normalization of the educational system. There will be a
mixed group (3+3) established for the realization of this agreement.
When young people seriously commit themselves to their educational and cultural formation, so
to become responsible citizens, the victory of civilization itself will prevail instead of the victory of ones
over the others.
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Dr. Ibrahim Rugova                          President of the Republic of Serbia Slobodan Miloãevi‡.”242
According to sources from Belgrade, there was an unpublished annex to the
Memorandum called »First Measures of Normalisation of the Education System in
Kosovo” or »Rome Document”, »containing a list of school facilities to which Albanian
students are to be given access.”243
The news of the signing of the Memorandum considerably improved the atmosphere
in Kosovo. It turned out soon, however, that the Memorandum was flawed with technical
mistakes and political weaknesses. While an Albanian translation explicitly mentioned
»pupils and students,”244 the Serbian original for very good reason had only »pupils”
(u˜enici), not, however, »university students” (s udenti). This allowed Belgrade to deny
that the agreement provided for readmission of Albanian students to the University of
Prishtina. The Kosovo Albanian side on the other hand interpreted the agreement as
providing for the reopening of the Albanian University of Prishtina which in 1990 had been
turned into a Serbian institution of higher education. Yet also regarding elementary and
secondary education the Memorandum was interpreted in fundamentally different ways
by the two sides. According to Belgrade the Memorandum provided for the return of the
Albanian pupils to the state system of education (»re-integration”), while the Kosovo
Albanians were of the opinion that state-owned school buildings would be turned over to
them. A particularly dangerous source of friction was the application of the principle of
double-shift teaching in state-owned school building—Serbs in the morning, Albanians in
the afternoon. And a particular flaw of the agreement was that it did not include a
timetable for its implementation.245
So, in practical terms, the agreement did not bring about a change in the situation:
more than 270,00 Albanian primary school pupils, 60,000 secondary school pupils,
20,000 university students and 20,000 teachers were still forced into their »parallel
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system” in private premises, lacking adequate educational material and financing.246
The fact that Belgrade did not undertake any steps to implement the agreement led
Msg. Paglia and his advisers Roberto Morozzo della Rocca and Paulo Rago to a renewal
of their mediation efforts in the summer of 1997. They succeeded in making the 3+3
Group meet on 9 October 1997 in Prishtina and on 10 October in Belgrade where,
however, the talks collapsed.247 As mentioned above, there were announcements that the
3+3 Group was going to meet end-February 1998.248 Obviously, such a meeting took
place, and on 23 March both sides signed a document on measures to implement the
agreement.249 In the meantime, however, the Drenica massacre had completely
destroyed the atmosphere for any progress in educational matters.
Humanitarian Law Center
Since 1993, this Belgrade-based NGO chaired by Nataãa Kandi‡ has been closely
monitoring the human rights situation in Kosovo by way of intensive field research.250 In
September and October 1997, the Center carried out an investigation into the educational
system of Kosovo in order »to establish whether there had been any change in the use of
schools and university facilities following the signing of the Miloãevi‡-Rugova Agreement
on the normalization of education in Kosovo, and the conditions under which students
receive instruction in the Albanian language.”251 Their report »Education of Kosovo
Albanians” of 16 October 1997 contained a critical evaluation of the Memorandum plus a
set of recommendations:
»The Humanitarian Law Center considers that there is no justification whatsoever for the failure to take
steps to eliminate the degrading conditions in the field of Albanian-language education in Kosovo. This
must be done immediately and without the setting of political preconditions, and would denote
compliance with the Miloãevi‡-Rugova Agreement in which the signatories underscore that ‘the
Agreement is above any political debate,’ and solemnly declare its humanitarian import [recte: impact]
and their ‘concern for the future of Albanian youth in Kosovo.’
Any attempt by the Serbian authorities to make the normalization of Albanian-language education
conditional on the ethnic Albanian community accepting the Serbian uniform school programs would
directly politicize the problem and, consequently, be in contravention of the Agreement. For acceptance
of the uniform program would mean that the Kosovo Albanians recognize the sovereignty of the
Republic of Serbia over Kosovo, and that is a political issue and completely separate from the
humanitarian issue of education.
The Humanitarian Law Center urges the Serbian representatives on the 3+3 Group to refrain
from attempts to politically discredit the other side, and to focus their concern on the implementation of
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the Agreement. In this context, the HCL draws attention to the statement made by Goran Per˜evi‡ on 10
October 1997 after a meeting of the 3+3 Group and in which he accused the Kosovo Albanian
negotiators of ‘stark separatism.’ This kind of rhetoric raises doubts as to the Serbian authorities’
genuine readiness to resolve the problem of education in the Albanian language.
The Humanitarian Law Center suggests an interim solution that Albanian-language schools be
financed from taxes and contributions paid by Kosovo Albanians to the Republic of Serbia.”252
The Humanitarian Law Center used the opportunity of the OSCE Implementation Meeting
at Warsaw on 12 to 28 November 1997 to acquaint a broad international audience with its
views on the educational problems in Kosovo.253
International Commission on the Balkans
As to the more academic NGO initiatives, they have resulted in a number of policy
recommendations. The most prominent of these initiatives was the International
Commission on the Balkans, founded in September 1995 by the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace and the Aspen Institute Berlin.254 In January 1996, the Commission
undertook a study mission to Prishtina and its surroundings,255 and included in the 57
recommendations of its final report »Unfinished Peace” the following four on Kosovo:
»20 Serbia should lift martial law entirely, restore Kosovo's status of autonomy, and effect a gradual
withdrawal of troops and police, unilaterally, before the start of negotiations.
21 The Kosovo Albanian leadership should, in return, be ready to enter negotiations without further
preconditions, thus backing off from their refusal to talk about anything other than independence.
22 Although the final outcome cannot be prejudged, it would be expected to take legitimate Serb
concerns into account and, at the same time, to acknowledge the right of the Kosovo Albanians to self-
government, including but not limited to:
-- The right of the Albanians to control their own police and judiciary as well as health, cultural, and
educational institutions.
-- Reliable guarantees of the rights of the Serbian minority in Kosovo
If no agreement can be reached within a reasonable time, say two years, the Commission feels that the
future status of Kosovo should be submitted to legally binding arbitration and, if the arbitrators so
recommend, a Kosovo-wide referendum on the various options. A concerted international effort should
buttress this process. A long-term presence of an OSCE monitoring mission would be indispensable.
23 Along with the lifting of martial law, a coordinated effort is needed by the Albanian leadership,
Western foundations and NGOs, and the Serbs, to restore a normal civil and cultural life to Kosovo.
This means, above all, a unified Prishtina University, with financial aid, technical help, and academic
exchange programs aimed at restoring the University as an open and pluralistic institution.”256
In an update of August 1997, the Commission repeated some of these recommendations:
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»In Kosovo, pressure should be applied to both sides to resume talks on the basis of basic mutual
concessions that the Commission urged last year. Serbia should lift martial law entirely, restore
Kosovo's status of autonomy, and withdraw troops and police, unilaterally, before the start of talks. In
return, the Kosovo Albanian leadership should be ready to enter negotiations without further
preconditions, thus abandoning the refusal to talk about anything other than independence.”257
Young Leaders Studies Group on the Future of the Balkans
Also in 1997, the Aspen Institute Berlin set up a Young Leaders Studies Group consisting
predominantly of Southeast Europeans to investigate »The Future of the Balkans.” At a
meeting in Istanbul on 7 March 1998, this group formulated the draft an »International Call
for Action” with a focus on Kosovo:
»Given the fact that Kosovo is a keystone of peace and security in the region;
having in mind that the violent events of 1998 have brought the situation in Kosovo to a breaking point;
due to prevailing political and economic crises in Serbia, Albania, Macedonia and Montenegro;
considering that the non-violent movement of Albanians in Kosovo has so far contributed to avoiding a
state of war, but is now reaching the point of exhaustion;
and finally, recognizing that any delay in confronting the Kosovo issue could lead to war, most likely
involving neighboring countries,
it is timely and necessary that strong and united international action be undertaken before it is too late.
As the International Helsinki Federation recently quoted an expert observer in Kosovo: ‘Concern is not a
policy.’
In an effort to support those ready to take ‘action’ on the Kosovo issue, our group would like to point out
and endorse excellent recommendations that have been made including those in the 1996 Unfinished
Peace report of the International Commission on the Balkans; in the 1996 report of the Center for
Preventive Action called Towards Comprehensive Peace in Southeast Europe: Conflict Prevention in
the South Balkans; in the November 1997 declaration of the European Action Council for Peace in the
Balkans and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace called ‘Kosovo: From Crisis to a
Permanent Solution’; and in the January 1998 press release of the International Helsinki Federation call
‘Kosovo: Urgent Appeal for Courage, Leadership and Cooperation.’ Much work has been done to
explore viable approaches to the tense situation in Kosovo, and these recommendations should not be
overlooked as governments become involved at the last minute.
Building on recommendations made by the sources already cited, we recommend:
To the international community:
1. To take all the appropriate actions to end violence in Kosovo.
2. Demand the immediate restoration of full civil, political and human rights of the Kosovo Albanians.
3. Convene an international conference on Kosovo to develop a framework for transatlantic
cooperation, with the purpose of coordinating external actors and not to impose an agreement on
Kosovo’s final status. Any divergence of strategies will only weaken international leverage over the
disputing parties.
4. The Contact Group should appoint a mediator for negotiations between the two parties to facilitate a
mutually agreed solution. The Contact Group already has an international mandate for the Former
Yugoslavia and has been successful in the past. The Contact Group should commit itself to deploy
all means at its disposal to resolve this crisis. This process should initiate and actively promote a
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process designed to lead to a permanent solution of the Kosovo problem. The international
community can play a vital role in initiating and facilitating confidence-building measures, a political
dialogue, and negotiations; as well as guaranteeing agreements between the parties.
5. All appropriate leverages should be used to encourage progress towards a solution and to ensure
cooperation of both sides with the appointed mediator. Existing tools include the ‘outer wall of
sanctions’ and conditionality concerning the development of friendly relations between the EU and
its member states and the FRY and its constituent republics. The ‘outer wall’ should remain in place
until all conditions for its removal have been fulfilled, including significant progress in the resolution
of the Kosovo crisis.
6. International efforts should be geared towards demilitarization. Eventually, an international
commitment, similar to that which was deployed in Eastern Slavonia should be adopted to secure
the cessation of hostilities and to implement the transition.
7. The negotiation process on the future status of Kosovo should have time limitations. Any
agreements reached, including those in the interest of confidence building, should have time
deadlines for implementation. One of the problems with implementing the Education Accord has
been the lack of any time pressure or obligation.
To Serbian leaders, in order to facilitate a fair dialogue:
1. End human rights abuses in Kosovo. This includes state terror, police repression and imprisonment
of Albanians for political purposes.
2. Effect a withdrawal of troops and interior ministry personnel to barracks and ensure that they remain
there.
3. Normalize the functioning of educational, cultural, information, scientific, economic and financial
institutions and implement the Education Accord (signed by Milosevic and Rugova).
4. Enable the reopening of Radio-Television Pristina in Albanian and other media, banned since 1990.
5. Establish local democratic institutions including a local assembly and independent judiciary with
ethnic Albanians included on the bench.
6. Allow the unconditional return of the OSCE long-term mission and opening of an EU/UN office and
other international and non-governmental organizations and offices.
7. Express commitment to a dialogue without precondition.
To Kosovo leaders, in order to facilitate a fair dialogue:
1. Reaffirm a commitment to non-violence.
2. Call on international monitors to investigate all terrorist activity in Kosovo, including activities of the
Kosova Liberation Army.
3. Make a commitment to the protection of human rights which directly addresses the position of
Serbs living in Kosovo.
4. Work with the OSCE to assist in monitoring of human rights for Serbs living in Kosovo.
5. Express commitment to a dialogue without precondition.”258
South Balkans Working Group
In December 1995, a newly formed South Balkans Working Group of the US-American
Council on Foreign Relations’ Center for Preventive Action travelled throughout the
Balkans and presented a report entitled »Towards Comprehensive Peace in Southeast
Europe.”259 Concerning Kosovo it contained the recommendation of confidence-building
measures plus dialogue and negotiations in order to reach »an interim settlement that
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would relieve tension without requiring either side to renounce its firmly held positions on
the final status of Kosovo.”260 As the most important confidence-building measures were
named:
»From Belgrade:
-- Ending violations of human rights in Kosovo, including police repression, detention of political
prisoners, and confiscation of passports;
-- Assuring no repetition of the bans [...] on the operations of [...] independent media, which have
contributed to Serbian-Kosovar dialogue [...];
-- Permitting an increased international presence in Kosovo to monitor human rights, including
reestablishing the missions of long duration of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
(OSCE) and opening of offices by other international and non-governmental organizations, as well as
by foreign governments [...].
From the Kosovar leadership:
-- Reaffirmation of the commitment to nonviolence;
-- Reaffirmation and clarification of guarantees of the rights of the Serbian population in Kosovo,
including international monitoring;
-- Quiet communication of a willingness to defer discussion of independence while talks take place on
interim measures to defuse tension.
From the international community:
-- Pressing the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) to allow the OSCE to reopen
its missions of long duration in Serbia;
-- Establishing centers of operation in Kosovo by international humanitarian organizations such as the
office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and the International Committee of the Red Cross,
which now serve the region from other offices.”261
Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
Also in 1995, the Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP) in
Athens initiated a research project »Avoiding Another Balkan War: Strategy on Conflict
Prevention in Kosovo.” In September 1996, the research group lead by Thanos Veremis
concluded:
»We believe that any solution will have to be the product of negotiations between the two sides, with the
aid of an interlocutor who is credible to both sides.
The starting points of any negotiation will be that:
a. The territorial integrity of the FRY is not under question. Future constitutional arrangements,
however, regarding the status of Kosovo, Vojvodina will be at the centre of the settlement process.
b. The Albanian majority of Kosovo is a constituent part of the FRY.
c. The international community (UN, EU, OSCE, Council of Europe) guarantees the federal
character of Yugoslavia, and Kosovo as a constituent part of it.
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We believe that a form of extensive autonomy262 ought to be the aim of the negotiations. Towards that
end, a) an interim restitution of the autonomous status of Kosovo must go into effect; until the
arrangement is completed b) international guarantees must be given that will secure the external
borders of FRY and exclude the possibility of Kosovo’s independence and union with neighbouring
states; c) international aid will be extended to Kosovo for financing bi-communal projects; d) the
Albanians of Kosovo must agree to participate in future national elections of FRY; e) military units must
be relocated from urban centers to the borders of FRY; f) all paramilitary groups must be disbanded; g)
the possibility of setting-up a higher juridical body made up of two Albanians and two Serbs, presided
by an independent personality chosen by the two, must be explored.
Confidence-building measures
1) Banning secessionist activities and propaganda.
2) Reopening of the University of Pristina as a bilingual institution as well as schools of primary
and secondary education.
3) Establishment of bi-communal mass media.
4) Designation of an ombudsman.”263
Also stemming from the ELIAMEP research group on Kosovo is an outline plan drafted by
Evangelos Kofos in early 1998:
»A Non-Paper for a Long-Term Settlement of the Kosovo Dispute
A long-term settlement of the Kosovo dispute, to be durable, should try to meet the legitimate needs of
the parties concerned. It should also take into consideration questions of peace and security of the
wider region.
The following ideas focus on a stage-by-stage and win-win approach. The scenario seeks to
accommodate the Serbian-Albanian positions, initially on 70-30 ratio in favour of the current possessors
(Serbs). Subsequently, the ratio 70-30 would be progressively reversed to favour the heirs (Albanians).
Once the parties are brought to the negotiating table for meaningful talks, the stage by stage
scenario would provide:
Stage A: The parties agree on the organization of the province as an Autonomous Region,
composed of Albanian and Serbian cantons. The Serbs might be given roughly a 30 percent of the land
which should comprise the areas with strong emotional value to them. Some minor movement of
population on a voluntary basis—with strong incentives for those moving—might be necessary to
ensure that the respective ethnic groups enjoy relative majority in their respective cantons.
Understandably, the Albanians would enjoy majority rule in the Region.
Stage B: The Region would be admitted as a unit of the Republic of Serbia. The Autonomous
Region and the cantons would enjoy extensive self-rule on all domains, including public order, except
for national defense and foreign policy.
Stage C: After a mutually agreed, and internationally sanctioned, period, which might extend to
roughly 10 years, the Region by plebiscite would decide to join the Yugoslav Federation as a federate
republic, with equal rights with Serbia and Montenegro but not with the right of secession.
[Stage D: After an additional 10-15 years, the cantons of the Republic Kosovo might decide by
plebiscite to exercise the right of self-determination in order to establish an independent state. The
cantons deciding against independence would join one of the other constituent states of the Yugoslav
                                                 
262 It is interesting to note that the term »autonomy” was replaced by »special status” in a 1998 verison of the text. Cf.
»Avoiding Another Balkan War: Strategy on Conflict Prevention in Kosovo. A Policy Proposal,” in Kosovo: Avoiding Another
Balkan War, p. 15.
263 Thanos Veremis, »Avoiding Another Balkan War,” pp. 7-8. See also Thanos Veremis, Alex Heraclides, and
Dimitris Zegginis, »Kosovo: Strategien zur Konfliktverhütung [September 1996],” Europäische Rundschau 25 (1997), no. 3,
pp. 31-36; Thanos Veremis, »Möglicher Krisenherd: Kosovo. Die Zeitbombe tickt,” Politische Studien 46 (1995), special
issue 3/1995: Die Balkankrise, pp. 87-100; and idem, »Kosovo: The Powder Keg on Hold,” Balkan Forum 4 (1996), no. 2
(15), pp. 27-44.--Stemming from the same research project is a paper by Alexis Heraclides, »The Kosovo Conflict and Its
Resolution. In Pursuit of Ariadne’s Thread,” Security Dialogue 28 (1997), pp. 317-331. See also idem, »Konfliktlösung am
Beispiel der Kosovo-Frage,” Internationale Politik 50 (1995), no. 12, pp. 33-38.
federation. Constitutional provisions, by international (standards?) should guarantee that the
independent state should commit itself to not opting for union with another state (or?) might opt to join
another state only after a specified period to be decided by international treaty].
Understandably, the provisions of such an agreement would require the guarantee of an
international treaty, subscribed either by the Security Council of the United Nations, or by other
international bodies.
»Stage D” is presented in brackets, to be addressed according to circumstances.”264
Transnational Foundation for Peace and Future Research
In 1996, the Transnational Foundation for Peace and Future Research in Lund, Sweden,
proposed to set up what they call the »United Nations Temporary Authority for a
Negotiated Settlement (UNTANS)” in Kosovo.265 In particular, TFF opted for the following
measures:
»-- A memorandum would be signed between Yugoslavia and the UN Security Council to the effect that
the UN, for a period of three years, takes over parts of the daily administration of the area, aimed to
reduce tension.
-- All troops and police in Kosovo are demilitarised during the agreed period, with the exception of what
is needed for Yugoslavia's legitimate self-defence.
-- A permanent Professional Negotiation Facility is established, to help the parties achieve a timely
result. The leadership of this facility must be selected from nations with no significant interest in the
region.
-- The paramilitary troops and police are replaced by international civil police and monitors who co-
operate with the UN administration, the Negotiation Facility and with a broad spectrum of local and
international civil society organisation in the region.
-- Peacebuilding efforts, including peace education, conflict-mitigation, negotiation techniques and
reconciliation and co-operative projects in local communities, are conducted throughout the area to
empower people to handle their own future conflicts.
-- Some smaller groups of countries, such as the Nordic states, take the initiative to establish a 'Helsinki
Process' for all of the Balkans, inviting all parties and civil society organisations to participate.
-- The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is fully integrated into the international community and
intergovernmental organisations, including the OSCE, as a prerequisite for accepting anything like a
UNTANS.”266
In response to the reaction of the international community to the Drenica massacre, on 6
March 1998 TFF issued a press release entitled »Kosovo – why it is serious and what not
to do”267, as well as list of policy recommendations of the same day entitled »Kosovo –
What Can Be Done Now?” According to TFF director Jan Öberg, »many things can still
be done – but only as long as there is no, or limited, violence.” As »impartial goodwill
initiatives” governments and citizens »around the world” could take, he listed the
following:
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»A HEARING IN THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY. We need to get the facts on the
table, presented by impartial experts as well as by the parties themselves; listen actively to them for
they have interesting arguments and question their positions, activities and policies.
MEETINGS all over Europe with various groups of Serbs and Albanians to discuss their problems.
Governments and NGOs can provide the funds, the venues and the facilitators
SEND A HIGH-LEVEL INTERNATIONAL DELEGATION OF "CITIZEN DIPLOMATS" to Belgrade and
Kosovo and have it listen and make proposals on the establishment of a permanent dialogue or
negotiation process but NOT on what the solution should be.
A NON-VIOLENCE PACT. Pressure must be brought to bear on all parties to sign a document in which
they solemnly declare that they will unconditionally refrain from the use of every kind of violence against
human beings and property as part of their policies.
SIMULTANEOUS WITHDRAWAL of Serb police and military from the region (with the exception of
what is needed for self-defence along the borders) and disarmament of the Kosovo Liberation Army.
This should be combined with a "WEAPONS-BUY-BACK" PROGRAM: citizens and paramilitary units
are remunerated for handing in their weapons to collection points controlled by the UN.
Monitoring of this process by UN CIVIL AFFAIRS AND CIVIL POLICE (200 or so are enough).
POSITIVE INCENTIVES. Make it known to the parties that international organisations will help them
with things they need if they refrain from violence now and engage in talks. As a vital element in the
conflict is underdevelopment, poverty and deepening economic crisis, there is considerable space for
economic "carrots."
SHOW RESPECT. Tell the parties that any solution they reach voluntarily will be accepted by the
international community. This means not treating them as helpless, clients or inferiors.
GET YUGOSLAVIA BACK INTO THE OSCE. Lift the suspension of Yugoslavia in the OSCE, it was
unwise from the beginning to exclude Yugoslavia which then, naturally, did not want to continue hosting
the OSCE missions on its territory.
UN CIVIL POLICE MISSION. Get perhaps 200 United Nations Civil Police on the ground to prevent
incidents like those we have seen from exploding into something nobody can control.
INDEPENDENT GOVERNMENT INITIATIVES. Don't wait for the European Union to find a common
policy on this issue. The Scandinavian countries and Switzerland could play a particularly active role in
this conflict.
ARRANGE SEMINARS where a lot of IMAGINATIVE LONGTERM SOLUTIONS can be suggested,
analysed and debated in a non-binding manner, almost like a brainstorm - such as:
- various types of autonomy,
- international presence,
- protectorate or other types of transitional administration,
- demilitarisation,
- normalisation of everyday life before an overall solution is reached,
- conditions and modalities for remaining in Serbia/Yugoslavia
- humanitarian presence and human rights monitoring,
- economic development, e.g. creation of a Kosovo Co-Prosperity Region or Economic Free Zone,
- UN or OSCE peacekeeping,
- trusteeship,
- condominium (shared control of one government by two or more states),
- "cantonisation" or a division of Kosovo,
- federalisation (i.e. Yugoslavia consisting of not only Serbia and Montenegro but also of Kosovo)
- combinations of these ideas that the parties, citizens' groups and others would accept.
- In summary, develop a multitude of options, don't narrow it all down to "Our way, or war."
ACKNOWLEDGE THAT VIOLENCE BEGINS WHEN PEOPLE SEE NO IDEAS OR WAYS OUT or
when they are afraid of losing face. Violence-prevention means helping
parties overcoming that feeling.
FOCUS ON INTERESTS, NOT POSITIONS. There could be governmental and nongovernmental
dialogues on specific, concrete needs and interests - education, health, finance, culture, etc. - with the
common understanding that the longterm status of the region will be more easily solved if the parties
have found solutions to pressing issues for the millions of citizens involved, particularly youth.
ESTABLISH A TRUTH COMMISSION. The situation is already infected with prejudice, racism, hate,
propaganda and media blackouts. The majority of foreign media cover the violence, not the underlying
conflict; they often side with the party they sympathise with but seldom analyse the problems that must
be solved.
ESTABLISH A RECONCILIATION COMMITTE with impartial international organisations and highly
respected international figures. Reconciliation is not needed only after wars: it is much easier to heal
psychological wounds when 20 rather than 200 000 have been killed and no material damage has
happened.
AN OSCE-LIKE PROCESS FOR THE BALKANS. There are more than enough problems in this whole
region - and in its relations with the rest of Europe, the EU, NATO etc. There is poverty, animosity,
misery, human rights violations. Serbia has more than 600 000 refugees, the largest number in Europe.
There are international "national interests" in all the Balkans. It is time to develop a comprehensive
approach through a series of conferences and dialogues. If the OSCE, the UN, small governments and
NGOs cannot take such an initiative, who can? When is the time, if not now?”268
Bertelsmann Science Foundation and Research Group on European Affairs
In the summer of 1996, a mediation initiative involving prominent Serbian and Kosovo
Albanian intellectuals as well as experts from diplomacy and academia was started by the
Bertelsmann Science Foundation at Gütersloh in cooperation with the Research Group
on European Affairs of the Centre for Applied Politics at the University of Munich, both in
Germany. At the five meetings held so far on »The 'Albanian Question' in the Balkans”
and on »Strategies and Options for Kosovo,” a list of policy recommendations was
compiled. And the results of discussions in small working groups dealing with the three
questions »How to improve the given situation?,” »How to realize an extended autonomy
for Kosovo?,” and »How to realize independence for Kosovo?” were published.269 Not
surprisingly, these exercises demonstrated that on status issues like autonomy or
independence no consensus could be reached. There was, however, much more
common ground than expected amongst all participants on the topic of practical
improvements of the current situation. Accordingly, meetings in Athens and on the Greek
island of Halki focused on short-term measures to stabilise the volatile status quo by
                                                 
268 »Kosovo – What Can Be Done Now?,” TFF PressInfo # 35, 6 March 1998, at http://www. transnational.org.
269 Exploring Futures for Kosovo: Kosovo Albanians and Serbs in Dialogue - Project Report, eds. Josef Janning and
Martin Brusis (München: Research Group on European Affairs, August 1997).—Participants from the Serbian side were
Duãan Batakovi‡, Milan St. Proti‡, Predrag Simi‡ and Ratomir Tani‡; from the Kosovo Albanian side Gazmend Pula, Veton
Surroi and Isa Zymberi. The working groups were led by Martin Brusis, Fabian Schmidt and Stefan Troebst.
proposing a number of unilateral and bilateral confidence building measures in order to
establish in the near future a joint Serbian-Albanian interim authority. The result was a
document entitled »Joint Recommendations on the Kosovo Conflict”270 con aining 15
concrete provisions:
»Confidence Building and Practical Improvements
1. The education agreement of September 1996 should be implemented without further delay. Kosovo
Albanians should be allowed to use the school and university buildings again. Curricula,
standardization of exams, recognition of degrees, financing and supervision of schools should be
determined jointly, by involving the Serbian Ministry of Education, the Kosova Education Authority,
parents and teachers. This implies mutual recognition of the existing education systems. The
Serbian State should also apply this principle with respect to the degrees obtained by Kosovo
Albanian pupils and students during the last years. However, if schools decided to choose other
curricula, the recognition of degrees should be linked to the fulfillment of certain standards. In
principle, a higher degree of independence would entail a higher degree of responsibility for the
maintenance and service quality of schools. It may be useful to implement different models with
varying degrees of independence, adjusted to local preferences and needs.
 
2. A fundamental reform of the public health care institutions should be reached through an
appropriate agreement. Institutional arrangements should guarantee an effective participation of
Kosovo Albanians in the public health care system. The staff of public health care institutions should
be recruited on the basis of its professional qualification exclusively. The professional medical
organizations should create a codex of non-discriminating behaviour and monitor compliance with
its rules. As the health system faces economic reform, privatization of practices and of health
insurance organizations offers organizational forms to transform the current shadow state health
care and social services into a pluralist public health system. Within such a system the state is
complemented by other service providers.
 
3. Both Albanian and Serbian should be used as official languages in public life and institutions in
Kosovo.
 
4. An agreement should be negotiated with respect to cultural and sport activities. All citizens should
have equal access to cultural and sport facilities, which should be jointly administered in the public
interest. Both sides commit themselves to develop and cultivate the identity of the Kosovo Albanian
and the Serb community in Kosovo. The problem of naming streets, places and public institutions in
Kosovo needs to be addressed. A commission consisting of Kosovo Albanian, Serb and
international representatives should be established in order to ensure that names reflect the
heritage of the object and the wishes and preferences of the local population.
 
5. Both sides should agree to improve the security situation in Kosovo by implementing the following
interrelated measures simultaneously, wherever possible:
a) The Serbian Parliament should remove the state of emergency, declared
on 26 June 1990, and all legal consequences derived from the act on ‘special circumstances.’
b) In return, the Kosovo Albanian side should reaffirm not to resort to any
violent means; both sides should agree with the Helsinki principles concerning the change of
international borders.
c) The Serbian and the Kosovo Albanian authorities should create a joint
council to coordinate their activities in the area of internal security. Both sides commit
themselves to publicly condemn and investigate in human rights violations and politically
motivated acts of violence, including terrorist acts and allegations of terrorist acts, irrespective
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from which source on either side they may come. Concerning the use of the term »terrorist
acts”, no final consensus was reached among the participants.
d) Kosovo Albanians should be offered civilian forms of military service or
be exempted from military service for a mutually agreed interim period.
e) Disarmament of people with registered and unregistered weapons is
required in order to guarantee the long-term security in Kosovo. Possession should be restricted
to registered shotguns where a reason is provided for needing them (hunting rifles etc.). Both
sides should agree to set up a trilateral commission consisting of a Kosovo Albanian, Serb and
international community representative, in order to disarm the local population.
f) The Yugoslav army should support a de-escalation by avoiding public
appearances in Kosovo. Army units should not get involved in police activities. The army should
confine itself to controlling and defending the borders of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
1. The local public administration including police should again be opened to Kosovo Albanian
personnel. Public employment policy should apply equal opportunity principles, seeking to choose
the best-qualified applicants, while, at the same time, aiming at reflecting the composition of the
population in Kosovo.
 
2. Police officers and civil servants working in Kosovo should participate in mandatory conflict
management and human rights training. This would facilitate empathy and improve skills in non-
violent techniques to reduce tensions and settle conflicts.
 
3. The independence of the judiciary needs to be ensured. A judicial commission consisting of Kosovo
Albanian, Serbian and international experts should be established in order to evaluate the work of
courts in Kosovo and formulate recommendations.
 
4. The independence of public and private media should be guaranteed. Frequencies should be
granted to independent radio and TV stations in Kosovo.
 
5. The office of an ombudsperson should be established in order to improve the legal and political
means to cope with problems of human rights. The ombudsperson should be acceptable for both
sides. She/he would have full access to information and the right to present cases directly to the
relevant political bodies. He/She should consider alleged or apparent violations of human rights and
discriminations on ethnic or other grounds. All persons should have the right to submit applications
concerning alleged violations of human rights to the ombudsperson.
 
6. International support of economic development should be considered because it is in the interest of
the international community to stabilize the present situation. This support could take place in
particular in the context of the Regional Approach of the European Union. Support should also be
given in the framework of special programs of the World Bank and the European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development.
 
7. A free-trade zone with the neighbouring countries should be created. Visa regulations should be
liberalized. Increasing cross-border trade and economic co-operation could enhance the importance
of economic motives and interests and it could make borders more transparent.
 
8. The European Union should give technical assistance to programs aiming at an improvement of the
co-operation between ethnic communities.
 
9. The international community should support the social and economic re-integration of those Kosovo
Albanian refugees [who] have been repatriated.
 
10. The Governments of Serbia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia are recommended to agree
with the European Union and the United Nations on the opening of offices in Kosovo. Furthermore,
the Serbian and Yugoslav Governments are encouraged to agree with the Organization for Security
and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) on the presence of a mission of long duration in Kosovo and to
cooperate with the Personal Representative of the OSCE Chairman-in-Office for Kosovo and with
the Office of the High Representative. The OSCE should acknowledge this step by considering it
supportive for the full participation of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the OSCE.”271
As a second step of this mediation initiative the outlining of an interim political framework
for Kosovo for a period agreed upon by Prishtina and Belgrade with the help of experts in
constitutional law was envisaged.
Project on Ethnic Relations
Due to a boycott by the ruling Serbian Socialist Party, a Serb-Albanian Roundtable
»Toward Peaceful Accommodation in Kosovo” set up by the Princeton-based Project on
Ethnic Relations in April 1997272 and backed by the US State Department resulted only in
a short declaration:
»Jointly Agreed Positions:
1. Kosovo constitutes a serious problem that requires an urgent solution. Without international
encouragement and assistance the current lack of confidence between the sides cannot be overcome
or a lasting settlement reached.
2. The problem can only be resolved by mutual accord reached through dialogue that is entered into
with no preconditions or prejudgment of possible outcomes.
3. The agreement must be based on the principles of democratization, mutual respect between the
sides, respect for human rights, both individual and collective, and promotion of regional stability
through respect for Helsinki principles concerning borders. An interim solution requires a democratic
Kosovo and a democratic Serbia.”273
European Action Council for Peace in the Balkans
On 1 November 1997, the Amsterdam-based European Action Council for Peace in the
Balkans and the Public and International Law & Policy Group of the Carnegie Endowment
for International Peace at Washington, D. C., published a report entitled »Kosovo: From
Crisis to a Permanent Solution.” The findings and recommendations presented in this
report are partially based on discussions that took place during a »Forum on Kosovo,”
which these organisations held in Vienna on 18-20 April 1997. At the Forum, a group of
specialists evaluated the various aspects and potential solutions to the Kosovo crisis.
The report includes background information on the situation in Kosovo, an
assessment of various theoretical options for a permanent solution to the Kosovo crisis,
and suggests a process towards a permanent solution. The proposed process includes
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two steps, which are not mutually exclusive but should be pursued simultaneously:
»Confidence-building between the Kosovo Albanians and Serbs” to create a climate of
trust—which could be formalised as an »interim framework”—and »[p]romotion of a
dialogue and negotiations between the parties.”274 The report also contained the following
recommendations:
»• The international community should initiate and actively promote a process designed to lead to a
permanent solution of the Kosovo problem. The international community can play a vital role in initiating
and facilitating confidence-building measures, a political dialogue, and negotiations; as well as
guaranteeing agreements between the parties.
• The international community should avoid advocating any specific option for the permanent status of
Kosovo and leave it up to the parties to reach agreement. Th  international community should not
burden the process by promoting the option it prefers—enhanced autonomy—since this option is
rejected by both sides. The parties themselves should define the permanent status of Kosovo.
International promotion of any specific option will also hamper the principle of ‘no preconditions’ in
negotiations. Thus, the international community should aim to start the process, not define the final
outcome.
• The international community should demand the immediate and full restoration of the civil and human
rights of the Kosovo Albanians.
• The international community should use existing leverages to encourage progress towards a solution.
An international strategy of sticks and carrots should ensure that the parties reach agreement on a
permanent solution through peaceful means. Existing leverages include the ‘outer wall of sanctions’ and
conditionality concerning the development of friendly relations between the EU and the FRY. The ‘outer
wall of sanctions’ should remain in place until all conditions for its removal—including significant
progress in the resolution of the Kosovo crisis—have been fulfilled. Implementation of the education
agreement should be rewarded with financial support for education in Kosovo.
• The international community should define a common policy and appoint a high-level special envoy. As
divergence of strategies will only weaken international leverage over the parties, the international
community should adopt a comprehensive, united policy regarding the problem. A high-level special
envoy should be appointed to act on behalf of the international community.
• Additional assistance should be made available to support the democratisation process in Serbia, to
strengthen civil society, and to improve the social and economic situation in Kosovo. Although
democratisation and strengthening of civil society will in themselves not solve the Kosovo crisis, they
are the indispensable basis for any sustainable solution. International support—both financial and
political—should be provided to the independent media, the local NGO sector, human rights projects,
alternative political voices, and efforts to enhance communications between different civil groups. To
normalise the social and economic situation in Kosovo, direct international assistance should be given
for education, health care, income-generating activities, and the return of refugees.”275
International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights
The IHF is monitoring compliance with the human rights provision of the Helsinki Final
Act and its follow-up documents. Among its 34 national Helsinki committees are three in
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the FRY, a Kosovo Albanian, a Montenegrin, and a Serbian one. In November 1993, the
IHF published an exhaustive report »From Autonomy to Colonization: Human Rights in
Kosovo 1989-1993” based on eight fact-finding missions.276 The latest of these IHF
missions visited Kosovo in early 1998. Its results were incorporated into an »Urgent
Appeal For Courage, Leadership, and Cooperation” issued on 21 January:
»The situation in Kosovo has reached an unprecedented danger level, which requires urgent,
determined efforts to convince FRY President Slobodan Miloãevi‡ to agree to a process of international
mediation about the future political status of Kosovo.
A delegation of the International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights and its affiliates in Kosovo,
Montenegro, Norway, and Serbia recommend an immediate initiative to convene an international
‘Dayton-like’ conference to resolve the present crisis which threatens to escalate into a bloody military
confrontation.
As an expert observer in Kosovo remarked, ‘Concern is not a policy.’
Our organizations urgently call attention to the following:
- The resolve of Kosovo Albanians to deal non-violently with Serb oppression is reaching the point of
exhaustion. Other ominous indications of possible forthcoming dangerous escalation of violence are
the appearance of the so-called ‘Kosovo Liberation Army’ that has assumed responsibility for at
least 17 killings of Serbian related targets, as well as the massive and peaceful protests of Albanian
students, which have been violently broken up by Serbian police.
 
- The IHF held discussions with numerous observers and leaders, including President of the self-
proclaimed Republic of Kosovo, Dr. Ibrahim Rugova, and other prominent figures, as well as
interviews with local human rights defenders and villagers from the region of Drenica, where a
Serbian police convoy was ambushed in November 1997. The IHF has been given three possible
explanations for acts of armed violence in this region: acts by a coherent organization, referred to in
the media as the ‘Kosovo Liberation Army’; cases of individual armed resistance by desperate
groups, defending their homes and families; and acts perpetrated by Serbian secret police as a
pretext for increased military intervention in Kosovo, in order to tighten their grip on the already
oppressed region. In any event, the level of violence has increased dramatically, and there are
areas, visited by the IHF delegation, which are now avoided by Serb police.
 
- The IHF delegation received numerous reports of preparations by Serbian military and police
forces, including special police exercises in the D[r]enica villages of Kuchiche and Golesh, and in
the vicinity of Peja and Lipjan, as well as the special police training site at Ajvalia, apparently aimed
at intimidating the Albanian population, and in preparation for a large-scale military crack-down.
Increased militarization of Kosovo reportedly includes arming of Serb civilians with additional
weapons. Notorious Serb paramilitary leader ‘Arkan’ has also reportedly been observed in the area,
an indication of possible violence against Albanians.
 
- Organizations of Albanian students plan more non-violent demonstrations, which the IHF
commends as a brave and peaceful approach, but which must not be broken up by violent
intervention of Serbian polices forces.
The IHF recommends that international organizations express their solidarity with the students and their
legitimate demands for release of the premises of the university. The Education Agreement must be
implemented immediately as a first step toward normalization.
Furthermore, international institutions could support confidence-building measures on the level of
civil society, which will facilitate implementation of an international political solution.”277
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The appeal was followed up by an open letter to the new OSCE Chairman-in-Office,
Polish Foreign Minister and former Solidarno¿‡ activist Bronis³aw Geremek, calling for »a
Dayton-like international conference on Kosovo” and signed by the executive director of
the IHF and the chairpersons of the Serbian, Montenegrin, and Kosovo Helsinki
Committees:
»Many in our organization have greeted your term as Chairman-in-Office of the OSCE with hope and
expectation, based on our respect for your wisdom and integrity.
We are writing to convey our serious concerns about the politically very dangerous situation in
Kosovo.
The long lasting status of peaceful and civil resistance of Albanians in Kosovo has ended. The
situation seems to be sliding out of control and heading toward large-scale violence between Albanians
and Serb police units. Every day, there are reports of more violent assaults and increased repression
against Albanians in the form of Serbian reprisal expeditions. In addition, there are also increasing
numbers of armed assaults against Serbian police and other repression-related targets, assumed to be
carried out by the so-called Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA).
Having recently visited regions reportedly under the control of Albanian armed resistance
movements, the IHF believes the policy of passive resistance will come to an end if Serbian repression
and reprisal campaigns do not stop and if the fundamental rights and dignity of the Albanians in Kosovo
are not restored.
No political solution in Kosovo can be reached without an international mediation for negotiation
between Serbs and Albanians and strong outside pressure and assistance. Such an international
mediation should take the form of a Dayton-like international conference on Kosovo
To call for ‘dialogue’ is not enough. Dialogue cannot take place between two manifestly unequal
parties, in a situation in which one party is violently and systematically oppressing the other.
Suggestions about various partitioning scenarios for Kosovo, which would likely lead to ethnic
cleansing and further large scale suffering for Albanians, seem to have become acceptable solutions
from official Serbian viewpoint.
The initiatives of the OSCE, the UN, the Council of Europe, the Contact Group, and individual
states (Germany, France, US) have an acute and strong need for much more clarity and coordination.
As during the Bosnian war, conflicting interests prevent Europe, Russia and the US from making a
decisive and timely contribution to the resolution of the conflict. The main beneficiaries seem to be
President Milosevic and Serbian nationalists.
Strong and concerted pressure must be brought to bear on President Milosevic to agree to a
process of international mediation aimed at ending Serbian oppression in Kosovo and at negotiating a
just and stable future political status for Kosovo. This is why the IHF is calling for a ‘Dayton-like’
conference. A political solution requires a strong, internationally legitimated framework, negotiated on
the basis of international standards.
In fact, under the Dayton process itself, Kosovo ought to be the subject of a Peace
Implementation Council ministerial meeting.
The OSCE, as an inclusive security-framework, ought to be the context in which a plan for action
is developed and given moral priority. The OSCE also provides a platform from which to mobilize
political energy.
We would respectfully suggest that you, as Chairman-in-Office of the OSCE, publicly and
forcefully insist on a new initiative to end what is arguably the worst human rights situation in the entire
region, which threatens to degenerate into large-scale violence.
Of course, we pledge our cooperation should there be any way in which our organizations might
be of assistance.
                                                                                                                                                      
the former British foreign service member Jonathan Clark, which »resembles Belgrade propaganda and is a grave injustice
to Kosovo Albanians who have shown remarkable restraint during years of severe repression.” See Aaron Rhodes, »On
Kosovo,” International Herald Tribune, 14 January 1998, p. 9. Clarke had depicted the US, French and German initiatives
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Sonja Biserko, Chair, Serbian Helsinki Committee
Gazmend Pula, Chair, Kosova Helsinki Committee
Slobodan Franovi‡, Chair, Montenegrin Helsinki Committee
Aaron Rhodes, Executive Director, International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights”278
The Serbian Helsinki Committee was also instrumental in bringing about a meeting of
Serbian and Kosovo Albanian intellectuals in Ulcinj (Ulqin) on the Montenegrin coast on
23-25 June 1997, the written results of which were presented at a follow-up meeting in
Prishtina on 20 February 1998.279 The Prishtina meeting issued the following »appeal to
the authorities and to the public”:
»On 20 February in Pristina the promotion of the book Albanian-Serbian Dialogue was held, as a follow-
up of the Albanian-Serbian dialogue, convened in Ulcinj in June 1997 by the Council for Human Rights
and Freedoms in Pristina, the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia and the Belgrade Circle.
This was an opportunity for the exchange of opinions on the current situation in Kosovo. It was
pointed out that the dangerous aggravation of the situation threatens to get out of control with
inconceivable consequences for the stability of the region and even of the Balkans.
The participants were unanimous in opting for a peaceful solution. Therefore, it was emphasized
that the authorities should immediately stop all forms of repression in Kosovo, and that all kinds of
violence should be given up. The use of force does not lead to a solution of the problem.
A dialogue between representatives of the current authorities in Serbia and legitimate
representatives of the Albanians in Kosovo is the only way to reach any solution of the Kosovo issue.
The participants of the meeting in Pristina appeal to all relevant factors to start a dialogue as soon as
possible, with no preconditions, in order to reach a political solution, acceptable to both sides.
At the same time, the participants call upon the international community to become more involved
in the finding of a solution for the Kosovo problem. This includes the convening of an international
conference on Kosovo.
The participants agreed to continue regular dialogue.
Pajazit Nushi, Council for the Defense of Human Rights and Freedoms in Prishtina
Sonja Biserko, Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia
Obrad Savi‡, Belgrade Circle
Pristina, 20 February 1998”280
On 2 March 1998, after the initial wave of police violence against the Drenica region IHF
as one of the first international NGOs issued an appeal »Serb Police Terror Must End;
US and EU Must Mediate.”281
Human Rights Watch
Since 1992, the New York-based US-American NGO Human Rights Watch (formerly
Helsinki Watch) is closely monitoring the human rights situation in Kosovo.282 A report
»Open Wounds. Human Rights Abuses in Kosovo” written by Julie Mertus and published
in March 1993, contained a detailed set of recommendations to Belgrade. In particular,
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police violence and abuse in detention was demanded to be stopped immediately as well
as freedom of association, speech and the press to be granted to the Kosovo Albanians.
In addition, the right to monitor for local and international human rights monitors and
international monitoring missions was asked for.283 To the international community
Human Rights Watch recommended:
»Human Rights Watch/Helsinki calls on the United Nations and the CSCE to take immediate steps to
re-establish a long-term human rights monitoring mission throughout the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia, including Kosovo. The United States and all other nations concerned about protecting
human rights should, visibly and vocally, support such efforts. Moreover, as a first step, the U. N. and
all nations of the world should demand that Serbia abide by international human rights standards in
Kosovo. If Serbia does not comply, the U. N. should immediately explore all options for a peaceful
solution in Kosovo, one that stems the tide of violence without sacrificing the human rights of any ethnic
or political group.”284
Under the headline »Human Rights Watch Condemns Violence by Security Forces in
Kosovo, Calls on International Community to Investigate”, the organisation issued a press
release on the Drenica massacre. It »urges the international community to undertake an
immediate investigation into the Drenica events. In addition, Kosovo should be a primary
focus of the newly-appointed Special Representative of the OSCE to the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia, Felipe Gonzales.”285
Campaign for a Non-Violent Solution of the Problem of Kosov@
Initiated in 1992 by the social scientist Alberto L’Abate of the University of Florence, this
movement combines Italian NGOs of Christian orientation, war resisters, and
organisations dealing with minority issues. CSNK has organised study missions to
Kosovo, held a conference in 1994, and opened a »Peace Embassy” in Kosovo which
was in operation for several months during 1995. In 1997, CSNK proposed the
establishment of a »European Civilian Peace Corps” in Kosovo. Its tasks were described
as follows:
»1) monitor the respect of human rights both by Serbs and by Albanians;
2) encourage occasions for dialogue and open confrontation between parties in conflict in order to seek
for just, nonviolent solutions, not only at the top level, but also at the base; and to monitor the
implementation of mutually agreed solutions;
3) help the recovery of economical, social, cultural life in this area, encouraging and enabling all
Albanians to go back to their jobs from which they had been dismissed;
4) help the return to Kosovo of all the young men who emigrated in order not to perform military service
– helping them to obtain the right to be exempted from military service -; help the return of people or
families who emigrated because they felt threatened or because they did not have an adequate income;
5) help to organize elections to allow the population of the area to express their will in relations to the
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future of this region.”286
Other projects of CSNK are the establishment of a »European Cultural Center” in
Prishtina287 and an international seminar of NGOs and grassroot associations dealing with
Kosovo held on 8 March 1998 in Bolzano. The meeting directed the following final
document to the international community and the media:
»WE, Non Governmental Organizations and grassroot Associations, committed for many years to a
peaceful and non-violent solution of the Kosovo issue, gathered in Bozen/Bolzano to examine the
situation in Kosovo, very shocked by the recent violent acts causing deaths, injuries and arrests of
defenceless citizens, that exacerbate the tension and provoke a real threat to regional peace
WANT TO STRESS THAT
1. It is not possible to justify the Serbian police and army attacks that have been taking place since the
28th of February in the Drenica area as anti-terrorism operations. The shelling of private houses, the
killing of civilians, including a pregnant woman and people from 16 to 70 years old, the mutilation of
corpses are patent violations of Human Rights.
2. The foreseeable effect of this operation is not the elimination of the so-called Kosovo Liberation
Army (UCK), but the strengthening of the popular sympathy among the Kosovo Albanians of an
armed and violent struggle. The 10 years long non-violent policy has up to now prevented the
spreading of war to the Kosovo region. The lack of improvements of the situation and the recent
attacks may seriously damage this non-violent option.
3. Still, there are forces that can continue the non-violent policy, but their task is impossible without a
radical change in the practical attitude, support and effective help from the international community.
4. The (violently repressed) peaceful protests organized by the Independent Students’ Union of the
University of Prishtina (SIUUP) were a clear example of a non-violent movement to achieve their
return into the educational premises. This goal is in fact the same envisaged by the Milosevic-
Rugova Education agreement, of which many governments and international organisations have
asked the implementation over the last 18 months.
5. It is very important that the elections in Kosovo (of the Parliament and the Presidency of the self-
styled Kosova Republic) scheduled for the 22nd March take place in a peaceful way. In this critical
moment where the UCK is getting more and more visibility, it is very important to leave a space for
expression to the Albanian people for a democratic alternative.
THE KOSOVO ISSUE IS AN INTERNATIONAL ISSUE THAT RISKS TO ESCALATE TO A NEW WAR
IN THE BALKANS: THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY SHOULD TAKE THE FOLLOWING STEPS:
Put the strongest pressure on the FRY (Serbia and Montenegro) government to stop immediately the
military operations and police repression in Kosovo, also by reimposing sanctions.
Demand in the strongest terms the withdrawal of police and military forces recently deployed in Kosovo,
and the demobilization of paramilitary organizations, civilians and refugees. In the meantime Kosovo
Albanian parties should call for an immediate end to any act of UCK. The perspective should be of a
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demilitarized Kosovo.
Organize the access of international humanitarian Organizations to the whole territory of Kosovo without
any restraint, especially in the areas where urgent medical aid is needed.
Establish immediately an ad-hoc U. N. commission to find out the truth around the Drenica massacres,
and get the Hague Tribunal to prosecute all war crimes committed in the space of former Yugoslavia.
Ensure international presence (members of democratic governments of the world, ambassadors,
Members of Parliaments, international Organizations, civic associations and political parties,
international media) at the scheduled Friday the 13th March Students manifestations and at the Sunday
22nd of March elections.
Urge the return of OSCE monitors, expelled in 1993, and restore their presence all over Kosovo
territory.
Implement a consistent International presence in Kosovo, through the settlement of the scheduled EU
office in Prishtina, and of other Governmental and Non-Governmental Organizations in Kosovo.
Choose an international High Representative to deal with the Kosovo issue, with a strong mandate to
mediate for confidence building measures to be implemented: normalization in the educational, health,
judiciary, media, public administration fields.
ORGANIZE AN INTERNATIONAL GOVERNMENTAL CONFERENCE TO SETTLE BALKAN
REGIONAL PROBLEMS STATING COMMON SHARED PRINCIPLES AND APPLYING THEM
COHERENTLY.
Society for Threatened Peoples (South Tyrol, Italy)
Campaign for a non-violent solution in Kosovo (Italy)
Bertelsmann Foundation, Germany
Helsinki Citizen’ Assembly
Movement for a Non-violent Alternative – MAN (France)
Pax Christi International
Peaceworkers (USA)
Friend of the Balkans and Kosovo, Belgium
Bozen/Bolzano, the 8th of March 1998”288
International Crisis Group
ICG is a private, multinational organisation focusing conflict prevention based in Brussels
and maintaining a network of field correspondent in Kosovo. It is chaired by the former
US Senate majority leader and chairman of the Stormont negotiations on Northern
Ireland, George Mitchell. At a press briefing on 17 February 1998, ICG presented the
findings of a study on conflict in Kosovo undertaken by Anna Husarska289, nd on 24
March a report »Kosovo Spring” was released. It contained the following
»Recommendations by the International Crisis Group, 24 March 1998
Major pressure will have to be applied to Serbia if Belgrade is to act to end human rights violations in
Kosovo and accept international involvement in solving the Kosovo problem. The possibilities of
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exercising such pressure through international bodies—be they political (such as OSCE, High
Commissioner for [ecte: on] National Minorities, UN Subcommission on Human Rights) or financial
(such as the World Bank or IMF)—is limited because the ‘outer wall of sanctions’ excludes FRY from all
these organisations. The status of FRY at the UN is a so-called ‘empty seat solution’ even though UN
humanitarian agencies (UNHCR, UNICEF) are operating in FRY. As of this writing the Contact Group is
the main forum where the Kosovo problem is being dealt with, while NATO is refusing to take the lead.
ICG proposes the following recommendations:
SHORT TERM MEASURES
Military strategy
NATO’s involvement in helping to contain and, ultimately, defuse the crisis in Kosovo is essential. The
current situation poses a serious threat to peace in South Eastern Europe and the NATO Alliance is the
capable of heading off such a threat. Therefore, ICG calls for an urgent meeting of the NATO Ministers
of Defence and Foreign Affairs to agree on a strategy concerning Kosovo, thereby sending a clear
signal to President Milosevic that NATO is willing and ready to intervene should he continue using
violence in Kosovo. Following this meeting, a senior NATO representative should visit Belgrade to
convey to President Milosevic NATO’s position. Furthermore, the mission of the UN Preventive
Deployment Force (UNPREDEP) in Macedonia should be extended and the number of troops increased
and strengthened with NATO forces. Consideration should also be given to deployment of an
international force in Albania close to the borders with Kosovo. These last two steps would help prevent
the conflict in Kosovo from spreading and would facilitate rapid and effective action should an
intervention become necessary. The possibility of holding military exercises in Macedonia or in
Albania—which is a ‘Partnership for Peace’ member—should also be considered. To make matters
perfectly clear to the Belgrade regime the ‘Christmas Warning’ (in December 1992 then president
George Bush warned Milosevic in a cable that in the event of conflict in Kosovo, the US would be
prepared to employ military force against the Serbs) should be restated multilaterally through NATO if
possible, unilaterally by the Clinton administration if necessary.
Sanctions and other punitive measures
Only the credible threat and, if necessary, the imposition of effective sanctions or other measures will
persuade both parties to engage in meaningful and unconditional negotiations on the future status of
Kosovo. If such an approach is to be effective, however, the international community must agree on a
common policy concerning which sanctions are appropriate and under what conditions they will be
enforced. The initial emphasis should be on forcing the Belgrade leadership to agree to genuine
negotiations without pre-conditions. Among the measures that should be considered are the freezing of
all overseas assets of the government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) and its individual
leaders; visa restrictions to prevent the FRY leadership from travelling beyond Yugoslavia; tougher
trade sanctions; and the suspension of air links to and out of Belgrade. Given the more conciliatory
approach adopted by the Montenegrin government, thought should be given to ways to soften the
effects of such measures on Montenegro and its leadership. Steps may also need to be taken to exert
pressure on the Kosovo Albanian leadership if it continues to rule out a compromise solution and refuse
to enter into negotiations.
Mediation of immediate issues
Given the diametrically opposed political objectives of the parties, the intervention of a neutral, high-
level envoy is essential to initiate a genuine process of dialogue and negotiations. The appointment of
former Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez as the Personal Representative of the OSCE Chairman-in-
Office and the European Union Representative in the mediation effort is a welcome development,
pending his acceptance as mediator by the two sides. To coordinate the political efforts of the
international community, Mr Gonzalez should also work in close cooperation with the US government
and, if appointed, a US special envoy.
International Presence
The presence of international personnel on the ground—including diplomats, journalists, and human
rights monitors—can play an important role in deterring acts of violence. Governments, the United
Nations, the European Commission, other international organisations, and international NGOs should
increase as far as possible the number of international observers based in Kosovo. NATO observer
force should be introduced throughout Kosovo, initially comprised of Belgrade-based NATO member
embassy attaches and diplomats. They would not only send a clear signal and help deter acts of
violence, they could also assess the compliance-level by Belgrade and Pristina of any conditions or
moratoriums.
ACCOMPANYING MEASURES
Negotiations
The collapse of the Rome agreement on education had a profoundly negative effect on the prospects
for a solution in Kosovo. It undermined confidence in the very idea of negotiation, with both sides
accusing each other of not being a worthy partner. There are now efforts to revive the Rome agreement
and the prospects of its implementation may be better because of the effect of the wave of protest and
the world’s attention being concentrated on Kosovo. If the education agreement remains
unimplemented, it will be difficult to rebuild trust in the negotiating process but it can be done.
Once the immediate mediation aimed at stopping the violence is successfully completed, secret
negotiations about the status of Kosovo should be encouraged, with no media attention, no
intermediaries that would like to use the event for their own promotion. This would have to be
something along the lines of the Oslo Peace Process. For the participants such a modus operandi
would reduce the risk of being blamed in the event that the negotiations fail, and make it easier to
present and sell concessions as part of a broader package. A non-governmental organisation or a very
neutral government should prepare the logistics and some minimal procedural matters.
Increase Contacts
All kinds of contacts between the two ethnic communities should be encouraged. Diplomats should
practice parallel diplomacy by inviting Albanians and Serbs together to events, and strengthen their
Kosovo desks by bringing in people with the knowledge of Albanian. (The USIS office in Pristina and
the political desk of the British Embassy are seen by the Kosovars as the best informed diplomatic
mission). Non-government organisations and UN agencies should continue to explore every avenue
that can bring people of the two communities together.
Support for Education and Health Service
The parallel systems of education and health service set up by Kosovo Albanians are clearly not
satisfactory. The Kosovars are making the best out of adverse circumstances and their effort is
admirable. All of the dozen non-governmental organisations operating from Pristina and dealing with
health, nutrition, education and construction direct their efforts and funds to supporting services that
benefit mainly the Kosovo Albanians. Given the demographics and the discrimination practised by the
Serbian regime, this is the right policy and should be continued.
Direct financial assistance to the parallel Kosovo education and health systems would, however,
contribute to further isolating the two communities and would reinforce the Kosovars’ belief that their
parallel system is sustainable, which it is not. Instead, the international community should use the
instrument of aid conditionality—the attachment of tough conditions to the granting of financial
assistance—to create links between the two systems and benefit both. For example, funding could be
used to renovate schools and health institutions on the condition that they are used by both
communities.
Civil society
A Kosovar journalist likes to say that Kosovo is a non-governmental organisation itself, but it remains in
great need to build its NGOs and its own civil society. The women’s groups are strong, but other types
of NGOs need strengthening. The international community should increase its support for projects in
education, public health, community building, independent media, culture, and civil society building.
This would have a positive impact on the quality of life of both the Albanian and Serbian populations of
Kosovo. The projects themselves could have an important confidence-building effect. Such assistance
would also be a decisive gesture of support for the non-violent path by demonstrating that social
progress and opportunity can result form civil, rather than military, effort.
Media
The group of journalists around the independent Pristina daily Koh  Ditore offers the most balanced
source of information for the Albanian-speaking population of Kosovo. They should be supported in
their efforts to obtain a license and create their own television and/or radio station. It is necessary to
have the most influential media in the most professional hands. Koha Ditore recently started a joint
project with the independent Belgrade radio B92 and with the independent wire service Beta, also from
Belgrade. This is an example of a possible collaboration between media from Belgrade and from
Pristina. More such projects should be encouraged through media-oriented NGOs.
There is a surprisingly high number of satellite dishes in Kosovo, so the audience for any satellite
broadcast would be significant. To offer Kosovars world news broadcast in their language may bring
them a reality check and help the realise that they need to take their fate into their own hands and come
up with more realistic demands and expectations. A major international news provider, such as for
example CNN, could be asked to donate the right to rebroadcast news programmes on the satellite link
used by Tirana TV. (Some East European countries have a CNN-translated news service and it is
always a popular broadcast).
Students
Positioned between the two more extreme political alternatives (the passivity of the LDK or the violence
of the UCK), the Kosovar students’ movement may provide the best basis on which to build an
effective, moderate opposition capable of putting forward a credible and peaceful plan of action.
Kosovo students should be encouraged to increase their contacts and take advice from students in
Eastern Europe more than in the West. The modus operandi, the concrete actions undertaken by young
people under totalitarian regimes are more likely to provide useful examples for the Kosovars that the
more distant experiences of students in Western societies. They should also be encouraged to get in
touch and collaborate with students from Belgrade. The Union of Students desperately needs help with
public relations; even as the wave of protests swept through Kosovo, they failed to take the lead the
way their peers did in 1968 in Paris.”290
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CONCLUSION
From 1992 to early 1998, the message from the international community to the conflict
parties in Belgrade and Prishtina has been unequivocal: no violence and no unilateral
change of international borders, but also no prolongation of the tense sta us quo. Instead,
internal self-determination for the Albanians and the preservation of the territorial integrity
of the FRY were suggested. Neither part of this message provided common ground to the
parties in a conflict so asymmetric as the Kosovo one. On both sides there were and still
are actors prone to using violence to achieve their political aims or to stay in control; a
majority of the Kosovo Albanians is undoubtedly in favour of independence and thus of
creating a new international border between Kosovo and the FRY; and a majority of
Serbs favours the status quo in Kosovo.
Undoubtedly the most flexible positions adopted by Serbs and Kosovo Albanians on
the Kosovo issue are a return to the 1974 autonomy on the one hand and a re-
federalisation of the FRY on the other. At first glance, the gap between these two
positions appears bridgeable. Yet a second glance reveals that the frameworks of
reference of the sides in the conflict are fundamentally different: autonomy refers to the
Republic of Serbia--an autonomous Kosovo would hierarchically still be subordinated to
the republican government. Re-federalisation refers to the FRY--a Republic of Kosovo
within a federation would be hierarchically on the same level as the Republics of Serbia
and Montenegro (and probably of Vojvodina and Sandþak). To be put on an equal footing
with Prishtina is unacceptable to Belgrade; and to remain under the domination of
Belgrade is unacceptable to Prishtina. The same goes, of course, for the other
programmes of independence, partition, regionalisation, and ethnic cleansing: they are
absolutely unacceptable to one of the two sides. Thus, for the core question of a future
status of Kosovo, no solution is in sight. Up to the Drenica massacre, moderate forces in
Belgrade and Prishtina as well as international organisations and NGOs had opted for
separating status issues from immediate measures in order to improve the volatile status
quo and for medium-term provisional arrangements. Realising that a lasting compromise
solution on the status issue will be reached only—if at all—at the end of a long process of
dialogue and rapprochement, they concentrated on the short-term perspective of
improving the tense situation in the province in order to prevent further escalation and the
outbreak of violent conflict on a mass scale.
The Drenica massacre and the excessive use of force by the police against
demonstrators have shown that Miloãevi‡ is designing his Kosovo policy solely for the
purpose of his preserving personal power—without taking into account negative reactions
of the international community. Having been severely criticised for months in a row by
Serbian nationalists for being too weak on Kosovo and having been granted concessions
by the US of considerable symbolic value on 23 February, he considered the time to be
ripe to ram it home to the Albanians who is the real master of Kosovo. The effect was as
intended: the Serbian public, including most of the »democratic” opposition, applauded;
the Albanians were terrified; and the international community once again was »deeply
concerned”—though nothing more. The fatal message of »the West” was that Kosovo is
no longer an internal affair of Serbia but a personal affair of Miloãevi‡’s. He is the key to
the Kosovo problem.
The international community’s stereotypical repetition of the view that any solution to
the Kosovo problem is thinkable only within the borders of the FRY--even of Serbia—was
(and still is) an indirect support for Miloãevi‡’s interpretation of the conflict as an »internal
affair.” Moreover, by excluding a priori the option of independence for Kosovo and by
following Miloãevi‡ in labelling violent Albanian resistance to Belgrade’s policy of
oppression explicitly as »terrorism,” the West—primarily the US and the Contact Group--
legitimised Serbian police brutality and thus paved the way to Drenica.291 To sum up: The
international community proved to be unable to develop a promising strategy of
preventing the Kosovo conflict from escalating. To make things worse, it naively, yet
unintentionally contributed to such an escalation by prejudicing the outcome of Kosovo
Albanian-Serbian negotiations on the future status of Kosovo and by a rash
condemnation of Albanian counter-violence to Belgrade’s state terrorism-like oppression.
To take out the steam of the Kosovo conflict by a carefully orchestrated carrot-and-
stick policy towards Belgrade on behalf of the international community, resulting in a joint
Serbian-Kosovo Albanian search for an interim solution and paralleled by a
democratisation of the FRY, is the recipe for defusing the Kosovo time bomb. Despite
many negative developments recently, it still is an encouraging sign that for a significant
part of the Kosovo Albanian elite—including representatives of the older »Tito generation”
and of the younger generation which got its education during the years of autonomy
1974-1989—the idea to remain in a common, yet democratised, re-federalised and
preferably re-christened, state with Serbs, Montenegrins, Hungarians, Sandþakli, Roma
et al. is not rejected offhand. It would be an irony of history if in this way the 19th century
political non-starter of the Balkans--the concept of a multiethnic Balkan federation--re-
emerged. However, such a diminishing of the fascination with the nation-state and the
rise of the idea of supra-national integration is only one of the possible answers to the
»Albanian Question.” The other one is the example of the Serbian, Croat, and Bosnian
neighbours: nationalist agitation, civil war, ethnic cleansing, and inter-state war. For
Kosovo, the spring of 1998 might indeed acquire the same function as the spring of 1992
did for Bosnia-Herzegovina--»the Rubicon may have been crossed.”292
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CPC Conflict Prevention Center
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NGO Non-Governmental Organisation
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